Oyoma Asinor v. DC
Decided August 9, 2024 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth Amendment requires that any continued retention of personal property, even after a lawful seizure incident to a lawful arrest and the subsequent release of the arrested individuals, must remain reasonable.
Facts:
- Oyoma Asinor, a journalist, was arrested while photographing an August 31, 2020 protest.
- Upon Asinor's arrest, Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers seized his cell phone, camera, and other personal effects.
- Asinor was released the same day and informed he would not face charges, but he was unable to retrieve his property for nearly a year despite repeated requests.
- In a separate consolidated case, several individuals (the 'Cameron plaintiffs'), including Bryan Dozier, were arrested during an August 13, 2020 protest.
- MPD officers seized the Cameron plaintiffs' personal effects, including cell phones, upon their arrest.
- The Cameron plaintiffs were quickly released, and the MPD neither pressed charges nor sought warrants to search or continue possessing their phones.
- Despite many phone calls and emails to the MPD and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Cameron plaintiffs were unable to get their phones back.
- Some Cameron plaintiffs' phones were returned 285 and 312 days after their arrests, while others received their phones more than a year and two months later.
Procedural Posture:
- The `Cameron` plaintiffs initially filed a D.C. Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) motion for property return in existing criminal cases against other individuals in the D.C. Superior Court.
- The Deputy Clerk of the D.C. Superior Court instructed the `Cameron` plaintiffs to refile their motion in a new, standalone case in that court.
- In November 2021, the five `Cameron` plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia in federal district court, alleging Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims and common-law conversion, and sought class certification.
- The federal district court dismissed the `Cameron` plaintiffs' complaint, concluding they failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim and that the Fifth Amendment provided adequate process. It then declined supplemental jurisdiction over the conversion claim and denied class certification as moot.
- Asinor (the journalist) also sued the District of Columbia in federal district court, raising Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and D.C.-law claims.
- The federal district court dismissed Asinor's constitutional claims based on its reasoning in the `Cameron` case, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his other claims.
- The plaintiffs in both cases (Asinor and Cameron) appealed the federal district court's dismissals to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment require that the government's continued possession of personal property, lawfully seized incident to a lawful arrest, must also be reasonable after the arrested individuals have been released and no charges have been pressed?
Opinions:
Majority - Circuit Judge KATSAS
Yes, the Fourth Amendment requires that any continued possession of personal property, lawfully seized incident to arrest, must also be reasonable after the arrested individuals have been released. The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment's text, promising security against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' of 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' encompasses both the act of taking possession and the ongoing state of having taken possession. This interpretation is supported by Founding-era common law, which provided remedies for wrongful detention of property even if the initial taking was lawful (citing William Blackstone's Commentaries). Modern Supreme Court precedent, particularly United States v. Jacobsen (466 U.S. 109 (1984)), establishes that 'a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests' or 'its length unduly intruded upon constitutionally protected interests.' Analogously, the court's caselaw on seizures of persons, such as Manuel v. City of Joliet (580 U.S. 357 (2017)), holds that pretrial detention must remain reasonable throughout its duration. The court found no textual, historical, or other reason to distinguish between the ongoing seizure of persons and effects. It distinguished California v. Hodari D. and Torres v. Madrid by clarifying that those cases addressed when a seizure occurs, not its permissible duration. The court also rejected the District's argument that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause exclusively governs, citing Soldal v. Cook County (506 U.S. 56 (1992)) for the principle that multiple constitutional provisions can apply to the same wrong. Finally, the court dismissed concerns about 'federalizing' state law, noting that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable seizures, allowing for legitimate law-enforcement purposes and accounting for practical difficulties and the lesser burden of property retention compared to personal detention.
Concurring - Circuit Judge HENDERSON
I agree with the majority opinion in full, affirming that the Fourth Amendment's protections do not cease once the government takes possession of an individual's property. I write separately to explain why the court correctly departs from the consensus of several sister circuits (First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh) that have held the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the continued retention of legally seized property. Many of these circuits considered the issue superficially or failed to adequately discuss the key Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Jacobsen. While Fox v. Van Oosterum and Lee v. City of Chicago were more thorough, they incorrectly focused on United States v. Place without recognizing how Jacobsen broadened Place's holding. Jacobsen extended the principle that an initially lawful seizure can become unreasonable due to its 'manner of execution' (including its 'length') to all lawful seizures, not just narrow investigatory detentions. This broader application means that what the government does with seized property can violate the Fourth Amendment even after the initial lawful taking. The Supreme Court's decision in Manuel v. City of Joliet, which applies the Fourth Amendment to the duration of pretrial detention, further supports this conclusion by suggesting analogous protection for 'persons' and 'effects'.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands Fourth Amendment protections by explicitly extending the 'reasonableness' requirement to the duration of government property seizures, even after initial lawful seizure and the dissipation of immediate law enforcement justifications. By rejecting the District's arguments that the Fourth Amendment only governs the initial taking or that other constitutional provisions are exclusive, the D.C. Circuit creates a new avenue for individuals to challenge prolonged and unjustified police retention of personal effects. This ruling establishes a circuit split with several other U.S. Courts of Appeals, potentially prompting Supreme Court review to establish a uniform national standard. The decision strengthens individual property rights against government overreach and could lead to changes in police inventory and return procedures nationwide.
