No, this search was legal. The Fourth Amendment protects your 'person, house, papers, and personal belongings,' but a big open field isn't any of those things. Even though the owners tried to make their fields private, society doesn't view a field as having the same high level of privacy as a home. This 'open fields' rule means police don't need a warrant for this kind of search.

Yes, this search was illegal. The Fourth Amendment is meant to protect people's reasonable expectation of privacy, not just specific locations. When you put up fences and 'No Trespassing' signs, you are telling the world you want privacy. The police should have to respect that and get a warrant before searching.

No, the search was fine, for a simple reason. The Constitution's text protects 'houses' and 'effects.' A field is not a house or an effect. That's the end of the analysis. We don't even need to discuss whether the owner expected privacy.

No, the Fourth Amendment does not protect open fields because people can't expect to have privacy for activities in these areas far from their house. The Amendment only protects the area close to the house, called the curtilage. The Court looked at the words of the Amendment, the history of laws treating open fields differently from the curtilage, and the fact that intimate activities protected by the Amendment don't usually happen in open fields. The Court said that even if entering the open fields is trespassing, it's not the same as violating someone's privacy rights.

The Court is wrong to say the Fourth Amendment doesn't protect open fields just because they're not specifically mentioned. The Court should have looked at factors like whether the law gives people the right to keep others out, how the space is used, and whether Oliver and Thornton made it clear they wanted privacy. Based on these factors, Oliver and Thornton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their fields that was violated by the police searches.

Agrees with the result and the main points of the majority opinion, which are enough to decide the case. Says there's no need to discuss expectations of privacy because even reasonable expectations can't turn a field into a 'house' or 'effect' that the Fourth Amendment protects.

No, the Fourth Amendment does not protect open fields because people can't expect to have privacy for activities in these areas far from their house. The Amendment only protects the area close to the house, called the curtilage. We looked at the words of the Amendment, the history of laws treating open fields differently from the curtilage, and the fact that intimate activities protected by the Amendment don't usually happen in open fields. We said that even if entering the open fields is trespassing, it's not the same as violating someone's privacy rights.

Yes, the Fourth Amendment does protect people from police searches in open fields on their private property. I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment doesn't protect open fields just because they're not specifically mentioned. We should look at factors like whether the law gives people the right to keep others out, how the space is used, and whether Oliver and Thornton made it clear they wanted privacy. Based on these factors, Oliver and Thornton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their fields that was violated by the police searches.

No, the Fourth Amendment does not protect people from police searches in open fields on their private property. I agree with the result and the main points of the majority opinion, which are enough to decide the case. There's no need to discuss expectations of privacy because even reasonable expectations can't turn a field into a 'house' or 'effect' that the Fourth Amendment protects.

"Curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."

The area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home," the curtilage, is "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."

An "asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that `society recognizes as reasonable.'"

—held that there was no fourth amendment privacy interest in open fields, the Court observed that the "curtilage," the land immediately surrounding the home, is entitled to fourth amendment protections that attach to the home.

—the Court distinguished between the law of trespass and the right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Regardless, "open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance."

A] n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home

—single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant.[Citation.] In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment …

The United States Supreme Court has noted, however, that "for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage—as the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends—is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience."

"The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly `private'activity "but" whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. "

No. A warrantless search of an open field does not violate the Fourth Amendment because an individual does not have a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in such areas. The Court reasoned that the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment, which protects 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' does not extend to open fields. Historically, the common law distinguished between the 'curtilage'—the land immediately surrounding a home—and open fields, affording constitutional protection only to the former. The Court held that society is not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in open fields as reasonable, as these areas do not host the same intimate activities as a home. Furthermore, creating a case-by-case analysis based on fences or signs would create an unworkable standard for law enforcement.

Yes. A warrantless search of secluded and posted private land violates the Fourth Amendment by intruding upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. The dissent argued that the majority's focus on the literal text of the Fourth Amendment ignores the Court's precedent, established in Katz, that the Amendment 'protects people, not places.' An individual's expectation of privacy in posted and fenced land is reasonable because: (1) property rights, especially those backed by criminal trespass laws, reflect society's recognition of a right to exclude others; (2) private lands are used for a variety of private activities; and (3) the owners took clear steps to manifest their desire for privacy. The majority's bright-line rule withdraws constitutional protection from deserving privacy interests and creates its own ambiguity regarding the definition of 'curtilage'.

No. The warrantless search was permissible based on the plain text of the Fourth Amendment alone. The concurrence agrees with the majority's conclusion and its textual analysis that the amendment's protection of 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' does not cover open fields. Therefore, it is unnecessary to engage in an analysis of the landowner's expectation of privacy, as no such expectation can transform a field into a constitutionally protected 'house' or 'effect'.

No, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not extend to open fields, because an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in activities conducted in open fields. The Amendment's protections only apply to the curtilage, the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home. The Court's analysis rests on the literal text of the Amendment, the historical distinction between open fields and curtilage, and the fact that open fields are not settings for the intimate activities the Amendment is intended to protect from government interference or surveillance. The Court also distinguishes between the law of trespass and the right to privacy, emphasizing that the government's intrusion upon open fields is not a 'search' in the constitutional sense, even if it would be a trespass at common law.

The Court's decision rests on a misinterpretation of the literal language of the Fourth Amendment and disregards prior decisions extending protection to places not mentioned in the text. The Court's rule is also inconsistent with the results reached in other cases. The determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate should depend on factors like whether the expectation is rooted in entitlements defined by positive law, the uses to which spaces can be put, and whether the person claiming the privacy interest manifested that interest to the public. Considering these factors, Oliver and Thornton had legitimate expectations of privacy in their fields that were violated by the warrantless searches.

Concurs in the judgment and joins Parts I and II of the majority opinion, finding them sufficient to dispose of the issue. Asserts there is no need to address the expectation of privacy matter, as reasonable expectations cannot convert a field into a 'house' or 'effect' protected by the Fourth Amendment.

No, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not extend to open fields because an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in activities conducted in open fields. The Amendment's protections only apply to the curtilage, the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home. This analysis rests on the literal text of the Amendment, the historical distinction between open fields and curtilage, and the fact that open fields are not settings for the intimate activities the Amendment is intended to protect from government interference or surveillance. Additionally, there is a distinction between the law of trespass and the right to privacy, emphasizing that the government's intrusion upon open fields is not a 'search' in the constitutional sense, even if it would be a trespass at common law.

Yes, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to open fields on private property. The majority's decision rests on a misinterpretation of the literal language of the Fourth Amendment and disregards prior decisions extending protection to places not mentioned in the text. The majority's rule is also inconsistent with the results reached in other cases. The determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate should depend on factors like whether the expectation is rooted in entitlements defined by positive law, the uses to which spaces can be put, and whether the person claiming the privacy interest manifested that interest to the public. Considering these factors, Oliver and Thornton had legitimate expectations of privacy in their fields that were violated by the warrantless searches.

No, I concur in the judgment and join Parts I and II of the majority opinion, finding them sufficient to dispose of the issue. There is no need to address the expectation of privacy matter, as reasonable expectations cannot convert a field into a 'house' or 'effect' protected by the Fourth Amendment.

Oliver v. United States

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