NRC v. Texas
605 U. S. ____ (2025) (2025)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Hobbs Act, a 'party aggrieved' seeking judicial review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing decision must either be the license applicant or have successfully intervened in the agency’s licensing proceeding as defined by the Atomic Energy Act.
Facts:
- Interim Storage Partners (ISP) applied for a license to build a private facility in West Texas for storing spent nuclear fuel.
- For the proposed facility, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) prepared a draft environmental impact statement (EIS).
- A Texas government agency submitted comments to the NRC on the draft EIS, expressing concerns about the proposed facility.
- Fasken Land and Minerals (Fasken), a private West Texas business, also submitted comments on the draft EIS and petitioned to intervene in the NRC's licensing proceeding.
- In September 2021, the NRC granted ISP a renewable 40-year license to build and operate its proposed off-site storage facility.
Procedural Posture:
- Fasken's petition to intervene in the Commission's licensing proceeding was denied by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.
- The full Nuclear Regulatory Commission affirmed the denial of Fasken's petition to intervene.
- Fasken sought judicial review of the denial of its intervention petition in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, which upheld the Commission's denial. Fasken did not seek en banc review in the D. C. Circuit or certiorari to the Supreme Court regarding this denial.
- Texas and Fasken sought judicial review of the Commission's final licensing decision in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit vacated ISP’s license, ruling that it had jurisdiction to hear the ultra vires claim and that the Commission lacked statutory authority to issue such a license.
- The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a 9-to-7 vote.
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (as petitioner in 23-1300) and Interim Storage Partners (as petitioner in 23-1312) both sought certiorari from the U. S. Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Hobbs Act, which permits judicial review only for an 'aggrieved party,' allow a state or private entity that submitted comments on an Environmental Impact Statement or unsuccessfully sought to intervene to obtain judicial review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing decision?
Opinions:
Majority - Kavanaugh, J.
No, the Hobbs Act does not allow Texas and Fasken to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision because they were not 'parties' to the Commission's licensing proceeding. The Hobbs Act limits judicial review to a 'party aggrieved' by a Commission licensing order, a standard distinct from the APA's 'person aggrieved' and referring to a party before the agency. Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) §2239(a)(1)(A), a 'person' becomes a 'party' in a Commission licensing proceeding only after requesting a hearing (intervening) and being 'admit[ted]... as a party' by the Commission. Submitting comments or merely attempting to intervene is insufficient. Fasken's prior unsuccessful challenge to the denial of intervention in the D.C. Circuit is a final decision and cannot be collaterally attacked in this new Hobbs Act suit, as a non-party must successfully intervene to appeal an adverse judgment in the underlying proceeding. Furthermore, nonstatutory ultra vires review, as argued by Texas and Fasken, is narrowly limited to cases where an agency acts entirely 'in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition,' which does not apply where the claim is a statutory-authority argument. Ultra vires review is also unavailable when a statutory review scheme, like the Hobbs Act, provides an adequate opportunity for judicial review (e.g., judicial review of intervention denial). The Court explicitly stated it does not decide the underlying merits of whether the Commission had statutory authority to issue the license, as Texas and Fasken have no right to judicial review.
Dissenting - Gorsuch, J.
Yes, the Hobbs Act should allow Texas and Fasken to challenge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decision because they qualify as 'parties aggrieved,' and the agency's license approval was unlawful. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 strictly limits interim storage of spent nuclear fuel to two locations: at nuclear reactor sites or federally owned facilities, expressly prohibiting storage at private off-site facilities. Therefore, the Commission's license for ISP's private off-site facility is unlawful. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) did not originally address spent nuclear fuel storage, and its provisions for licensing 'special,' 'source,' and 'byproduct' material do not encompass spent nuclear fuel or authorize passive storage; the more specific NWPA should control. Texas and Fasken are 'aggrieved' due to the serious risks the license poses to their citizens, lands, and property. They qualify as 'parties' under the Hobbs Act because they actively participated in the essential 'environmental review' component of the NRC's licensing proceeding by submitting extensive comments, which the agency considered and addressed. The Hobbs Act refers to participation in 'any proceedings before the agency preliminary to issuance' of the order. Section 2239, which governs hearings and intervention, is not the exclusive path to party status, and conflating a §2239 hearing with the overall licensing 'proceeding' is incorrect. There is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review, and courts should be wary of allowing agencies to restrict who can challenge their actions, especially when agencies like the NRC use restrictive internal rules to exclude affected parties despite statutory mandates for hearings.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits who can challenge agency licensing decisions, particularly for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. By strictly interpreting 'party aggrieved' in the Hobbs Act and connecting it to successful intervention under the Atomic Energy Act, the Court ensures that only those who navigate and succeed in a formal adjudicatory process at the agency level can seek judicial review. This could lead to a reduction in challenges from affected third parties, concentrating the power to oversee agency action in a narrower set of actors or requiring more diligent and successful intervention efforts. The decision also reinforces the narrowness of the Leedom v. Kyne ultra vires exception, making it harder to bypass statutory review schemes.
