O'LEARY v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc.
677 F. Supp. 807, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21257, 27 ERC (BNA) 1510 (1988)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) does not divest a federal court of its pre-existing ancillary jurisdiction over a hazardous waste cleanup managed through a court-ordered receivership. While a court may defer to the EPA's expertise in selecting and implementing the final cleanup remedy under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it retains the equitable power to enforce vested financial obligations under its original decree and prevent interference with the receivership.
Facts:
- For many years, Moyer's Landfill operated as a disposal site for solid and hazardous waste in Lower Providence Township, Pennsylvania.
- Contaminated water, known as leachate, seeped from the landfill into the nearby Skippack Creek, polluting the water supply for residential neighbors.
- In December 1980, after a lawsuit concerning the landfill had already been filed, the U.S. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), granting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) new authority to manage hazardous waste site cleanups.
- In September 1983, the EPA listed Moyer's Landfill on its National Priority List and began its own investigation to determine an appropriate remedial action, independent of the ongoing court-supervised cleanup.
- The court-appointed Receiver, the EPA, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER), and a group of waste generators (PRPs) engaged in lengthy negotiations to create a unified cleanup plan.
- After a change in state administration in 1987, the DER withdrew its offer to help fund the operation and maintenance of the negotiated cleanup plan.
- The DER's withdrawal caused the comprehensive settlement agreement to collapse, leaving the court-appointed Receiver with obligations under the court's decree and the EPA asserting its own authority to proceed with a separate cleanup plan.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of citizens filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in October 1980 under the Clean Water Act and RCRA against Moyer's Landfill and its owners.
- Following a bench trial, the District Court found the defendants to be in violation of federal environmental laws.
- On July 16, 1982, the court entered a Consent Decree which appointed Joanne R. Denworth as a Receiver to possess the landfill's assets and supervise its cleanup.
- The Receiver subsequently filed a Motion for Enforcement of the Court's Remedy in the same District Court.
- In her motion, the Receiver sought to join the EPA and a class of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) as defendants and asked the court to select and oversee a final remedial plan for the landfill.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) divest a federal district court of its pre-existing ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree and manage a receivership for a hazardous waste cleanup when the EPA subsequently initiates its own remedial action at the site under CERCLA?
Opinions:
Majority - Pollak, J.
No, the enactment of CERCLA does not divest a federal district court of its pre-existing ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree. The court's jurisdiction over the landfill was established before CERCLA's enactment and continues by virtue of the receivership, which places the property under the court's exclusive control to effectuate its judgment. CERCLA contains no explicit language to divest courts of pre-existing jurisdiction, and § 9613(d) confirms that the statute does not moot litigation commenced prior to its passage. The statutory limits on judicial review of EPA actions in § 9613(h) were intended to prevent responsible parties from filing new, dilatory lawsuits, not to suspend ongoing litigation that predates the statute. While the court retains jurisdiction, it will defer to the EPA's primary jurisdiction and expertise regarding the technical implementation and funding of the remedy. However, the court will exercise its equitable power to enforce the financial obligations that have vested under the Consent Decree, such as fees for the Receiver and counsel.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the EPA's broad powers under CERCLA are not absolute and do not automatically extinguish a federal court's pre-existing jurisdiction over a hazardous waste site. It carves out a significant exception to CERCLA's general bar on pre-enforcement judicial review, clarifying that these limitations do not apply to ongoing litigation that predates the statute. By balancing its own ancillary jurisdiction with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the court creates a hybrid model for resolving conflicts between judicial remedies and subsequent administrative actions. This allows courts to protect vested rights and enforce their own orders while deferring to the specialized expertise of an agency like the EPA for the technical aspects of a remedy.
