Palin v. The New York Times Company
933 F.3d 160 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
A district court cannot rely on evidence adduced at an evidentiary hearing to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. A public figure's defamation complaint plausibly alleges actual malice by pleading facts that allow a reasonable inference that the publisher acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, even if an alternative, innocent explanation is also plausible.
Facts:
- In early 2011, Sarah Palin's political action committee, SarahPAC, circulated a map that placed crosshairs over certain Democratic congressional districts, including that of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords.
- On January 8, 2011, Jared Loughner shot Rep. Giffords and others in Tucson, Arizona.
- Despite initial media speculation, investigations revealed no link between the SarahPAC map and Loughner's attack; in fact, Loughner's animosity toward Giffords predated the map's publication.
- On June 14, 2017, following a shooting at a congressional baseball practice, The New York Times published an editorial titled "America's Lethal Politics," written by editorial page editor James Bennet.
- The editorial asserted that a "link to political incitement was clear" between the SarahPAC map and the 2011 Giffords shooting.
- Following immediate public backlash, The New York Times removed the challenged language within a day and issued a correction stating that "no such link was established."
Procedural Posture:
- Sarah Palin sued The New York Times for defamation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (a federal trial court).
- The New York Times filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, during which the editorial's author, James Bennet, testified.
- Relying on Bennet's testimony, the district court granted the motion and dismissed Palin's complaint with prejudice.
- Palin filed a motion for reconsideration that included a Proposed Amended Complaint, which the district court denied.
- Palin (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where The New York Times was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a public figure's defamation complaint plausibly allege the element of actual malice when it provides facts suggesting the publisher had access to information contradicting the defamatory statement and had potential motives for bias against the plaintiff?
Opinions:
Majority - John M. Walker, Jr.
Yes. A public figure's defamation complaint plausibly alleges actual malice when it contains sufficient factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that the publisher acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. First, the district court committed a procedural error by holding an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and relying on the testimony of the editorial's author, James Bennet, to dismiss the complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), a court considering matters outside the pleadings must either exclude them or convert the motion to one for summary judgment, neither of which occurred here. Second, reviewing Palin's Proposed Amended Complaint de novo, the court found it plausibly alleged actual malice. The complaint alleged Bennet had been editor-in-chief of The Atlantic when it published articles debunking the very link he asserted, creating a plausible inference he knew the statement was false. Further allegations of political and personal bias, combined with the editorial's inclusion of a hyperlink to an article that contradicted its own central claim, were sufficient to plausibly suggest reckless disregard for the truth. At the pleading stage, a complaint need only state a plausible claim, not a claim that is more plausible than the defendant's alternative explanation.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict procedural separation between a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which is confined to the pleadings, and a motion for summary judgment, which can consider extrinsic evidence. It prohibits district courts from using 'plausibility hearings' to make credibility determinations and prematurely terminate a case. Substantively, the ruling provides a clear example of what factual allegations—such as a publisher's prior access to contradictory information and potential personal bias—are sufficient to meet the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard for pleading actual malice, thereby allowing a high-profile defamation claim to proceed to discovery.
