Ohio v. Clark
135 S. Ct. 2173, 192 L. Ed. 2d 306, 83 U.S.L.W. 4484 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
Statements are not testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes when their primary purpose, viewed objectively, is to enable assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, rather than to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. When the declarant is a very young child speaking to non-law enforcement personnel, such as teachers, their statements will rarely be considered testimonial.
Facts:
- Darius Clark lived with his girlfriend, T.T., and her two young children, three-year-old L.P. and 18-month-old A.T.
- Clark was T.T.'s pimp and sent her out of town to engage in prostitution, leaving the children in his care.
- The next day at preschool, L.P.'s teacher, Ramona Whitley, observed that the child's eye was bloodshot and he had red marks on his face.
- Another teacher, Debra Jones, asked L.P., "Who did this? What happened to you?"
- L.P. responded by identifying "Dee," which was Clark's nickname.
- Upon lifting the boy's shirt, the teachers discovered more injuries on his body.
- A teacher then called a child abuse hotline to report the suspected abuse.
- A later medical examination revealed extensive injuries on both L.P. and his younger sister, A.T., consistent with abuse.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Ohio indicted Darius Clark in a state trial court on multiple charges, including felonious assault and child endangerment.
- Before trial, the court determined that the three-year-old victim, L.P., was not competent to testify.
- The trial court denied Clark's motion to exclude L.P.'s out-of-court statements to his teachers, ruling they were not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause.
- A jury found Clark guilty on most counts, and he was sentenced to 28 years in prison.
- Clark, as appellant, appealed to an Ohio intermediate appellate court, which reversed his conviction, holding that the statements were testimonial and their admission violated the Confrontation Clause.
- The State of Ohio, as appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which affirmed the intermediate appellate court's judgment.
- The State of Ohio petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements made by a three-year-old child to his preschool teachers identifying his abuser, when the child was unavailable to testify and the primary purpose of the teachers' questioning was to address a suspected ongoing emergency of child abuse?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No, the introduction of the child's statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were not testimonial. A statement's primary purpose determines whether it is testimonial, and here, the primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency and protect a vulnerable child, not to create evidence for a prosecution. The court's objective inquiry considers all relevant circumstances, including the informal setting of the questioning (a preschool), the identity of the questioners (teachers, not police), and the age of the declarant. Statements by very young children are rarely testimonial because they lack the intent to create a substitute for trial testimony. Ohio's mandatory reporting law for teachers does not automatically convert their questioning into a formal law enforcement interrogation for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No, the statements were not testimonial. The majority's holding is correct, but its reasoning needlessly complicates and weakens the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence established in Crawford v. Washington. A simple application of the primary purpose test resolves the case: the three-year-old child was incapable of forming a testimonial purpose, and the teachers' primary purpose was to ensure the child's safety, not to gather evidence for prosecution. The majority's dictum that the primary purpose test is merely a 'necessary, but not always sufficient' condition is false and risks reopening the door to the overruled reliability-based approach of Ohio v. Roberts.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
No, the statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. The 'primary purpose' test is an ahistorical fiction that should be abandoned. The correct inquiry for whether a statement is testimonial is whether it bears sufficient indicia of solemnity and formality, akin to an affidavit, deposition, or other formalized material. The informal statements of a young child to his teachers in a preschool setting lack any such solemnity and therefore do not qualify as testimonial under the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the 'primary purpose' test to statements made to individuals who are not law enforcement officers, particularly in child abuse cases. It establishes that such statements are much less likely to be deemed testimonial, shifting the focus to the immediate context of the conversation—such as ensuring a child's safety—rather than the ultimate possibility of criminal prosecution. The Court's emphasis on the declarant's age and the informality of the setting provides lower courts with key factors for admitting children's out-of-court statements, thereby strengthening the ability of prosecutors to bring cases where young victims are unable to testify.
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