Pace v. State
224 N.E.2d 312, 248 Ind. 146 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
To be convicted as an accessory before the fact, a person's mere presence and negative acquiescence at the scene of a crime are insufficient; there must be affirmative conduct in the form of acts or words that show a common design or purpose to aid in the commission of the crime.
Facts:
- Carl Lemual Pace, Jr. was driving his car with his wife, two children, and a passenger, William Eugene Rootes.
- Pace stopped and picked up a hitchhiker, Richard Leon Reppert.
- Reppert sat in the back seat with Rootes and one of Pace's children.
- During the drive, Rootes pulled out a knife and took Reppert's wallet containing two dollars.
- After driving further, Pace stopped the car to let Reppert out.
- As Reppert was getting out, Rootes also took his wristwatch.
- Throughout the entire robbery, Pace, the driver, said nothing and did not act in any manner to assist or approve of the robbery.
Procedural Posture:
- Carl Lemual Pace, Jr. was charged by affidavit in the St. Joseph Superior Court No. 2 with Accessory Before the Fact to Robbery.
- Pace pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury.
- At the close of the State's evidence, Pace's motion for a directed verdict was overruled by the trial court.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Pace guilty as charged.
- The trial court sentenced Pace to 10 to 25 years in the Indiana Reformatory.
- Pace's subsequent motion for a new trial was overruled by the trial court.
- Pace (appellant) appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's mere presence and silent acquiescence while driving a car during a passenger's robbery of a hitchhiker constitute sufficient evidence to convict the driver as an accessory before the fact?
Opinions:
Majority - Hunter, J.
No. A defendant's conviction as an accessory cannot be sustained by evidence of mere presence and silent acquiescence during the commission of a crime. The court reasoned that established Indiana law requires affirmative conduct, either through acts or words, from which a common purpose to commit the crime can be reasonably inferred. Citing Mattingly v. State, the court affirmed that negative acquiescence is not enough to constitute aiding and abetting. While Mobley v. State suggested that a failure to oppose a crime could be considered, the court noted this principle is most applicable when the non-acting party owes a duty to protect the victim, which was not the situation here. Since Pace did not say or do anything to encourage, aid, or approve of the robbery, there was no substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high evidentiary bar for accomplice liability, specifically for the crime of being an accessory. It clarifies that the prosecution cannot rely on a defendant's passivity or inaction alone to secure a conviction. The case establishes a strong precedent against guilt by association, requiring prosecutors to prove active participation or encouragement. This ruling curtails the scope of the 'failure to oppose' doctrine from Mobley v. State, suggesting its application is narrow and often limited to situations involving a pre-existing duty to protect.
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