Yes, this law is unfair to the son. Normally, if a dad buys a house for his kid, the law assumes it's a gift. But this law did the opposite for Fred just because his dad was Japanese. It treated Fred, an American citizen, worse than other citizens based on his family's background. That's discrimination and it violates his rights.

Yes, Fred should win, but for a bigger reason. We shouldn't just criticize how the law was used here; the whole Alien Land Law is racist and unconstitutional. A state should not be allowed to have a law that stops people from owning property just because of their race.

Yes, the law is clearly unconstitutional. This law was created purely out of racism against Japanese people. Looking at its history, it was designed to hurt them. A law based on racial hate has no place in America and goes against the Constitution.

No, the law is okay. The law isn't targeting the son because he's Japanese-American. It targets any land deal where a person who is legally banned from owning land pays for it. California is allowed to ban certain aliens from owning land, so it must be allowed to create rules to stop people from finding loopholes.

No, this ruling doesn't make sense. The court is saying the state can't enforce its law, but it's not striking the law down. The real discrimination is the law against the father, which the court is allowing to stand. The rule about assuming a scam is just a tool to make that law work, and it should be allowed.

Yes, the law is not fair to Fred Oyama because it treats him differently just because of where his parents are from, and there's no good reason for that. The law doesn't pass the strict test it needs to when it treats people differently based on race or nationality. All the assumptions made it really hard for Fred Oyama to keep the land, just because his dad is Japanese.

No, the law in California doesn't unfairly target an American citizen just because his parents are from Japan. The law's assumption that there was an intent to get around the ownership rules is okay for the state to use. It would assume the same thing no matter what the kid's race was, if an immigrant who wasn't allowed to own land paid for it.

No, we shouldn't change the decision unless we're ready to say the whole California law is wrong, which we're not. The state's idea that it needs to stop people from getting around the law by using someone else's name is a good one. The Court is seeing a rule in the law about dads and sons that isn't really there.

Yes, and I think we should say the decision is wrong for bigger reasons, like the law goes against the Constitution's rule of treating everyone the same and it doesn't match up with the rules the whole country follows about people coming from other countries. The law was made to be mean to Japanese immigrants, if you look at its history. It's really hard to justify treating people differently because of their race.

Yes, the law is really about treating people from Japan badly just because they're from Japan, and that's not okay under the Constitution's rule that everyone should be treated the same. The law doesn't have a good reason for it, it's just based on hating Japanese people. Everyone should have the same rights, no matter where their family is from.

—holding that discrimination "based solely on... country of origin" requires a "compelling justification" to overcome an equal protection challenge

—invalidated California's Alien Land Law which forbade aliens ineligible for citizenship from owning agricultural land in the state.

From the conclusion reached that Indians living on reservations in California are citizens and residents of this state, it must therefore follow that under section 1, Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States they are endowed with the rights, privileges and immunities equal to those enjoyed by all other citizens and residents of the state

I would add that the Charleville court's notion of a state law that does address a matter of statewide concern—the Public Works Alien Employment Act, which barred aliens from being employed on public works projects (see Charleville, at pp. 399-400 [analogizing the statute to California's Alien Land Law, which prohibited the sale of agricultural land to aliens])—has …

—at page 646 [68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249]: "There remains the question of whether discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent, as revealed in this case, is justifiable. Here we start with the proposition that only the most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the equal protection clause and a federal statute …

The only other opinions that are contrary to a blanket rejection of Articles 55 and 56 as sources of privately enforceable rights are inapposite, as they involved arguments that the UN Charter provided additional support for a ban on racial discrimination in connection with the sale or ownership of property in the United States.

But to justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to "the purposes for which the state desires to use it."

Accordingly, the court held that sex-based classifications are inherently suspect, like the United States Supreme Court found classifications based on race, alienage, and nationality.

"The whole theory of guardianships is to protect the ward during his period of incapacity to protect himself."

Additionally, although there is no allegation present that Plaintiffs are a member of a suspect class, the Court notes that Plaintiffs do not belong to a suspect or quasi-suspect class.

