No. The government does not have to pay. The Constitution has a rule called the 'Appropriations Clause,' which says government money can only be spent if Congress passes a law allowing it. In this case, the law clearly said Richmond shouldn't get the money because he earned too much. A court can't ignore the Constitution and the law just because a government worker made a mistake. If we allowed that, any government employee could overrule Congress's decisions about spending, which would be a mess.

I agree the government wins, but let's be clear. This decision doesn't mean the government can *never* be stopped by fairness. But there's a big difference between stopping the government from doing something it has a choice about, and forcing it to make a payment that the law forbids. We are also not saying what would happen if Congress's spending rules violated another part of the Constitution.

I agree Richmond loses, but the main opinion's reason is wrong. The Constitution's spending rule isn't the issue. The real reason is that past court cases have been very tough on people in this situation. It's an unfair result, but we have to follow those older cases. If the situation had been more extreme and unfair, the outcome might have been different.

Yes. The government should have to pay. It was 100% the government's fault that Richmond lost his benefits, because he trusted their official advice. It's just not fair to punish someone for that. Courts should be able to bend the rules in situations like this to make sure the government treats people fairly. The majority is too worried about imaginary problems; this is about doing the right thing for one person who was wronged by his government.

No, the government doesn't have to pay. The law is clear that the government can only pay out money if there's a law that says it can. The Constitution says the government can't give out money just because someone made a mistake. The government isn't like a regular person or company; it has special rules to follow about money. The Supreme Court has never allowed someone to get money from the government just because they were told something wrong by a government employee.

The majority's ruling doesn't solve this case. Paying Richmond the disability benefits would follow the relevant law about the money set aside for this. Even if the law can't be read to provide money for people in Richmond's situation, the government still shouldn't be allowed to use the Constitution's rule to avoid paying, because of how they acted before the lawsuit. What's fair is on Richmond's side. We should understand the law and Congress' purposes as not blocking Richmond's claim when the government misled him.

I agree the government can't be forced to pay in cases like this. But the Court is smart not to say the government can never be forced to pay. There's a difference between stopping the government from using power it rightfully has and making the President's branch break a law Congress wrote. The Court also isn't saying Congress' limits on spending can never be overruled if they go against the Constitution or step on another branch's role.

I agree with the Court's decision but not its reasons. The Constitution's rule about spending has nothing to do with this. The disagreement is about what rules apply when spending money that's already been set aside, not whether money has been set aside at all. I agree with Justice Marshall that what's fair favors Richmond, but unless the decision in Federal Crop Ins. Corporation v. Merrill is overturned, this kind of bad management has to be allowed. The case is more like Schweiker v. Hansen and Heckler v. Community Health Services than Moser v. United States and United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.

—noting that the Supreme Court has reversed every finding of estoppel against the government that it has reviewed

The Court held that "judicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant... a money remedy that Congress has not authorized."

W] e have recognized that equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private litigants

—holding that payments of money from the federal treasury are limited by the Appropriations Clause to those authorized by statute, and that erroneous advice given by a government employee to a claimant for benefits cannot estop the government from denying benefits not otherwise permitted by law

The Supreme Court has noted "that this Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the Government by a claimant seeking public funds."

The Clause has a "fundamental and comprehensive purpose... to assure that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress as to the common good and not according to the individual favor of Government agents."

The Appropriations Clause "means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress."

Any exercise of a power granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury

Specifically, in Richmond, the United States Supreme Court held that "erroneous oral and written advice given by a Government employee to a benefits claimant" cannot "give rise to estoppel against the Government [.]"

While the federal courts can decide cases and controversies involving the other branches of government, they cannot order the payment of a judgment against a sovereign absent an appropriation.

