Yes, the owner is responsible. When someone breaks a safety law, that act is automatically considered negligence. The lawsuit isn't a special 'statutory' case; it's a regular lawsuit for carelessness (negligence), and the broken law is the proof of that carelessness. Since the clerk was an employee acting on the job, his boss (McMasters) is legally responsible for his actions.

Yes, the store owner is responsible for the customer's death because their employee, while working, sold poison without the warning label that the law requires. Not following the law is automatically considered a big mistake (negligence) since the law is meant to keep people safe.

It doesn't matter if there wasn't a rule about this before the law was made. The law sets a clear standard, and breaking it means you're at fault.

Also, in situations like this, bosses are responsible for the mistakes their workers make while on the job. So even though the law might only mention punishing the employee, the boss can still be held responsible in a lawsuit.

<opinion type="majority">
<author id="A0F">Mitchell, J.<footnotemark>1</footnotemark></author>
Upon the 1-ecord in this case it must be taken as the facts that defendant’s clerk in his drug-store, in the course of his employment as such, sold to plaintiff’s intestate a deadly poison without labelling it “Poison,” as required by statute; that she, in ignorance of its deadly qualities, partook of the poison, -which caused her death. Except for the ability of counsel and the earnestness with which they have argued the case, we would not have supposed that there could be any serious doubt of defendant’s liability on this state of facts. It is immaterial for present purposes whether section 329 of the Penal Code or section 14, c. 147, Laws 1885, or both, are still in force, and constitute the law' governing this case. The requirements of both statutes are substantially the same, and the sole object of both is to protect the public against tbe dangerous qualities of poison. It is now well settled, certainly in this state, that where a statute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty he is liable to those for whose protection or benefit it"was imposed for any injuries of the character which the statute or'ordinance was designed to prevent, and which were proximately produced/ by such neglect. In support of this we need only cite our own decision in Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, (23 N. W. Rep. 237.)
Defendant contends that this is only true where a right of action for the alleged negligent act existed at common law; that no liability existed at common law for selling poison without labelling it, and therefore none exists under this statute, no right of civil action being given by it. Without stopping to consider the correctness of the assumption that selling poison without labelling it might not be actionable negligence at common law, it is sufficient to say that, in our opinion, defendant’s contention proceeds upon an entire misapprehension of the nature and gist of a cause of action of this kind. The common law gives a right of action to every one sustaining injuries caused proximately by the negligence of another. The pres<page-number citation-index="1" label="105">*105</page-number>ent is a common-law action, the gist of which is defendant’s negligence, resulting in the death of plaintiff’s intestate. Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another, or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. In either case the failure to perform the duty constitutes negligence, and renders the party liable for injuries resulting from it. The only difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be determined upon common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or, in other words, negligence per se. The action in the latter case is not a statutory one, nor does the statute give the right of action in any other sense except that it makes an act negligent which otherwise might not be such, or at least only evidence of negligence. All that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be determined. The gist of the action is still negligence, or the non-performance of a legal duty to the person injured.
What has been already said suggests the answer to the further contention that if any civiliiability exis.ts.lt is only againslthe clerk who sold the poison, and who alone is criminally liable. Whether the“act constituting the actionable negligence was such on common-law principles, or is made such by statute, the doctrine of agency applies, to wit, that the master is civilly liable for the negligence of his servant committed in the course of his employment, and resulting in injuries to third persons.
Judgment affirmed.
<footnote label="1">
 G-ilfillan, C. J., because of affinity to one of tbe parties, took no part in this case.
</footnote>
</opinion>

Yes. The violation of a statute imposing a specific duty for the protection of others constitutes negligence per se. The cause of action is not a new one created by the statute, but rather a common-law action for negligence. Negligence is the breach of a legal duty, and a statute can establish a fixed standard of care that defines that duty. When a defendant violates such a statute, it is conclusive evidence of negligence, and the defendant is liable for any resulting injuries of the type the statute was designed to prevent. Furthermore, under the doctrine of agency, the master (McMasters) is civilly liable for the negligence of his servant (the clerk) committed in the course of employment.

Yes, the store owner is liable for the death of the plaintiff's intestate because the clerk, in the course of their employment, sold a deadly poison without the required statutory labeling. This omission constitutes a breach of a specific legal duty imposed by statute for the protection of the public. The breach of this duty is considered negligence per se, which means the act is inherently negligent due to the violation of the statute.

The defendant's contention that no liability existed at common law for selling poison without labeling it is irrelevant, because the statute establishes a fixed standard of duty, and its violation is conclusive evidence of negligence. The gist of this common-law negligence action is the defendant's breach of a legal duty, regardless of whether that duty arises from common law principles or is imposed by statute.

Furthermore, the doctrine of agency applies, making the master (defendant store owner) civilly liable for the negligence of their servant (clerk) when committed in the course of employment. The fact that only the clerk may be criminally liable under the statute does not preclude the store owner's civil liability under agency principles.

Osborne v. McMasters

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