Yes. The California Alien Land Law, as applied, deprives Fred Oyama of the equal protection of the laws. The statute saddles him with an onerous burden of proof that other minor citizens in California do not face, discriminating against him solely because of his father's Japanese ancestry. While California law ordinarily presumes that a parent's payment for land conveyed to their child is a gift, the Alien Land Law imposes a contrary presumption of fraud on children of ineligible aliens. This differential treatment based on parental national origin is a violation of the equal protection clause, as the rights of an American citizen to own land cannot be subordinated merely because of his father's country of origin.

Yes. The judgment should be reversed on the broader ground that the basic provisions of the California Alien Land Law are facially unconstitutional. The law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and conflicts with federal laws governing immigration. The law's purpose and effect is to discriminate against people of Japanese ancestry, placing them on the lowest possible economic level, which is contrary to the core principles of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Yes. The California Alien Land Law is unconstitutional on its face because it is an outright racial discrimination. Tracing the history of the law's enactment, it is clear that it was spawned from anti-Oriental prejudice and designed to target Japanese residents. Such a classification based on racism lacks any rational basis and is therefore a clear violation of the equal protection clause and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

No. The law does not unconstitutionally discriminate against the citizen son. The different treatment arises not from the son's ancestry, but from the father's legal incapacity to own land under a valid state law. The statutory presumption of intent to evade escheat applies to any grantee, regardless of their race or relationship to the donor, when consideration is paid by an ineligible alien. This is a reasonable classification designed to prevent the evasion of a law whose constitutionality is not being challenged.

No. The court's holding is illogical unless it is prepared to invalidate the entire Alien Land Law, which it declines to do. The statutory presumption is a reasonable and necessary tool for the state to enforce its valid prohibition on land ownership by certain aliens. The discrimination at issue is the fundamental one against the father, which the Court accepts as valid. The presumption applies to any grantee whose land is paid for by an ineligible alien, not just their son, and is therefore not an unconstitutional classification.

Yes, the Alien Land Law, as applied in this case, deprives Fred Oyama of the equal protection of California's laws and of his privileges as an American citizen because the State has discriminated against him based solely on his parents' country of origin without a compelling justification. The law is invalidated as it is not reasonably adapted to the purposes for which the state desires to use it and fails to meet the strict scrutiny required for such discriminatory practices. The cumulative effect of the statutory presumption and ancillary inferences was clearly to discriminate against Fred Oyama, saddling him with an onerous burden of proof not borne by most other children, solely because of his father's Japanese origin.

No, because the Alien Land Laws of California, as here applied, do not discriminate unconstitutionally against an American citizen, the son of Japanese nationals, and the presumption of intent to evade the law is a reasonable statutory tool to enforce the state's right to exclude ineligible aliens from land ownership. The same presumption would apply to any grantee whose lands were paid for by an ineligible alien, regardless of the grantee's race.

No, the judgment should not be set aside unless the Court is prepared to invalidate the California Alien Land Laws entirely, which it does not. The state's argument that it must prevent evasion of land ownership prohibitions by ineligible aliens is sound, and the statutory presumption is a reasonable means to that end. The Court reads a father-son classification into the law that is not justified by its text.

Yes, and I would prefer to reverse the judgment on broader grounds that the basic provisions of the California Alien Land Law violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and conflict with federal laws and treaties governing the rights of aliens. The law's discriminatory policy against citizens based on racial descent cannot be justified except under the most exceptional circumstances. The law was designed to discriminate against Japanese aliens, as evidenced by its history and context.

Yes, the Alien Land Law is an outright racial discrimination and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law's origin, purpose, and effect are rooted in racial animosity against Japanese aliens and therefore it should be condemned as unconstitutional. The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens, regardless of their racial descent, must be equal to those enjoyed by all other citizens. The law lacks any rational basis for the discrimination, which stems directly from racial hatred and intolerance.

Oyama v. California

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