Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru
591 U. S. ____ (2020) (2020)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment's ministerial exception bars employment discrimination suits against religious institutions by teachers who perform vital religious duties, such as educating students in the faith, regardless of whether the teachers hold the formal title of 'minister' or have extensive formal religious training.
Facts:
- Agnes Morrissey-Berru was a lay fifth and sixth-grade teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School (OLG), a Roman Catholic primary school.
- As part of her duties, Morrissey-Berru taught all subjects, including a daily religion class, prayed with her students, and prepared them for participation in Mass and other Catholic sacraments.
- Her employment agreement required her to carry out the school's religious mission and stated she could be terminated for conduct that brought discredit upon the Catholic Church.
- Kristen Biel was a lay first and fifth-grade teacher at St. James School, another Catholic primary school.
- Like Morrissey-Berru, Biel taught all subjects including religion, prayed with her students, and accompanied them to Mass as part of her official duties.
- Biel's employment agreement was nearly identical to Morrissey-Berru's, requiring her to model the Catholic faith and integrate it into her teaching.
- OLG declined to renew Morrissey-Berru's contract, and she alleged it was due to her age.
- St. James School declined to renew Biel's contract after she requested a leave of absence for breast cancer treatment, and she alleged it was disability discrimination.
Procedural Posture:
- Agnes Morrissey-Berru sued Our Lady of Guadalupe School in federal district court, alleging age discrimination.
- The district court (trial court) granted summary judgment in favor of the school, finding the suit was barred by the ministerial exception.
- Morrissey-Berru, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the school was the appellee.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the ministerial exception did not apply because Morrissey-Berru did not have the formal title or training of a minister.
- Separately, Kristen Biel sued St. James School in federal district court for disability discrimination.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the school based on the ministerial exception.
- Biel, as appellant, appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where the school was the appellee.
- A different panel of the Ninth Circuit also reversed, finding Biel did not qualify for the ministerial exception.
- The schools (Our Lady of Guadalupe School and St. James School) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted and consolidated the cases.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment's ministerial exception bar employment discrimination claims brought by lay teachers at religious elementary schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of teaching religion and integrating faith into their instruction?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
Yes, the First Amendment's ministerial exception bars these employment discrimination claims. The core of the ministerial exception is to protect the right of religious institutions to choose who will carry out their central mission of transmitting the faith. What matters is the function performed by the employee, not their formal title. Because Morrissey-Berru and Biel had the vital religious duties of educating students in the Catholic faith, inculcating its teachings, and guiding them in their spiritual lives, they fall within the exception. A rigid, checklist-style application of the factors from Hosanna-Tabor is inappropriate; the key inquiry is whether an employee's role lies at the core of the institution's religious mission. Judicial intervention in employment disputes with such teachers would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way the First Amendment does not tolerate.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes. The Court correctly concludes that the teachers' positions fall within the ministerial exception because they were charged with carrying out the schools' religious mission. However, the Religion Clauses require an even broader rule: civil courts should defer to a religious organization's good-faith claim that a particular employee's position is 'ministerial.' Determining who qualifies as a minister is an inherently theological question that secular courts are incompetent to resolve without risking entanglement in religious doctrine. To avoid interfering with a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission, courts must defer to the organization's sincere determination of which individuals carry out its religious mission.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
No. The majority's decision wrongly expands the ministerial exception and collapses the careful, multi-factor analysis from Hosanna-Tabor into a single, deferential consideration of an employee's religious function. These employees were primarily lay teachers of secular subjects who lacked substantial religious titles, training, and did not hold themselves out as ministers. By recasting the exception so broadly, the Court strips thousands of employees of basic antidiscrimination protections and gives religious employers a free pass to discriminate for reasons wholly unrelated to their faith, such as age or disability. This approach abandons judicial review for a rubber stamp of the employer's characterization and creates an unjustifiable carve-out from generally applicable laws.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the ministerial exception by shifting the focus from the formal indicia of ministerial status (title, training, etc.) outlined in Hosanna-Tabor to a more holistic, function-based inquiry. It establishes that the key determinant is whether an employee performs vital religious duties, with considerable deference given to the religious institution's own characterization of that role. The ruling makes it substantially more difficult for employees of religious institutions who have any role in religious instruction or formation to bring employment discrimination claims. The decision solidifies a strong principle of religious institutional autonomy in employment matters concerning those who teach the faith.
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