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Owen v. Tunison

Maine Supreme Judicial Court
131 Me. 42, 158 A. 926 (1932)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A statement of a minimum selling price in response to an inquiry is not a binding offer, but rather an invitation to open negotiations.


Facts:

  • On October 23, 1929, the Plaintiff wrote to R. G. Tunison, inquiring if Tunison would sell his store property in Bucksport, Maine, for the sum of $6,000.00.
  • Tunison, who was in France, replied by letter on November 12, 1929.
  • Tunison's letter stated: 'it would not be possible for me to sell it unless I was to receive $16,000.00 cash.'
  • Upon receiving Tunison's letter, the Plaintiff immediately sent a telegram stating: 'ACCEPT YOUR OFFER FOR BRADLEY BLOCK BUCKSPORT TERMS SIXTEEN THOUSAND CASH SEND DEED TO EASTERN TRUST AND BANKING CO BANGOR MAINE PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE.'
  • Four days later, Tunison notified the Plaintiff that he did not wish to sell the property.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Plaintiff sued R. G. Tunison in a Maine trial court for damages resulting from an alleged breach of a contract to sell real estate.
  • The case was reported directly to the Law Court of Maine (the state's highest court) for a final judgment based on the law and the submitted evidence.

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Issue:

Does a property owner's written statement that it would not be possible for him to sell a property 'unless I was to receive $16,000.00 cash' constitute a binding offer that can be accepted to form an enforceable contract?


Opinions:

Majority - Barnes, J.

No. A statement indicating a minimum price at which one might be willing to sell property does not constitute an offer to sell. For a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds based on a definite offer and acceptance. Tunison’s letter did not contain an offer or a proposal to sell; rather, it expressed an intent to open negotiations that might lead to a sale. The language 'it would not be possible for me to sell it unless' is not a definite proposal but a statement of the minimum price that would be entertained. Citing precedents like Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, the court reasoned that such language is general, similar to an advertisement or price circular, and not a specific offer by which the sender may be bound. Therefore, the plaintiff’s telegram was not an acceptance but a new offer to purchase, which Tunison was free to reject.



Analysis:

This case provides a foundational distinction between a valid offer and preliminary negotiations. It solidifies the principle that a mere quotation of a price, especially in response to an inquiry, is not an offer capable of creating a contract upon acceptance. The decision underscores the requirement that an offer must be a clear, definite, and unequivocal manifestation of intent to be bound. This precedent guides courts in analyzing the specific language and context of communications to determine whether the parties have moved beyond negotiation to the point of a formal offer.

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