Ohio v. Robinette

United States Supreme Court
519 U.S. 33 (1996)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized person be advised they are "free to go" before their consent to a search will be recognized as voluntary. The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact determined from the totality of the circumstances.

Facts:

Deputy Roger Newsome stopped Robert D. Robinette for driving 69 miles per hour in a 45-mph construction zone.
After checking Robinette's driver's license and finding no prior violations, Newsome issued a verbal warning and returned the license to Robinette.
As Robinette turned to go back to his car, Newsome asked, "One question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal contraband in your car?"
Robinette answered "no," after which Newsome asked for permission to search the car.
Robinette consented to the search.
During the search, Deputy Newsome discovered a small amount of marijuana and a pill later identified as MDMA.

Procedural Posture:

Robert Robinette was charged in an Ohio trial court with knowing possession of a controlled substance.
Robinette filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court denied.
Following the denial of his motion, Robinette pleaded "no contest" and was found guilty.
Robinette appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which reversed the conviction, holding that the search resulted from an unlawful detention.
The State of Ohio appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which affirmed the intermediate appellate court's judgment.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the State of Ohio's petition for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does the Fourth Amendment require a police officer, after concluding a lawful traffic stop, to inform the motorist that they are free to go before the motorist's consent to a search can be considered voluntary?

Opinions:

Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist

No. The Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer to inform a motorist that they are free to go before their consent to a search will be deemed voluntary. The constitutional touchstone is reasonableness, which is assessed by examining the totality of the circumstances. The Court has consistently rejected bright-line, per se rules in Fourth Amendment inquiries, as established in cases like Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, which held that knowledge of the right to refuse consent is only one factor, not a prerequisite, for a valid consent. Imposing such a mandatory warning would be impractical and is not required for consent to be voluntary. Furthermore, the officer's subjective intent for detaining Robinette is irrelevant; the stop was objectively justified by the speeding violation.

Concurring - Justice Ginsburg

No. I agree with the judgment that the Federal Constitution does not mandate the Ohio Supreme Court's "first-tell-then-ask" rule. However, state courts are free to impose greater restrictions on police activity under their own state laws. The Ohio Supreme Court's opinion was ambiguous as to whether its rule was based on federal or state law, making Supreme Court review under Michigan v. Long appropriate. On remand, the Ohio court can clarify that its rule is an independent requirement of Ohio state law, thereby providing its citizens greater protection than the federal floor.

Dissenting - Justice Stevens

No. While I agree with the narrow holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require a specific "free to go" warning, the judgment should be affirmed on other grounds. Robinette's consent was invalid because it was the product of an unlawful detention. The purpose of the traffic stop was complete once the officer returned Robinette's license and issued a warning; any continued detention without reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity was an illegal seizure. A reasonable person in Robinette's position would not have felt free to leave, meaning the seizure continued, and the consent obtained during this illegal seizure was tainted fruit of the poisonous tree.

Analysis:

This decision reinforces the Supreme Court's preference for a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances test over rigid, bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment consent-to-search cases. It solidifies the principle from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that a person's knowledge of their rights is just one factor, not a prerequisite, for determining the voluntariness of consent. The ruling gives law enforcement more leeway to request searches following traffic stops, as they are not required to signal the end of the detention with a specific warning. However, the decision also implicitly highlights the power of states to provide greater protections under their own constitutions, a point emphasized in the concurring and dissenting opinions.

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