Oregon v. Bradshaw
462 U.S. 1039 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
When a suspect in custody invokes their right to counsel, further interrogation is permissible only if the suspect initiates further communication with the police. A suspect's question can constitute initiation if it evinces a willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation, not merely a routine inquiry related to the incidents of custody.
Facts:
- In September 1980, police were investigating the death of Lowell Reynolds, who was found in his wrecked pickup truck.
- James Edward Bradshaw was asked to accompany police to the station for questioning regarding Reynolds' death.
- Bradshaw admitted to providing liquor for a party at Reynolds' house but denied involvement in the fatal traffic accident.
- After police arrested Bradshaw for furnishing liquor to a minor and told him their theory that he was the driver, Bradshaw stated, "I do want an attorney before it goes very much further."
- The officer immediately terminated the conversation.
- While being transferred from the police station to the county jail, Bradshaw asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?"
- Following a discussion, Bradshaw agreed to take a polygraph test the next day.
- After the polygraph examiner told Bradshaw he did not believe his story, Bradshaw recanted and admitted to being the driver of the vehicle when Reynolds was killed.
Procedural Posture:
- Bradshaw's motion to suppress his statements was denied by the Oregon trial court.
- Following a bench trial in the Oregon state court, Bradshaw was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and other offenses.
- Bradshaw, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals, with the State of Oregon as appellee, reversed the conviction, finding the statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
- The State of Oregon, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a suspect's question, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?", made after invoking his right to counsel, constitute an 'initiation' of communication under Edwards v. Arizona, thereby permitting further police interrogation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
Yes. A suspect's question to police constitutes an 'initiation' of communication if it can be reasonably interpreted as evincing a willingness for a generalized discussion about the investigation. Bradshaw's question was not a routine inquiry arising from the incidents of custody, such as a request for water. Instead, it indicated a desire to discuss his situation, which opened the door for police to re-engage with him. Once a suspect initiates communication, the court must conduct a separate inquiry into whether the subsequent waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. Here, since Bradshaw initiated the dialogue and the trial court found he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, his subsequent confession was admissible.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
No. A suspect 'initiates' further communication under Edwards v. Arizona only when their question or statement pertains to the subject matter of the criminal investigation itself. Bradshaw's question, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?", was a normal reaction to the custodial setting and the loss of control over one's freedom, not an invitation to reopen interrogation about the crime. To allow police to capitalize on such a natural response to custody undermines the procedural safeguards established in Miranda to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The plurality's interpretation drastically weakens the protections carefully erected around the right to counsel.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes. While agreeing with the judgment that Bradshaw's confession was admissible, this opinion expresses concern that the plurality's two-step 'initiation' analysis could become overly rigid and confusing. Rather than a formalistic inquiry into 'who spoke first,' the proper standard should be a holistic examination of the 'totality of the circumstances' under Johnson v. Zerbst to determine if a waiver was knowing and intelligent. Fragmenting the standard into a novel two-step test can frustrate justice. Under a full examination of the facts, including the repeated Miranda warnings and signed waiver, Bradshaw knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the 'initiation' prong of the Edwards v. Arizona rule, establishing a relatively low threshold for what constitutes a suspect's reopening of dialogue with police. By distinguishing between routine custodial inquiries and questions evincing a 'desire for a generalized discussion,' the Court gives law enforcement more leeway to re-engage with suspects who have invoked their right to counsel. This decision narrows the prophylactic protection of Edwards, as a suspect's ambiguous or general question about their situation can now be interpreted as an invitation to resume interrogation, shifting the focus to the voluntariness of the subsequent waiver.
