Ohio v. Clark
192 L. Ed. 2d 306, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 83 U.S.L.W. 4484 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Statements made by a young child to individuals who are not law enforcement, such as teachers, are not testimonial and do not violate the Confrontation Clause if the primary purpose of the conversation, viewed objectively, is to address an ongoing emergency and protect the child, rather than to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.
Facts:
- Darius Clark lived with his girlfriend, T.T., and her two young children, a three-year-old boy named L.P. and an 18-month-old girl.
- Clark, who was also T.T.'s pimp, sent her on a trip to work as a prostitute in March 2010, leaving the two children in his care.
- The next day, Clark took L.P. to preschool where his teachers, Ramona Whitley and Debra Jones, noticed injuries on the boy, including a bloodshot eye and red marks on his face.
- When the teachers asked L.P. what happened and who hurt him, L.P. identified "Dee," Clark's nickname.
- The teachers then lifted L.P.'s shirt and discovered more injuries on his body, prompting them to call a child abuse hotline.
- A day later, a social worker and physician found both children with extensive injuries consistent with severe abuse, including bruises, belt marks, black eyes, and a burn.
Procedural Posture:
- Darius Clark was indicted by a grand jury on multiple counts of felonious assault, endangering children, and domestic violence.
- At Clark's jury trial in an Ohio state court, the trial court determined that the child victim, L.P., was incompetent to testify.
- The trial court denied Clark's motion to exclude L.P.'s out-of-court statements to his teachers, ruling they were not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause.
- The jury found Clark guilty on most counts, and he was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment.
- Clark, as appellant, appealed to an Ohio intermediate appellate court, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statements were testimonial and their admission violated the Confrontation Clause.
- The State of Ohio, as appellant, then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which affirmed the intermediate appellate court's judgment.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the introduction of a three-year-old child's statements to his preschool teachers identifying his abuser violate the accused's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when the child is unavailable to testify at trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No. The introduction of L.P.'s statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements were not testimonial. The primary purpose of the teachers' questioning was to address an ongoing emergency—the suspected abuse of a vulnerable child—and to ensure his safety, not to gather evidence for a future prosecution. The court's analysis considered several factors: the conversation was aimed at resolving an immediate threat; the setting was an informal preschool classroom, not a formal interrogation; the declarant was a very young child who would not have intended to bear witness for a prosecution; and the questioners were teachers, not law enforcement officers. The court concluded that mandatory reporting laws do not, by themselves, transform a teacher's conversation with a student into a law enforcement mission for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. The judgment is correct that the statements were not testimonial, but the majority's reasoning unnecessarily complicates the analysis and expresses hostility toward the Court's precedent in Crawford v. Washington. The case is simple: L.P.'s age makes it impossible for him to have had the primary purpose of invoking state machinery for prosecution, and the teachers' primary purpose was clearly to protect the child from imminent harm, not build a case. The conversation lacked the requisite solemnity to be testimonial. Scalia criticized the majority's dictum that the primary purpose test is merely 'necessary, but not always sufficient,' viewing it as an attempt to weaken the protections established in Crawford.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
No. The judgment is correct, but the Court should not apply the 'primary purpose' test. Instead, the proper analysis for whether a statement is testimonial rests on whether it bears sufficient 'indicia of solemnity,' such as being part of a formalized dialogue or contained in materials like affidavits. Here, L.P.'s statements were made during an informal conversation with his teachers at a preschool. They bear no resemblance to the historical abuses, like formal ex parte examinations, that the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent. Therefore, the statements are not testimonial, and their admission does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the Confrontation Clause's 'primary purpose' test to statements made by very young children to non-law enforcement personnel. It establishes that such statements are highly unlikely to be deemed 'testimonial,' particularly when made in response to immediate safety concerns, thus making them admissible without cross-examination. The ruling provides prosecutors with a clearer path to admit crucial evidence in child abuse cases where the victim is often unable to testify. However, by declining to create a bright-line rule for all statements to private citizens, the Court leaves the door open for case-by-case analysis in different factual contexts.
