Owen v. City of Independence
1980 U.S. LEXIS 14, 445 U.S. 622, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity and may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Facts:
- In 1967, George D. Owen was appointed Chief of Police for the City of Independence, serving an indefinite term at the discretion of the City Manager.
- In 1972, a dispute arose between Owen and the new City Manager, Lyle W. Alberg, over the administration of the Police Department's property room.
- Alberg initiated an investigation which concluded there was no evidence of criminal acts but found administrative discrepancies.
- On April 10, 1972, Alberg asked Owen to resign and threatened to terminate his employment if he refused. Owen did not resign.
- On April 13, Alberg issued a public statement mentioning "discrepancies" but clarifying there was "no evidence to substantiate any allegations of a criminal nature."
- At a City Council meeting on April 17, Councilman Paul L. Roberts read a statement making serious allegations against Owen, including misappropriation of property and disappearance of narcotics.
- The City Council then passed a motion to release the investigative reports to the media and prosecutor, and urged the City Manager to take "direct and appropriate action."
- The following day, City Manager Alberg terminated Owen's employment without providing a reason or a hearing, which Owen had previously requested. The dismissal and the accusations received prominent media coverage.
Procedural Posture:
- George D. Owen sued the City of Independence and its officials in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri for violating his due process rights.
- The trial court entered judgment for the defendants, finding that the city was entitled to qualified immunity based on the good faith of its officials.
- Owen, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which initially reversed the District Court.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services.
- On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that Owen's constitutional rights had been violated but held that the City of Independence, as appellee, was entitled to qualified immunity.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of municipal immunity.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a municipality have qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the good faith belief of its officials that their actions were constitutional?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brennan
No. A municipality does not have qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the good faith of its officials. The court's analysis rested on statutory interpretation, common law history, and public policy. First, the text of § 1983 is absolute and unqualified, and the Court found no evidence Congress intended to incorporate municipal immunity. Second, a historical review revealed no tradition of good-faith immunity for municipal corporations at common law in 1871; doctrines like the governmental/proprietary distinction were abrogated by § 1983's imposition of liability for constitutional violations, as a city has no 'discretion' to violate the Constitution. Finally, the policy justifications for granting qualified immunity to individual officials—preventing injustice to the officer and avoiding chilling their decisiveness—do not apply to a governmental entity. It is not unjust to require the public treasury to compensate victims of its own unconstitutional policies, and the threat of municipal liability serves as a proper incentive for officials to respect constitutional rights, furthering the statute's compensatory and deterrent purposes.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Powell
Yes. A municipality should be entitled to a qualified immunity defense based on the good faith of its officials. The dissent first argued that no constitutional violation occurred, as the stigmatizing statements came from a single councilman, not an official city policy under Monell. Imposing strict liability on municipalities departs from precedent that reads § 1983 in harmony with common-law immunities and creates an inconsistency with the qualified immunity granted to individual officers. From a policy perspective, strict liability will paralyze local governance by forcing officials to constantly fear crushing damages for actions that were reasonable and lawful when taken. It is fundamentally unfair to punish a municipality for failing to predict future developments in constitutional law. Furthermore, the legislative history, particularly the rejection of the strict-liability Sherman Amendment, indicates the 42nd Congress's intent to avoid bankrupting local governments with liability imposed without notice or fault.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the holding of Monell by establishing that municipal liability for constitutional torts under § 1983 is strict. It removes the good-faith defense for government entities, creating a clear distinction between the qualified immunity available to individual officers and the lack thereof for the municipalities they serve. The ruling significantly increased the financial exposure of local governments, making them liable for damages even when their officials acted reasonably based on the state of constitutional law at the time. This creates a powerful incentive for municipalities to proactively train officials and structure their policies to avoid constitutional infringements, effectively shifting the financial risk of 'unknowable' constitutional violations from the individual victim to the taxpaying public.
