Pace v. DiGuglielmo
544 U.S. 408 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A state postconviction petition that is rejected by the state court as untimely is not considered 'properly filed' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Therefore, it does not toll the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
Facts:
- In February 1986, John Pace pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime in a Pennsylvania state court and was sentenced to life in prison.
- Pace did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.
- In August 1986, Pace filed his first state postconviction petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA).
- Those initial postconviction proceedings concluded in September 1992 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.
- On November 27, 1996, over four years later, Pace filed a second state postconviction petition, this time under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).
- The PCRA, unlike its predecessor, included a one-year statute of limitations that had become effective in January 1996.
- Pace's second petition did not address the issue of its timeliness under the new PCRA statute.
Procedural Posture:
- John Pace's second state postconviction (PCRA) petition was dismissed by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas (trial court) on July 23, 1997, on the grounds that his claims had been previously litigated and were meritless.
- Pace appealed the dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court (intermediate appellate court).
- On appeal, the Commonwealth argued for the first time that Pace's PCRA petition was untimely.
- On December 3, 1998, the Superior Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the Commonwealth that it was untimely under the PCRA's statutory time bar.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court (highest state court) denied review on July 29, 1999.
- On December 24, 1999, Pace filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
- The District Court held that Pace's federal petition was not time-barred, finding he was entitled to both statutory tolling (because the state petition was 'properly filed') and equitable tolling.
- The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed the District Court, holding that the petition was not 'properly filed' because it was untimely under state law and that equitable tolling was not warranted.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the meaning of 'properly filed'.
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Issue:
Does a state postconviction relief petition that a state court rejects as untimely qualify as 'properly filed' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), thus tolling the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. A state postconviction petition rejected by a state court as untimely is not 'properly filed' under § 2244(d)(2) and does not toll AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. The common understanding of the phrase 'properly filed' implies compliance with filing requirements, including time limits. As established in Artuz v. Bennett, time limits are a 'condition to filing.' The presence of statutory exceptions to a time limit, which may require judicial review, does not change its nature as a filing condition. Citing Carey v. Saffold, the Court affirmed that when a state court clearly rules a petition is untimely, 'that is the end of the matter' for tolling purposes. Allowing an untimely petition to toll the federal statute would create a 'de facto extension mechanism,' undermining AEDPA's goal of promoting finality and preventing abusive delay. The Court also found Pace was not entitled to equitable tolling because he failed to exercise diligence, having waited years to bring his claims in state court and an additional five months after state proceedings concluded before filing his federal petition.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. A petition that is accepted, filed, and reviewed by a state court, even if ultimately dismissed as untimely, should be considered 'properly filed' for tolling purposes. The majority's holding conflicts with the logic of Artuz v. Bennett, which distinguished between an 'application' and the individual 'claims' within it. Because Pennsylvania's time bar includes claim-specific exceptions, it functions like a procedural bar that requires judicial analysis, not a simple filing condition. The majority's rule forces federal courts into the 'verbal gymnastics' condemned in Artuz by treating some claims within a single application as properly filed and others not. This decision will not prevent delay but will instead create a 'flood of protective filings' in federal courts as petitioners file federal petitions and request stays to avoid having their AEDPA clock run out while they exhaust state remedies, thereby increasing the burden on the federal judiciary and undermining AEDPA's goal of streamlining litigation.
Analysis:
This decision provides a clear, bright-line rule for what constitutes a 'properly filed' application for AEDPA tolling purposes, prioritizing finality and strict adherence to statutory deadlines. By making a state court's finding of untimeliness dispositive, the Supreme Court effectively closes a potential loophole for extending the federal habeas clock. The ruling significantly impacts litigation strategy, forcing prisoners whose state claims are potentially time-barred to file a 'protective' federal habeas petition and request a stay pending exhaustion of state remedies. This approach, while preserving federal review, increases the administrative burden on federal district courts, an outcome the dissent argues is contrary to AEDPA's purpose.
