Ozuna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
123 S.W.3d 429, 2003 WL 22011299 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
An individual adopted by a testator after the execution of a will is not considered a pretermitted child entitled to an intestate share of the estate if the will makes any disposition of property to that individual, regardless of their legal status at the time the will was made.
Facts:
- On May 26, 2000, Jack Gideon Putnam executed his Last Will and Testament.
- The will included a specific bequest of $100,000 to Alma Ozuna.
- At the time the will was executed, Putnam and Ozuna were not related.
- On October 31, 2000, Putnam formally adopted Ozuna in an adult adoption proceeding.
- Putnam died on June 14, 2001, without having revoked or changed his will after the adoption.
Procedural Posture:
- Putnam's executor, Wells Fargo Bank, filed an application to probate his will in the trial court.
- Alma Ozuna filed a will contest, claiming she was a pretermitted child and thus entitled to a larger share of the estate.
- Both Ozuna and the Bank filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the trial court.
- The trial court granted the Bank's motion and denied Ozuna's motion, ruling that she was not a pretermitted child.
- Ozuna, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Texas Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Is an individual who is named as a beneficiary in a will and is subsequently adopted by the testator considered a 'pretermitted child' under section 67 of the Texas Probate Code, thereby entitling them to inherit a larger share of the estate?
Opinions:
Majority - Duncan, J.
No, an individual who is named as a beneficiary in a will and is subsequently adopted by the testator is not considered a 'pretermitted child' entitled to a statutory share of the estate. The Texas Probate Code defines a 'pretermitted child' as one born or adopted after the will's execution. However, the statute explicitly states that a pretermitted child only inherits a statutory share if they are not mentioned or provided for in the will. Section 67(d) clarifies that a child is 'provided for' if any disposition of property is made to them in the will. Because Putnam’s will made a $100,000 bequest to Ozuna, she was 'provided for' within the meaning of the statute. The court rejected Ozuna's argument that the provision must be made to her 'as a child,' distinguishing cases from other jurisdictions because the Texas statute contains the specific and controlling language of section 67(d).
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle of statutory plain meaning, holding that the clear text of the Texas pretermitted child statute controls over policy arguments or precedents from states with different statutory language. The case establishes a bright-line rule that any provision for a person in a will, regardless of their status at the time of execution, prevents that person from later claiming the status of a pretermitted heir if their legal relationship to the testator changes. This provides clarity and certainty in estate administration, emphasizing that the statute's purpose is to prevent unintentional disinheritance, not to augment the share of a beneficiary who was already intentionally included in the testamentary plan.
