Omelenchuk v. City of Warren
461 Mich 567, 609 N.W.2d 177 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Under Michigan's medical malpractice statutory scheme, when a plaintiff provides a notice of intent to sue within the final 182 days of the limitation period, the statute of limitations is tolled for the full 182-day statutory 'notice period,' not the potentially shorter 'no-suit' interval.
Facts:
- On February 13, 1994, George Omelenchuk suffered a heart attack at his workplace.
- Emergency personnel from the Warren Fire Department responded and inserted an endotracheal tube as part of resuscitation efforts.
- Upon Omelenchuk's arrival at a nearby hospital, medical staff discovered the endotracheal tube had been incorrectly placed in his esophagus instead of his trachea.
- Omelenchuk was pronounced dead at the hospital that same day.
- The following day, February 14, 1994, Jeanne and Kristin Omelenchuk were appointed copersonal representatives of George Omelenchuk's estate.
- On December 11, 1995, with 65 days remaining in the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice, the Omelenchuks provided the City of Warren with a written notice of their intent to file a lawsuit.
- The City of Warren and its fire department did not provide a written response to the Omelenchuks' notice of intent.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Jeanne and Kristin Omelenchuk filed a medical malpractice suit against the City of Warren and the Warren Fire Department in the circuit court (trial court) on July 19, 1996.
- Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing both governmental immunity and that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.
- The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants on the basis of governmental immunity.
- The plaintiffs appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, but did so on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired.
- The plaintiffs (as appellants) then applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
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Issue:
Under Michigan's medical malpractice statutes, is the statute of limitations tolled for the full 182-day statutory 'notice period' when the plaintiff files a notice of intent to sue, even if the actual 'no-suit' waiting period is shortened by the defendant's inaction?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The statute of limitations is tolled for the full 182-day statutory 'notice period' regardless of the length of the 'no-suit' waiting period. The court reasoned that the plain language of the tolling statute, MCL 600.5856(d), explicitly ties the tolling duration to the 'applicable notice period,' which is a fixed 182-day term defined in MCL 600.2912b. The court rejected the lower court's interpretation, which linked the tolling period to the variable 'no-suit' period, because that would require rewriting the statute and would encourage litigation over the length of the no-suit period. The court's construction provides a clear, predictable rule that the tolling period is a fixed 182 days.
Analysis:
This decision provides critical clarity on the calculation of the statute of limitations in Michigan medical malpractice cases, establishing a bright-line rule that favors predictability. By holding that the tolling period is the fixed 182-day 'notice period' rather than the variable 'no-suit' period, the court ensures that plaintiffs receive the full statutory tolling benefit. This prevents a defendant from strategically shortening the tolling period through its own inaction (i.e., by not responding to a notice of intent), thereby protecting a plaintiff's ability to timely file a claim.
