Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
1993 WL 179428, 621 So.2d 953 (1993)
Rule of Law:
A person cannot maintain a cause of action for damages if the injuries sustained were a direct result of their knowing and intentional participation in a crime involving moral turpitude.
Facts:
- On October 18, 1988, 14-year-old Mark Oden and a friend were outside a general merchandise store in Eva, Alabama.
- The two decided to steal soft drinks from vending machines by tilting them forward to dislodge the cans.
- They had already successfully stolen drinks from several other machines using this method on the same evening.
- They then attempted to tilt a machine manufactured by The Vendo Company and owned by Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company.
- While a friend tilted the machine, Mark stood in front to steady it and retrieve the drinks.
- Mark was unable to steady the machine, which weighed over 700 pounds.
- The vending machine fell forward, crushing and killing Mark.
Procedural Posture:
- Jerry Oden, as administrator of his son's estate, filed a products liability action against Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company and The Vendo Company in an Alabama trial court.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's case.
- Jerry Oden, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
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Issue:
Does the legal principle that bars a cause of action reliant on the plaintiff's own illegal act preclude a product liability and negligence claim by the estate of a person killed while intentionally committing a crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, this legal principle bars the claim. A person cannot maintain a cause of action if, to establish it, they must rely on an illegal or immoral act in which they participated. The court interprets this rule to bar any action for damages when the injuries are a direct result of the injured party's knowing and intentional participation in a crime involving moral turpitude. Mark Oden was engaged in theft, a crime of moral turpitude, and his death was a direct consequence of this illegal act. The purpose of this rule is not to protect the defendant, but to uphold public policy by ensuring that the judicial system does not provide aid to those who transgress the moral or criminal code.
Dissenting - Kennedy, J.
No, the claim should not be barred. The rule from Hinkle v. Railway Express Agency only applies when the plaintiff must rely on their illegal act to establish the essential elements of their claim. Here, Oden's estate could prove its product liability and negligence claims—that the machine was defectively designed and dangerously unstable—without any reference to Mark's reason for tilting it. Mark's intent to steal is not an element of the plaintiff's case. His actions may be relevant to the defenses of contributory negligence or product misuse, which are questions of fact for a jury, but they do not provide a basis for an absolute bar to the lawsuit at the summary judgment stage.
Dissenting - Ingram, J.
No, the claim for wantonness against Pepsi should not be barred. The public policy behind the rule is to prevent wrongdoers from profiting and is based on the premise that criminal acts are unforeseeable. Here, Mark is not 'profiting,' and Pepsi had actual knowledge that people were tilting machines to steal drinks and that this activity had resulted in serious injury and death. Pepsi's failure to add free warning labels or install anchors despite this knowledge could constitute wanton conduct. An exception to the absolute bar should exist for cases of willful or wanton conduct where the defendant knew the criminal activity was occurring and consciously disregarded the high risk of serious injury or death.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'wrongful conduct rule' in Alabama tort law, establishing that a plaintiff's intentional participation in a crime of moral turpitude can serve as a complete bar to recovery for resulting injuries. The ruling elevates this public policy defense over traditional tort principles like contributory negligence or comparative fault, preventing certain cases from ever reaching a jury. The decision shifts the legal inquiry from a factual analysis of causation and fault to a threshold question of the plaintiff's conduct, significantly impacting claims brought by individuals injured during the commission of a crime, even when a defendant's product may be defective or their conduct negligent or wanton.
