North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory
2016 WL 4053033, 831 F.3d. 204 (2016)
Rule of Law:
A facially neutral election law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, even if partisan considerations also played a role.
Facts:
- North Carolina has a history of racial discrimination, particularly concerning vote suppression, and its voting patterns are racially polarized, with African Americans predominantly voting for Democratic candidates.
- Between 2000 and 2012, African American voter registration increased by 51.1%, and turnout surged, leading to near-parity with white voters and making North Carolina a swing state in national elections.
- On the day after the Supreme Court's Shelby County v. Holder decision eliminated federal preclearance requirements for election law changes, a leader of the newly dominant legislative party (which rarely received African American support) announced an “omnibus” election law.
- Before enacting the new law, the legislature requested and received racial data showing that African Americans disproportionately used early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration, and disproportionately lacked Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) issued photo identification.
- The General Assembly swiftly passed Session Law 2013-381, which required in-person voters to show specific photo IDs (excluding many forms of ID disproportionately held by African Americans), eliminated the first week of early voting, and abolished same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration.
- African Americans in North Carolina disproportionately experience socioeconomic factors like poverty, lower education levels, and less access to transportation, which make these restricted voting mechanisms particularly necessary for their participation.
Procedural Posture:
- The League of Women Voters, along with numerous other organizations and individuals, filed suit in federal district court, challenging provisions of Session Law 2013-381.
- Concurrently, the North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, in conjunction with several other organizations and individuals, filed a separate action, and the United States also filed suit, challenging the same provisions.
- A group of 'young voters' intervened in the consolidated cases, alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.
- Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction of several provisions of the law, which the district court denied (N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F.Supp.2d 322).
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, remanding the case with instructions to issue an order staying the elimination of same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting (League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224).
- The Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit's injunction mandate (North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S.Ct. 6) but later denied certiorari, automatically reinstating the preliminary injunction.
- In June 2015, the General Assembly ratified Session Law 2015-103, which amended the photo ID requirement by permitting a voter without acceptable ID to cast a provisional ballot if they completed a declaration stating a reasonable impediment.
- The district court bifurcated the trial, first conducting a trial on the challenges to all provisions except the photo ID requirement in July 2015, then a separate trial on the modified photo ID requirement in January 2016.
- On April 25, 2016, the district court entered judgment against the Plaintiffs on all of their claims, finding no discriminatory results or intent, no undue burden, and no Twenty-Sixth Amendment violation (N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 2016 WL 1650774).
- The district court temporarily extended the preliminary injunction of same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting through the imminent June primary election.
- Plaintiffs timely noted their appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and requested that the court stay the district court’s mandate and extend the preliminary injunction, which the Fourth Circuit granted pending its decision.
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Issue:
Did the North Carolina General Assembly enact provisions of Session Law 2013-381, including a photo ID requirement and restrictions on early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration, with racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Diana Gribbon Motz, Circuit Judge, writing for the court except as to Part V.B.; Wynn, Circuit Judge, writing for the court as to Part V.B., joined by Floyd, Circuit Judge
Yes, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the challenged provisions of Session Law 2013-381 with racially discriminatory intent, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court found that the district court "missed the forest in carefully surveying the many trees" by failing to consider critical facts, including the "inextricable link between race and politics in North Carolina." Applying the Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. framework, the court found strong circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent: 1. Historical Background: North Carolina has a "shameful" history of official discrimination and voter suppression, with numerous Department of Justice objections and successful Voting Rights Act lawsuits post-1980. The court emphasized the undeniable racial polarization in North Carolina politics, where African American voters overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates. The legislature's stated aim to "move the law back to the way it was" after unprecedented African American voter participation was viewed as suspect, especially when "politics as usual translates into race-based discrimination." 2. Specific Sequence of Events: The law's passage was highly suspicious. Immediately after the Shelby County decision removed federal preclearance, a previously minor photo ID bill was swiftly transformed into "omnibus" legislation, vastly expanding its scope to include the challenged provisions. This expanded bill was rushed through the legislature in three days, with minimal public debate, significant opposition from House Democrats who had supported the initial bill, and strict party-line votes, suggesting an intent to avoid scrutiny. The photo ID provision itself was made more stringent by removing alternative IDs disproportionately held by African Americans. 3. Legislative History (Race Data): Prior to and during the legislative process, members of the General Assembly explicitly requested and received racial data on voting practices. This data showed African Americans disproportionately used early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration, and disproportionately lacked DMV-issued IDs. Relying on this data, the General Assembly enacted legislation restricting all and only those practices disproportionately used by African Americans, while exempting absentee voting (disproportionately used by whites) from the photo ID requirement. 4. Impact: The district court's own findings confirmed that the challenged provisions disproportionately impacted African Americans, who face greater socioeconomic hurdles. The court rejected the district court's minimization of this impact, stating that for many African Americans, these voting tools were a "necessity," not a "preference." The cumulative effect of these restrictions (e.g., longer lines, increased disenfranchisement) further burdened African American voters. The court further concluded that the State failed to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without discriminatory intent. The State's proffered justifications (e.g., combating voter fraud, promoting consistency, reducing administrative burden) were "meager," "inapt remedies," and "solutions in search of a problem." For instance, the photo ID law was "too narrow" (exempting absentee voting, where fraud was more documented) and "too broad" (excluding reliable IDs disproportionately held by African Americans). The General Assembly ignored recommendations from the State Board of Elections. As a remedy, the court reversed the district court's judgment and permanently enjoined the photo ID requirement, reduction in early voting, and elimination of same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration. Regarding the 2015 "reasonable impediment exception" for photo ID (Part V.B.), the court found it did not fully cure the harm from the intentionally discriminatory photo ID provision, as the State failed to meet its burden of proving the amendment eradicated the discriminatory taint. The court declined to impose additional remedies like federal poll observers or preclearance under VRA § 3.
Dissenting - Diana Gribbon Motz, Circuit Judge, dissenting as to Part V.B.
No, the court should not permanently enjoin the photo ID requirement without first remanding the case to the district court to assess whether the 2015 "reasonable impediment exception" completely remedies the discriminatory harm. While agreeing on the discriminatory intent of the original photo ID law, the dissent argued that injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, not automatically granted, and should only "cure the condition that offends the Constitution." The General Assembly amended the photo ID law before it went into effect, adding an exception allowing voters without qualifying ID to cast a provisional ballot after declaring a reasonable impediment. No party alleged discriminatory intent behind this amendment. The dissent contended that the exception, "by its terms," could totally excuse the discriminatory photo ID requirement, but the current record is "incomplete" regarding its practical effect. The district court, having found no discriminatory intent, did not analyze whether the amended law still posed an unconstitutional effect under the appropriate standard for remedying intentional discrimination. Given the amendment and the lack of specific factual findings on its real-world impact (especially considering the two primary elections held under the amended law), the dissent argued for a temporary injunction and a remand to the district court for further fact-finding to determine if a permanent injunction is indeed necessary to cure the discriminatory effect.
Analysis:
This case profoundly reinforces the principle that courts will rigorously scrutinize facially neutral election laws for evidence of discriminatory intent. It signals a strong judicial response to legislative actions that disproportionately burden minority voters, especially when such actions occur in the wake of increased minority political participation and immediately following the removal of federal oversight. The ruling establishes that partisan motivations cannot shield laws that are proven to be driven by racial discrimination. Furthermore, the court emphasized that amendments to a discriminatory law, even if appearing to lessen the burden, will not negate the need for a full remedy if the original discriminatory taint is not entirely eradicated, placing a high burden on states to prove complete remediation.
