No, the law is not against the First Amendment. This is different from regular adult pornography. Making child pornography harms real children, and the government has a very important job to protect them. One way to do that is to get rid of the demand for these pictures by making it illegal for anyone to have them. So, even though people usually have a right to privacy in their homes, that right doesn't cover possessing material that was created by abusing children. The court still overturned Osborne's conviction, but only because the jury wasn't given the right instructions about what the law specifically meant.

Yes, the law is against the First Amendment. A famous earlier case said the government can't control what people read or watch in their own homes. Even if making and selling child pornography is illegal, just having it privately should be protected. The dissent also argued that the Ohio law was written so poorly that it could be used to punish people for having innocent pictures, like a photo of a naked baby at the beach or a famous painting.

I agree with the main decision to overturn the conviction. But I want to point out that it was right for the Court to review this case, even if the defendant's lawyer didn't use the perfect magic words to object during the trial. The main legal problem didn't even exist until the Ohio Supreme Court changed the meaning of the law on appeal, so he couldn't have objected to it properly at the start.

No, Ohio's law is allowed because protecting kids is more important than Osborne's right to have those pictures privately. The law isn't too broad because Ohio's court limited it to only apply to certain kinds of pictures and requires knowing it's wrong. But Osborne gets a new trial to make sure the jury understands the law correctly.

I disagree because I think Ohio's law is still too broad even with the limits the court added. The limits are unclear and could apply to too many pictures. Also, our past case Stanley v. Georgia says people have a right to have what they want in their own homes, and Ohio's reasons aren't good enough to take away that right.

I agree with the Court's decision but want to note that the Court can look at Osborne's complaint about the jury not being told the exact limits of the law, even though he didn't object during the trial.

"It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling."

—government has compelling interest in outlawing possession of child pornography in order "to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children

—holding that the First Amendment is not violated by a prohibition on the possession and viewing of child pornography

As a result, the Court held that Ohio could "constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography."

W] e have repeatedly emphasized that where a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only `real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep

—observing that "pornography's continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come

"Given the importance of the State's interest in protecting the victims of child pornography," the State was justified in "attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain."

It is... surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand

Notably, the Government already has found that protecting its citizens out-weighs the First Amendment's right of freedom of speech, for it applies prior restraint to child pornography

—the Ohio Supreme Court had narrowly construed the statute to prohibit "the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of the person charged."

No, a state law prohibiting the private possession of child pornography does not violate the First Amendment. Unlike the private possession of obscenity protected in Stanley v. Georgia, the state's interests in prohibiting child pornography are compelling and far exceed those in Stanley. The state's goal is not a paternalistic regulation of a person's private thoughts, but the protection of child victims by destroying the market for their exploitative use. The court reasoned that banning possession decreases demand, which is an integral part of the illegal production of child pornography. Furthermore, the materials cause continuing harm to victims and are used by pedophiles to seduce other children, providing additional justification for the ban. The Court also held that the Ohio statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court to require a "lewd exhibition or graphic focus on the genitals" and scienter, was not unconstitutionally overbroad. However, the Court reversed Osborne's conviction on separate due process grounds, because the jury was not instructed on the essential element of lewdness.

Yes, a state law prohibiting the private possession of child pornography violates the First Amendment. The dissent argued that Stanley v. Georgia protects an individual's right to possess any material, including child pornography, in the privacy of their own home, even if the state can regulate its production and distribution. The state failed to demonstrate why existing laws against production and distribution are inadequate. Furthermore, the Ohio statute, even as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court, remains unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The terms "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" are undefined and could criminalize constitutionally protected materials like art, family photos, or medical textbooks.

The opinion joins the majority's judgment but writes separately to agree with a procedural point made in the dissent. Justice Blackmun agreed that the Court's ability to review Osborne's due process claim, which was based on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the "lewd exhibition" element, did not depend on whether Osborne's counsel had made a specific objection at trial. This is because the constitutional error was not complete until the Ohio Supreme Court applied its new, narrowing construction of the statute to affirm the conviction.

No, Ohio may constitutionally prohibit the possession and viewing of child pornography because the State's interest in protecting child victims and destroying the market for exploitative materials outweighs Osborne's First Amendment right to possess such materials privately. The Ohio statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad because the Ohio Supreme Court appropriately narrowed its scope to apply only to the possession of materials depicting a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on genitals, and the statute includes a scienter requirement. However, Osborne's conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial because the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of the offense as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court.

I dissent because I believe the Ohio statute is unconstitutionally overbroad even as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court. The narrowing construction is still too broad and creates a new problem of vagueness. Additionally, our decision in Stanley v. Georgia should prevent the State from criminalizing Osborne's mere private possession of the photographs at issue, as the State's justifications for the prohibition do not override the fundamental First Amendment right to read or view what one pleases in the privacy of one's home.

I join the Court's opinion but write separately to express my agreement with Justice Brennan that the Court may consider Osborne's due process claim regarding the failure to instruct the jury on the narrowing construction, even absent an objection at trial.

Osborne v. Ohio

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Issue:

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