Osteen v. Henley
1993 WL 540812, 13 F.3d 221 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant a public university student the right to have legal counsel act as a full participant in a disciplinary proceeding. A university's procedure is constitutionally sufficient if it is fundamentally fair, even if it limits counsel's role to consultation rather than active representation.
Facts:
- Thomas Osteen, a student and football player at Northern Illinois University (NIU), was with friends outside a bar.
- A verbal altercation occurred between his friend's girlfriend and another male student.
- Without speaking, Osteen kicked or stomped the male student in the head with his boots, breaking the student's nose.
- When a friend of the injured student approached, Osteen punched this second individual in the face, breaking his nose as well.
- As a result of these two assaults, NIU initiated disciplinary proceedings against Osteen.
Procedural Posture:
- Northern Illinois University initiated disciplinary proceedings against Thomas Osteen.
- Osteen pleaded guilty to the charges but requested a hearing before a university appeals board regarding the sanction of a two-year expulsion.
- The university appeals board held a hearing and upheld the two-year expulsion.
- Osteen appealed internally to a university associate vice-president, who affirmed the expulsion.
- Osteen filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against university officials, alleging his expulsion violated the Due Process Clause.
- The district court (trial court) dismissed Osteen's lawsuit.
- Osteen, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a public university's disciplinary proceeding, which denies a student the right to have an attorney fully participate as trial counsel, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Chief Judge.
No, the university's disciplinary proceeding does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Constitution does not entitle a student to be represented by counsel in the traditional trial sense within a university disciplinary hearing. The court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test and found that judicializing these proceedings would impose significant costs and administrative burdens on the university. This cost is not justified by the risk of error, which the court deemed trivial, especially where the facts are not complex and the university has no incentive to unjustly expel a student. Finally, the student's interest—a two-year suspension that did not bar enrollment elsewhere—was not so grave as to require the full procedural safeguards of litigation. While a student might have a right to consult with an attorney, there is no right for that attorney to examine witnesses, make arguments, or otherwise fully participate in the hearing.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that university disciplinary proceedings do not require the same procedural formalities as criminal or civil trials. It establishes a clear precedent in the Seventh Circuit against a student's right to full legal representation in such hearings, emphasizing the university's interest in maintaining a less adversarial, complex, and costly system. The ruling reinforces the judiciary's deference to academic institutions in managing their internal disciplinary affairs, so long as fundamental fairness is provided. By distinguishing the right to 'consult' counsel from the right to 'representation,' the case provides a clearer framework for future due process challenges in the educational context.
