Noguchi v. Nakamura
638 P.2d 1383, 1982 Haw. App. LEXIS 97, 2 Haw. App. 655 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
Consent to confinement is terminated when the consenting party's purpose for the confinement has been accomplished, and any further confinement against that party's will constitutes false imprisonment.
Facts:
- Appellant and Appellee had previously been in a romantic relationship, which Appellant had decided to end.
- On the day of the incident, Appellee came to Appellant's home and asked her on a date for that evening, which she refused.
- Appellee then asked Appellant to accompany him to a store, and she consented on the express condition that he would bring her right back home.
- Appellee drove Appellant to the store and then returned, stopping in front of her house.
- As Appellant sat in the car with the door open, preparing to exit, Appellee suddenly drove off.
- Subsequently, Appellant fell, was pushed, or jumped from the moving car and sustained injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellant filed a complaint in a trial court against Appellee, asserting claims for negligence and false imprisonment.
- At trial, the court granted a directed verdict in favor of Appellee on the false imprisonment claim.
- The jury then proceeded to find in favor of Appellee on the remaining negligence claim.
- Appellant appealed the trial court's order granting the directed verdict on the false imprisonment claim to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Is there sufficient evidence for a jury to find a claim of false imprisonment when a driver, after completing a trip to which a passenger gave limited and conditional consent, drives away with the passenger against her will?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. There is sufficient evidence for a jury to find a claim of false imprisonment because consent to confinement can be limited in scope and duration, and confinement that exceeds the bounds of that consent can be unlawful. The court reasoned that a jury could find that the Appellant's consent was strictly limited to a trip to the store and back. The completion of this trip, her position in the stopped car with the door open in front of her house, and her prior refusal to go on a date all indicated that her limited consent had expired. A moving automobile can constitute a place of confinement due to the danger of egress, and driving it away against a passenger's will after consent has been withdrawn or has expired can satisfy the elements of false imprisonment. Whether the initial consent was broad enough to cover the subsequent action is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that consent is not an absolute defense to false imprisonment; its scope and duration are critical. The decision establishes that when consent is given for a limited purpose, exceeding that purpose can transform a lawful presence into an unlawful confinement. It reinforces the principle that withdrawal of consent need not always be verbal, as actions (like opening a car door to exit) can clearly indicate that consent has terminated. This precedent ensures that cases involving an initial grant of consent that is later exceeded are typically sent to a jury to determine the factual question of the scope of that consent.
