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Pakos v. Clark

Oregon Supreme Court
453 P.2d 682, 253 Or. 113, 1969 Ore. LEXIS 435 (1969)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

For conduct to be actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress, it must be so extreme and outrageous in character as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.


Facts:

  • George Pakos and his wife had a history of disputes with their neighbors and had previously been committed to a state hospital for eleven months in 1960.
  • After their release and restoration of competency, the Pakoses sued their neighbors for damages related to the commitment.
  • On April 20, 1964, Deputy Danielson investigated a report that Pakos had stolen petunias from a store, which Pakos denied; no charges were filed.
  • On April 24, 1964, Pakos went to the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office with his two young children to inquire whether a warrant had been issued for his arrest.
  • During an approximately three-hour period at the office, Pakos claimed that Deputy Johnson called him 'crazy as a bedbug,' threatened to have him recommitted to an asylum, and threatened to take his children away.
  • Pakos also alleged that Deputy Rocks questioned him about his wife's fidelity while puffing out his cheeks and bulging his eyes at him.
  • At the conclusion of the events at the courthouse, Deputies Johnson and Danielson signed papers initiating a mental health proceeding against Pakos.
  • Johnson and Danielson then served Pakos with a warrant for the proceeding and transported him to a hospital for a sanity hearing.

Procedural Posture:

  • George Pakos (plaintiff) sued the Sheriff of Multnomah County and five deputies (defendants) in a state trial court for damages arising from alleged mental suffering.
  • The case proceeded to trial.
  • At the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendants moved for an order of involuntary nonsuit.
  • The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case against all defendants.
  • Pakos (appellant) appealed the trial court's order of involuntary nonsuit to the Supreme Court of Oregon.

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Issue:

Does the conduct of sheriff's deputies—including accusing an individual of a crime, threatening him with incarceration and the loss of his children, making gestures and statements suggesting he is of unsound mind, and causing delays—constitute 'extreme and outrageous conduct' sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?


Opinions:

Majority - Hammond, J.

No. The conduct of the sheriff's deputies, while potentially annoying, insulting, or unbecoming of peace officers, does not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' required to be actionable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court formally adopted the standard from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, which requires conduct that is 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' The court reasoned that liability does not extend to 'mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.' While the deputies' status as police officers is a relevant factor, their actions in this context—dealing with an agitated individual who voluntarily remained at the office for hours—did not meet this high threshold. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he suffered the 'severe' emotional distress required for recovery, describing his state as merely 'frustrated' and 'nervous' in response to the deputies' actions.



Analysis:

This case is significant for formally adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in Oregon. It establishes an extremely high threshold for such claims, requiring conduct that is not merely malicious or insulting but truly atrocious. The decision also solidifies the trial court's gatekeeping role, empowering it to dismiss IIED claims as a matter of law if the alleged conduct cannot reasonably be considered 'extreme and outrageous.' This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed on IIED claims based on verbal abuse or intimidating behavior alone, thereby protecting defendants from liability for what the court deems the 'rough edges of our society.'

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