Palin v. New York Times Co.
264 F. Supp. 3d 527 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
For a public figure to state a plausible claim for defamation, the complaint must allege particularized facts showing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published a defamatory falsehood with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Allegations of political hostility, failure to investigate, or negligence are insufficient to meet this standard, which must be attributable to a specific individual responsible for the publication.
Facts:
- Prior to 2011, Sarah Palin's political action committee, SarahPAC, circulated a map that placed stylized crosshairs over the geographic locations of several targeted congressional districts, including that of Representative Gabrielle Giffords.
- In January 2011, Jared Lee Loughner shot nineteen people at a political event, severely wounding Representative Giffords. Subsequent news reports, including in The New York Times, concluded that no link had been established between the SarahPAC map and Loughner's attack.
- On June 14, 2017, James Hodgkinson opened fire on members of Congress during a baseball practice.
- That same day, The New York Times published an editorial titled 'America’s Lethal Politics,' written primarily by editorial page editor James Bennet.
- The editorial stated that in the 2011 Giffords shooting, 'the link to political incitement was clear' and referenced Sarah Palin's committee circulating the map with 'stylized cross hairs.'
- The online version of the editorial contained a hyperlink to an ABC News article that explicitly stated, 'No connection has been made between [the SarahPAC Map] and the Arizona shooting.'
- Within hours of publication, The New York Times received reader complaints about the inaccuracy.
- By the next morning, The New York Times had issued two corrections, both online and in print, and revised the editorial to remove the inaccurate language and state that 'no such link was established' between political rhetoric and the Giffords shooting.
Procedural Posture:
- Sarah Palin filed a one-count complaint for defamation against The New York Times Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The New York Times filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- The court, finding the complaint deficient on its face, convened a brief evidentiary hearing to ascertain background facts to properly assess the plausibility of the complaint's allegations.
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Issue:
Does a public figure's defamation complaint plausibly state a claim of 'actual malice' where it alleges that a newspaper published a false statement but fails to provide sufficient factual allegations that a specific individual responsible for the publication knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Rakoff
No. The complaint fails to plausibly state a claim of actual malice. For a public figure to sustain a defamation claim, she must allege facts sufficient to show that the publisher acted with knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or with reckless disregard of its falsity. Here, the facts suggest negligence, not malice. First, the complaint fails to attribute the requisite state of mind to a specific individual, instead improperly alleging a collective knowledge by 'the Times.' Even focusing on the editor, James Bennet, the allegations fall short. Political opposition or a motive to increase readership does not constitute actual malice. Furthermore, a failure to investigate or check sources, including the hyperlinked article that contradicted the editorial's assertion, amounts to negligence at most, not the reckless disregard required by New York Times v. Sullivan. The prompt and thorough correction of the error is 'much more plausibly consistent with making an unintended mistake and then correcting it than with acting with actual malice.' Because the complaint, even supplemented by facts from an evidentiary hearing, cannot support a plausible inference of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, it must be dismissed.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the formidable 'actual malice' standard that public figures must meet to succeed in a defamation claim, particularly at the pleading stage. It demonstrates how courts act as gatekeepers post-Twombly and Iqbal, dismissing claims that do not present specific, plausible factual allegations of a defendant's culpable state of mind. The opinion underscores that journalistic failures like negligence, carelessness, or failure to investigate are legally distinct from the constitutional standard of reckless disregard for the truth. The court's use of a pre-discovery evidentiary hearing to assess plausibility also highlights a procedural tool courts can use to protect First Amendment values from the chilling effect of expensive but meritless litigation.