No. The legal doctrine of equitable estoppel does not permit a court to order a payment from the Treasury that is not authorized by a specific statute. The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 9, cl. 7) states that 'No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.' Because the relevant statute explicitly prohibits disability payments to an individual in Richmond's position, Congress has not appropriated funds for this purpose. A court cannot use the equitable doctrine of estoppel to override this explicit constitutional command and statutory directive. To allow estoppel based on an agent's error would effectively transfer Congress's constitutional power of the purse to Executive Branch officials, violating the separation of powers.

While concurring in the judgment, this opinion emphasizes two limitations. First, the Court does not create an absolute rule that the government can never be estopped; it distinguishes this case, which asks the Court to order an illegal payment, from a case like PICCO, which merely asked to prevent the government's discretionary action. Second, the opinion notes that the Court's holding does not address whether statutory appropriation limits could ever fall if they violate another constitutional command, like the Just Compensation Clause, or encroach upon the powers of another branch.

While concurring in the judgment, this opinion rejects the majority's reasoning. The Appropriations Clause is a 'red herring' because appropriations cover entire programs, not individual payments. The real issue concerns the rules governing the administration of an existing appropriation. The proper basis for the decision is precedent, specifically Federal Crop Ins. Corporation v. Merrill, which established a harsh rule against estoppel that must be tolerated in cases without extreme facts. The opinion suggests that in a more extreme case of hardship, the Court would likely apply estoppel principles to prevent an unjust forfeiture.

Yes. Equitable estoppel should permit a claimant to receive a monetary payment in these circumstances. The statute governing disability benefits should be interpreted flexibly to effectuate Congress's intent for fair implementation, allowing exceptions where the government's own error causes a claimant's ineligibility, as seen in cases like Moser v. United States. Even if the statute is read inflexibly, the government should be equitably estopped from invoking the Appropriations Clause as a defense because of its own affirmative misconduct. The equities of the case strongly favor Richmond, and the majority's policy fears of fraud and a drain on the public fisc are overstated.

No. Payments from the Federal Treasury are limited to those authorized by statute. The Constitution's Appropriations Clause does not permit payments of money not authorized by law, regardless of erroneous advice from Government employees. The Supreme Court has consistently reversed every finding of estoppel against the Government it has reviewed, emphasizing that equitable estoppel does not apply against the Government as it does to private litigants. The fundamental purpose of the Appropriations Clause is to assure that public funds are spent according to the precise judgments of Congress, not based on the discretionary decisions of individual Government agents. Judicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant respondent a money remedy that Congress has not authorized, because courts cannot estop the Constitution.

The majority's holding that a litigant may not succeed on a claim for payment of money from the Treasury in the absence of a statutory appropriation does not resolve this case. Richmond's collection of disability benefits would be fully consistent with the relevant appropriation. Even if the statute cannot be construed to appropriate funds for claimants in Richmond's position, petitioner may nonetheless be estopped, on the basis of its prelitigation conduct, from arguing that the Appropriations Clause bars his recovery. The equities favor Richmond. Respect for Congress' purposes in creating the federal disability annuity system and principles of elementary fairness require that we read the statute as not barring Richmond's claim where the Executive has misled him.

I agree that the Government may not be estopped in cases such as this one. However, the Court wisely does not decide that the Government may not be estopped under any circumstances. There is a difference between preventing the Government from exercising lawful discretionary authority and requiring the Executive Branch to violate a congressional statute. The Court also does not state that statutory restrictions on appropriations may never fall even if they violate a command of the Constitution or encroach on the powers reserved to another branch of the Federal Government.

Although I join the Court's judgment, I cannot accept its reasoning. The Appropriations Clause has nothing to do with this case. The dispute is about what rules govern administration of an appropriation that has been made, not whether an appropriation has been made. I agree with Justice Marshall that there are strong equities favoring respondent's position, but unless the decision in Federal Crop Ins. Corporation v. Merrill is repudiated, this kind of maladministration must be tolerated. The case is closer to Schweiker v. Hansen and Heckler v. Community Health Services than to Moser v. United States and United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.

Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond

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Issue:

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