Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta
597 U. S. ____ (2022)
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Rule of Law:
States possess concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country, unless that jurisdiction is expressly preempted by federal law or unlawfully infringes on tribal self-government.
Facts:
- In 2015, Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta lived in Tulsa, Oklahoma, with his wife and his 5-year-old stepdaughter, who is a Cherokee Indian with cerebral palsy and legal blindness.
- One day in 2015, Castro-Huerta’s sister-in-law discovered the young girl sick in the house, leading to her being rushed to a Tulsa hospital in critical condition.
- The girl was found to be severely dehydrated, emaciated, covered in lice and excrement, and weighed only 19 pounds, with investigators finding her bed filled with bedbugs and cockroaches.
- Castro-Huerta admitted that he had severely undernourished his stepdaughter during the preceding month.
Procedural Posture:
- Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta was charged by the State of Oklahoma for child neglect in state court.
- Castro-Huerta was convicted in state court and sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment.
- While Castro-Huerta’s state-court appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided McGirt v. Oklahoma, holding that the Creek Nation’s reservation in eastern Oklahoma remained 'Indian country,' which led to similar recognition for other reservations in eastern Oklahoma, including the Cherokee Nation.
- In light of McGirt, Castro-Huerta argued that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute him for a crime committed in Tulsa (now recognized as Indian country) against his stepdaughter (a Cherokee Indian), and that the State therefore lacked jurisdiction.
- The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with Castro-Huerta, ruling that the State did not have concurrent jurisdiction, and vacated his conviction.
- While Castro-Huerta’s state appellate proceedings were ongoing, a federal grand jury in Oklahoma indicted him for the same conduct, and he accepted a plea agreement for a 7-year federal sentence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the extent of a State’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
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Issue:
Does a State have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country, or is federal jurisdiction exclusive?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kavanaugh
Yes, the Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. The Court establishes that Indian country is an integral part of a State's territory, not separate from it, and thus a State generally holds jurisdiction over its territory unless that authority is preempted by federal law or unlawfully infringes on tribal self-government. The Court rejects arguments that federal law preempts state jurisdiction in this context. First, the General Crimes Act (GCA), 18 U.S.C. §1152, does not preempt state authority. The GCA merely 'extends' federal criminal law applicable in federal enclaves to Indian country; it does not declare federal jurisdiction exclusive or preempt state jurisdiction. The phrase 'sole and exclusive jurisdiction' in the GCA is descriptive of the federal laws being extended, not the jurisdictional nature of Indian country itself, as clarified in precedents like In re Wilson (1891) and Donnelly v. United States (1913). Historical context from the early Republic, when Indian country was viewed as separate, has been abandoned, and the GCA's text has not changed to make federal jurisdiction exclusive, especially after United States v. McBratney (1882) affirmed state jurisdiction over non-Indian on non-Indian crimes in Indian country. The reenactment canon does not apply to isolated dicta from Williams v. United States (1946) regarding state jurisdiction because the GCA's text is clear, and its 1948 recodification was general, not an endorsement of prior dicta. Second, Public Law 280 (PL-280) does not preempt state authority. PL-280 affirmatively grants certain States (and allows others to acquire) broad jurisdiction, but it contains no language divesting States of pre-existing or lawfully assumed jurisdiction, as held in Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C. (1984). The law addresses a broader scope of crimes, including those by Indians, so its enactment does not render pre-existing state jurisdiction over non-Indian on Indian crimes 'pointless surplusage.' Third, the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) balancing test, which considers tribal, federal, and state interests to determine if state jurisdiction unlawfully infringes on tribal self-government, does not bar state jurisdiction here. Tribal self-government is not infringed because Indian tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe (1978)). A state prosecution of a non-Indian does not involve the exercise of state power over any Indian or tribe. Federal interests in protecting Indian victims are not harmed because state prosecution supplements, rather than supplants, federal authority. The State has a strong sovereign interest in public safety and criminal justice within its territory, including protecting all crime victims, whether Indian or non-Indian, and declining state jurisdiction would effectively treat Indian victims as 'second-class citizens.' Finally, the Court reiterates that Indian country is part of a State, not separate, and that prior treaties (e.g., New Echota 1835, 1866) were supplanted by Oklahoma’s statehood in 1907. The Oklahoma Enabling Act did not contain explicit language to prevent the State from exercising criminal jurisdiction throughout its limits, consistent with McBratney and Organized Village of Kake v. Egan (1962).
Dissenting - Justice Gorsuch
No, the State does not have concurrent jurisdiction, and the Federal Government's jurisdiction remains exclusive for crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country unless Congress clearly provides otherwise. Justice Gorsuch argues that the majority fundamentally misunderstands the foundational principle of tribal sovereignty, which dictates that state laws have no force on tribal members within tribal bounds unless Congress clearly ordains it. This is the inverse of ordinary federal preemption principles. Historically, from the Nation's founding, the federal government held exclusive authority over tribal relations, and States lacked inherent jurisdiction on tribal lands, as established in Worcester v. Georgia (1832) and reaffirmed in Williams v. Lee (1959). The General Crimes Act (GCA) of 1834, adopted after Worcester, extended federal criminal law to Indian country, treating it akin to federal enclaves where state law generally does not apply. The GCA's exceptions for crimes involving only Indians or those punished by tribal law further underscore an intent to protect tribal sovereignty from state intrusion. The Major Crimes Act (MCA) of 1885, granting exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain major crimes by Indians, would be unnecessary if states already had concurrent jurisdiction. Treaties like the 1835 Treaty of New Echota explicitly promised the Cherokee freedom from 'State sovereignties.' The Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906, which required Oklahoma to 'forever disclaim all right and title' to Indian lands and acknowledge that such lands 'remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States,' reinforced federal and tribal authority, not state jurisdiction. Precedents like United States v. Ramsey (1926) confirmed that Oklahoma statehood did not grant the power to try 'crimes by or against Indians.' Public Law 280 (PL-280) and similar state-specific grants of jurisdiction are the only means by which Congress has affirmatively extended state criminal jurisdiction to Indian country for crimes by or against Indians. PL-280 explicitly requires states like Oklahoma to amend their laws and obtain tribal consent, neither of which Oklahoma has done. The majority's interpretation renders these congressional acts 'pointless surplusage.' Finally, the Bracker balancing test, designed for civil disputes where Congress had not comprehensively allocated jurisdiction, is inappropriate for criminal jurisdiction, where Congress has provided a detailed scheme. Even if applied, a proper balancing would recognize significant tribal interests, including historical mistreatment by states and potential for biased justice, outweighing the state's self-professed interests. The dissent criticizes the majority's 'policy argument' as an inappropriate usurpation of legislative authority, lacking complete assessment of costs and benefits for tribes and federal law enforcement.
Analysis:
This case fundamentally alters the understanding of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, shifting the default presumption from exclusive federal or tribal authority to concurrent state jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. It effectively reinterprets decades of precedent and federal statutes like the General Crimes Act and Public Law 280, potentially expanding state power in a manner many tribes and legal scholars previously believed required explicit congressional authorization and tribal consent. This ruling is significant for public safety and criminal justice in Indian country, particularly in Oklahoma post-McGirt, but it raises concerns about potential erosion of tribal sovereignty and the consistency of law enforcement efforts across different jurisdictions. The decision solidifies the perspective that Indian country, while unique, is generally part of the state and subject to its laws unless specifically preempted, rather than a separate sovereign territory where state law is generally excluded.
