Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co.
278 N.W.2d 898, 89 Wis. 2d 703, 1979 Wisc. LEXIS 2052 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
An intentional tort exclusion in a homeowners' insurance policy, which precludes coverage for bodily injury "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured," applies when the insured intends the act and intends to cause some bodily injury, even if the resulting harm is different in character or magnitude than specifically intended, and such intent can be inferred from the nature of the act and the reasonable foreseeability of harm.
Facts:
- Gary Pachucki was employed as a printer at Steins Garden Center of Milwaukee.
- On September 10, 1972, co-employees Dale Boeschke, Bernard Halas, and Anthony Anderson entered the room where Pachucki was working and started a "greening pin war."
- During the "greening pin war," a greening pin, a flying metal object similar in size and weight to a bobby pin, struck Gary Pachucki in his right eye, causing an injury to his cornea.
- Dale Boeschke stated he intended to strike Pachucki's body with the rubber band-propelled greening pin, but not his eye, acknowledging that greening pins were difficult to control and could hit someone in the eye.
- Boeschke personally knew the danger of greening pins, having bled on one occasion after being struck by one himself.
- Bernard Halas testified he was aiming in Pachucki's general direction but not at a particular body part, realizing that a flying greening pin could strike anywhere on a person's body, including the face.
- During the 3-5 minute "game of war," Pachucki and the defendants fired approximately 30 greening pins, with only one other pin striking Pachucki in the leg.
- Boeschke was standing about 6 feet away from Pachucki when he fired the pin that struck Pachucki in the eye.
Procedural Posture:
- Gary Pachucki commenced an action in state trial court seeking damages for personal injuries against his co-employees and their parents' homeowners insurance providers, Republic Insurance Co. and Underwriters Insurance Company.
- Republic and Underwriters subsequently amended their answers to allege defenses in coverage based on 'business pursuit' and 'intentional tort' policy exclusions.
- Republic and Underwriters moved for summary judgment of dismissal based on these policy exclusions.
- The trial court denied the motions for summary judgment but granted the insurers' requests for a bifurcated trial solely on the issue of policy coverage.
- After the bifurcated trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of Republic and Underwriters, dismissing Pachucki’s complaint and cross-complaints against them, finding that the "shooting of the greening pins was an intentional act of the kind and character exempted from coverage."
- Gary Pachucki appealed the interlocutory judgments entered in favor of the defendant-respondents Underwriters and Republic to the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Does a homeowners' insurance policy exclusion for bodily injury "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured" require proof that the insured specifically intended the exact type or magnitude of the resulting injury to deny coverage?
Opinions:
Majority - COFFEY, J.
No, the policy exclusion does not require proof of a specific intent to cause the exact resulting injury; rather, it applies if the insured intended the act and intended to cause some bodily injury, which can be inferred from the nature of the act and its foreseeable harm. Justice Coffey, writing for the majority, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court addressed the appellant's contention that the intentional tort exclusion was ambiguous, finding that a reasonable person would interpret the policy language as specifically applying only to injuries intentionally caused, consistent with Garriguenc v. Love. The court adopted the 'majority view' concerning intentional tort exclusions, stating that it is necessary that the insured intend both the act and to cause some kind of bodily injury, that intent may be actual or inferred by the nature of the act and the accompanying reasonable foreseeability of harm, and that once intent to harm is found, it is immaterial that the actual harm caused is of a different character or magnitude than that intended. The court distinguished Peterson v. Western Cos. & Surety Co. and Falk v. Whitewater, which required an intent to inflict harm in addition to an intentional act, but noted these cases did not directly address the 'expected or intended' language. Relying on Prosser, the court emphasized that intent extends not only to desired consequences but also to those 'substantially certain to follow.' The court found the trial court's inference of intent to inflict injury was not against the clear preponderance of the evidence, given the defendants intentionally fired the pins at Pachucki, admitted attempting to hit him (though not in the eye), and had prior knowledge that greening pins cause injury, especially at close range with little accuracy. The case was distinguished from Morrill v. Gallagher where harm was a remote possibility, noting the substantial certainty of harm here. The court cited Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co. and Butler v. Behaeghe as supporting precedent for the principle that intent to cause any injury is sufficient, even if the resulting injury differs in character or magnitude.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interpretation of 'expected or intended' clauses in homeowners' insurance policies, particularly in Wisconsin. It establishes that specific intent to cause the precise injury that occurred is not a prerequisite for the exclusion to apply. Instead, a general intent to cause some bodily injury, which can be reasonably inferred from the nature of the intentional act and the foreseeability of harm, is sufficient to deny coverage. This ruling broadens the scope of such exclusions, holding insureds more accountable for actions that carry a high risk of injury, even if a precise outcome was not malicious. It underscores the factual nature of determining intent, requiring courts to consider the actor's knowledge and the circumstances surrounding the incident.
