No, the agency can't do that. Forcing the Nollans to let people on their beach is a 'taking' of their property. The government said the problem was the new house blocking the view from the street. But letting people who are *already on the beach* walk across the Nollans' sand doesn't help anyone see the ocean better from the street. Because the solution doesn't connect to the problem, the government's demand is just a sneaky way to get public beach access for free, which violates the Constitution.

Yes, the agency can do that. The court is being too strict. The new house is part of a 'wall' of big houses that makes people think the beach is private. Seeing people walk along the sand helps show that the beach is open to everyone. The condition is a reasonable way to balance the Nollans' desire to build with the public's right to enjoy the coast. The Nollans should have known that building on the California coast comes with rules to protect public access.

Yes, it's allowed. The Court is being too nitpicky. The new house makes it harder in general for the public to access and enjoy the beach. Letting people walk along the shore helps make up for that loss. It's a fair trade. The Nollans knew about this rule when they decided to build, so it's not like their rights were suddenly taken away.

Yes, the agency should be allowed to do this. The main problem is that the Supreme Court's rules on property rights are confusing. By making city and state officials pay big money if they make a mistake, the Court is scaring them away from passing good laws to protect the environment and public spaces. This decision will make it harder for governments to manage development responsibly.

The government's condition wasn't justified because it didn't have a strong enough link to the problem it was trying to solve with the building permit. The government can't just take a part of your property without a good reason that's directly related to your building plans. Since the government's reason wasn't good enough, it was like they were trying to take the property without paying, which is not okay.

The government's requirement was reasonable and not a taking. The public path condition was related to the impact of the Nollans' new, larger house, which would make it seem like the beach wasn't open to the public. The government was trying to balance private development and public access, and the Nollans can't claim their expectations were unfairly changed.

The public access condition doesn't go against the rule that the public should always be able to get to the beach. The Court is being too strict about the connection between the building's impact and the condition. The public path and the issues caused by the Nollans' house are related enough to the goal of beach access. Based on the usual way of looking at these cases, this isn't a taking because the government's action is allowed and barely changes the property's value.

This case shows how confusing the rules about the government taking property can be. The Court's earlier decision that the government has to pay for even temporarily taking property will make government officials afraid to protect the environment and public welfare. Justice Brennan's view in this case, that the government should have flexibility in making rules about using land, doesn't fit with what he said before in a different case.

—the first of the cases, the Court held that a city government could not condition a building permit on the granting of a public easement across a beachfront lot because there was no "essential nexus" between the legitimate state interest (defined by the city as maintaining the public's visual access to the ocean) and the condition imposed (requiring lateral public access …

In Nollan, property owners challenged the commission's ability to condition a permit to rebuild their beachfront house on their transfer of a public easement across their property

This claim is based upon two cases from the Supreme Court recognizing a regulatory takings claim where exactions required by permit conditions lacked a reasonable relationship to the government's asserted interest in requiring the condition.

In Nollan, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the government's requiring landowners to convey an easement over their beach-front property as a condition for the approval of a development permit.

In Nollan, the Court stated that "land use regulation does not effect a taking if it `substantially advance [s] legitimate state interests' and does not `den [y] an owner economically viable use of his land.'"

A] s to property reserved by its owner for private use, the right to exclude [others is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property

The Nollan Court stated that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an `out-and-out plan of extortion.'"

—explaining that a Fifth Amendment taking by physical occupation occurs "where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises

Thus, although the commission could have denied the permit altogether, it could not condition the permit as it did, because "the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition

"It is axiomatic, of course, that state law is the source of those strands that constitute a property owner's bundle of property rights

Yes. Conditioning the building permit on the Nollans' grant of a public access easement constitutes a taking. Requiring an uncompensated conveyance of an easement would be a clear physical taking of property. Attaching this requirement to a building permit is only constitutional if the condition serves the same legitimate state purpose that would justify refusing to issue the permit altogether. Here, the Commission asserted that the new house would interfere with 'visual access' to the beach from the street. However, the condition imposed—a lateral easement for people already on the beach to walk across the property—does not remedy the purported harm of a blocked view from the street. Because this 'essential nexus' between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction is absent, the condition is not a valid land-use regulation but rather 'an out-and-out plan of extortion' to obtain an easement without paying for it.

No. The permit condition is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power and does not constitute a taking. The Court imposes an unreasonably high standard of precision; the correct standard for reviewing a state's exercise of police power should be whether the state could have rationally decided the measure might achieve its objective. The condition is reasonably related to the burdens created by the development, as the 'wall' of homes creates a psychological barrier to public access, which is counteracted by seeing people walking along the beach. Furthermore, the development encroaches on a shifting shoreline, and the easement helps resolve potential boundary disputes. The Nollans had no reasonable investment-backed expectation of being able to exclude the public, given California's long-standing constitutional and statutory protection of coastal access.

No. The Court's rigid 'eye for an eye' interpretation of the necessary correlation between a burden and a condition is inappropriate. Coastal development inherently makes public access more difficult, and the easement required of the Nollans is adequately related to the governmental interest in providing public access to the beach. The condition counteracts the loss of visual access and the decreased public sense of physical access caused by the new development. Standard takings analysis, which considers economic impact and investment-backed expectations, reveals no taking occurred here, especially since the Nollans had notice of the easement policy.

No. This dissent focuses on the severe tension between the majority's holding and the Court's recent decision in *First English Evangelical Lutheran Church*. The vague standards of takings jurisprudence, now coupled with a rule of pecuniary liability for regulatory 'mistakes,' will have an unprecedented chilling effect on public officials trying to implement land-use regulations for the public good. While agreeing with Justice Brennan's legal arguments, this opinion expresses concern that the Court's shortsighted rule of liability leaves land-use planners guessing about how the Court will react to future cases, thus hampering effective governance.

Yes, the condition imposed constitutes a taking. The Supreme Court held that the government's requirement of a public easement as a permit condition must have an essential nexus to the legitimate state interest served by the permit denial. Furthermore, the condition must substantially advance that interest and not deny the owner economically viable use of their land. The condition requiring the Nollans to provide public access across their beachfront property did not meet these requirements because there was no essential nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction. The right to exclude others is a fundamental element of property rights, and the government cannot condition approval of a permit on the relinquishment of this right without a clear justification that furthers the same governmental purpose as a development ban.

The Commission's permit condition is a valid exercise of the police power and does not constitute a taking. The condition is reasonably related to the public need created by the Nollans' new house, which would contribute to a 'wall' of residential structures preventing the public from realizing that a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit. The Commission's action is a reasonable effort to respond to intensified development along the California coast, on behalf of landowners who can make no claim that their reasonable expectations have been disrupted.

The permit condition does not implicate the public-trust doctrine, and the Court's rigid interpretation of the necessary correlation between a burden created by development and a condition imposed is misguided. The easement and the problems created by the Nollans' development are adequately related to the governmental interest in providing public access to the beach. Traditional takings analysis compels the conclusion that there is no taking here, as the governmental action is a valid exercise of the police power with minimal economic effect on the property value.

The debate between the Court and Justice Brennan illustrates the uncertainty surrounding takings jurisprudence. The Court's ruling in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, which holds that a temporary taking automatically gives rise to pecuniary liability, will have a chilling effect on public officials responsible for protecting the environment and public welfare. Justice Brennan's dissent in this case, advocating for flexibility in land-use regulation, is in tension with his earlier position in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

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