Ocasio v. United States
2016 U.S. LEXIS 2932, 194 L. Ed. 2d 520, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant can be convicted of conspiring to commit extortion under the Hobbs Act even if the conspiracy's objective is to obtain property from a fellow co-conspirator. The person paying the bribe (the property owner) can be a co-conspirator if they actively participate in the scheme and share the criminal objective, rather than merely acquiescing to an official's demand.
Facts:
- Hernan Moreno and Edwin Mejia, co-owners of the Majestic Auto Repair Shop, were struggling to attract customers in 2008.
- Moreno and Mejia entered into an agreement with Baltimore police officers, including Samuel Ocasio, to create a kickback scheme.
- Under the scheme, officers would persuade owners of damaged cars at accident scenes to have their vehicles towed to Majestic.
- In exchange for each referral, Moreno and Mejia paid the officers kickbacks ranging from $150 to $300.
- Ocasio participated from 2009 to 2011, often calling Moreno from accident scenes to ensure the referral would be profitable for the shop before sending the car.
- After directing a vehicle to Majestic, Ocasio would call Moreno to request his payment.
- The scheme was highly successful, eventually providing Majestic with at least 90% of its customers.
Procedural Posture:
- Samuel Ocasio, Hernan Moreno, Edwin Mejia, and other police officers were indicted in the U.S. District Court.
- Moreno, Mejia, and most other officers pleaded guilty.
- In a superseding indictment, Ocasio was charged with three counts of Hobbs Act extortion and one count of conspiracy to commit the same.
- At his jury trial, Ocasio moved for a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count, which the District Court denied.
- The jury found Ocasio guilty on all counts.
- Ocasio appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed his convictions.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a conspiracy to commit extortion under the Hobbs Act, by obtaining property from another under color of official right, require that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No. Under longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he entered into a conspiracy that had as its objective the obtaining of property from another conspirator. It is sufficient to prove that the conspirators agreed that the underlying crime of extortion would be committed by a member of the conspiracy capable of doing so. The core of a conspiracy is a shared criminal objective; here, Ocasio, Moreno, and Mejia shared the objective that Ocasio and other officers would commit Hobbs Act extortion by obtaining money 'from another' (i.e., from Moreno and Mejia). It is not required that each conspirator be able to personally commit every element of the substantive crime. The court distinguished the 'consent' inherent in Hobbs Act extortion from the specific intent and agreement required for conspiracy, noting that a victim merely acquiescing to an official's demand (e.g., paying protection money) would not have the necessary mens rea to be a co-conspirator.
Concurrence - Justice Breyer
The majority's opinion correctly applies existing precedent, specifically Evans v. United States. However, the premise of Evans—that Hobbs Act extortion is the 'rough equivalent' of taking a bribe—is questionable and raises difficult distinctions between involuntary victims and voluntary co-conspirators. Nevertheless, because the validity of Evans was not challenged in this case, joining the majority opinion is the correct course.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The Court's holding is based on the flawed premise from Evans v. United States that equated extortion with bribery. At common law, extortion involved a public official wrongfully taking property under a false pretense of right, making the payor an innocent victim, not an accomplice. Because a victim cannot logically conspire with their own extortionist, the shop owners could not be Ocasio's co-conspirators. This case involved bribery, not extortion, and the Court's decision needlessly extends federal criminal law into matters properly handled by the states, contrary to principles of federalism.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
No. The natural reading of the Hobbs Act's phrase 'obtaining of property from another' in a conspiracy context means obtaining property from a person outside the conspiratorial group. The conspiracy is a single criminal entity, a 'partnership in crime,' and its members cannot obtain property 'from another' by simply transferring it among themselves. The majority improperly shifts the statutory reference point from the collective conspiracy to the individual official who receives the money, creating an unnatural interpretation of the text that broadens the already sweeping scope of conspiracy prosecutions.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of general conspiracy principles to Hobbs Act prosecutions for extortion under color of official right. It confirms that the 'victim' of such extortion—the bribe-payor—can be prosecuted as a co-conspirator if they are an active and willing participant in the scheme, rather than a mere victim of coercion. This strengthens the hand of federal prosecutors in corruption cases by allowing them to charge both the bribe-taker and the bribe-giver as partners in the same criminal conspiracy, potentially making it easier to secure cooperation and testimony. The case also highlights the ongoing doctrinal tension created by Evans v. United States, which blurred the lines between the distinct crimes of extortion and bribery.
