Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co.
273 F. Supp. 3d 326 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Federal law, including the Controlled Substances Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, does not preempt a state law that prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or applicants who are qualifying patients using medical marijuana in compliance with state law, and such a state law may provide an implied private right of action for its enforcement.
Facts:
- In 2012, Katelin Noffsinger was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
- In 2015, Noffsinger's doctors recommended medical marijuana to treat her PTSD, and she registered with the state Department of Consumer Protection as a qualifying patient under Connecticut's Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA).
- After receiving her registration certificate, Noffsinger began taking one capsule of Marinol, a synthetic form of cannabis, each night as prescribed.
- In July 2016, Noffsinger, then employed as a recreation therapist at Touchpoints, was recruited for and accepted a director of recreational therapy position at Bride Brook, a nursing facility.
- Noffsinger disclosed her PTSD and medical marijuana use to Bride Brook's administrator, Lisa Mailloux, showing her registration certificate and explaining she took Marinol only at night and was never impaired during the workday.
- Noffsinger provided a urine sample for a pre-employment drug screen, which subsequently tested positive for cannabis.
- On August 2, 2016, one day before Noffsinger was scheduled to start work, Bride Brook rescinded her job offer because she had tested positive for cannabis.
- Noffsinger's former position at Touchpoints had already been filled, leaving her unemployed.
Procedural Posture:
- On August 22, 2016, Katelin Noffsinger filed a complaint in Connecticut Superior Court against SSC Niantic Operating Company, LLC, alleging three causes of action: a violation of PUMA's anti-discrimination provision, a common law claim for wrongful rescission of a job offer in violation of public policy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- SSC Niantic Operating Company, LLC removed the case from the state trial court to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut based on diversity jurisdiction.
- SSC Niantic Operating Company, LLC filed a motion to dismiss Noffsinger's complaint on several grounds, including that PUMA was preempted by federal law and that it did not provide for a private right of action.
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Issue:
Does federal law, specifically the Controlled Substances Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, preempt a Connecticut statute (PUMA) that prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or applicants who are qualifying patients using medical marijuana in compliance with state law, and does PUMA provide for an implied private right of action to enforce this anti-discrimination provision?
Opinions:
Majority - Jeffrey Alker Meyer, United States District Judge
No, federal law does not preempt Connecticut's Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA) anti-discrimination provision, and yes, PUMA does provide an implied private right of action for its enforcement. The court concluded that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) does not preempt PUMA's anti-discrimination provision (§ 21a-408p(b)(3)) because the CSA primarily regulates drug use, possession, and distribution, but not employment practices. The CSA's own savings clause (21 U.S.C. § 903) requires a "positive conflict" for preemption, which the court found lacking as merely hiring a medical marijuana user does not violate federal law. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also does not preempt PUMA, as it explicitly provides that an employer "may prohibit the illegal use of drugs... at the workplace" (42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1)) but does not regulate non-workplace activity. The ADA's savings clause (42 U.S.C. § 12201(b)) further allows states to enact greater protections for individuals with disabilities. Similarly, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not preempt PUMA as it does not regulate employment and PUMA's anti-discrimination provision does not conflict with its goals. Regarding the implied private right of action, the court applied Connecticut's three-factor Napoletano test. First, plaintiff Noffsinger is a qualifying patient and falls within the class PUMA was enacted to benefit. Second, there was no legislative intent to deny a private right of action; rather, legislative history indicated an expectation of enforceability in courts. Third, recognizing a private right of action is consistent with PUMA's purpose to prevent employer discrimination, especially because PUMA provides no other enforcement mechanism for this specific provision, making a private cause of action essential for the law to have practical effect. The court rejected the defendant's argument that it was exempt from PUMA because federal regulations require compliance with federal law, calling the argument "absurd" since merely hiring a medical marijuana user does not constitute a federal law violation. The court also dismissed the defendant's Equal Protection Clause argument, finding a rational basis to distinguish between medicinal and recreational marijuana use. Lastly, while the common law public policy claim was dismissed due to the availability of a private right of action under PUMA, the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was allowed to proceed, as a rescinded job offer was deemed more akin to a termination than an ongoing employment relationship, thus potentially actionable under Connecticut law.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the delicate balance between federal drug laws and state medical marijuana laws in the employment context. It established that federal drug statutes do not automatically preempt state laws with explicit anti-discrimination provisions protecting medical marijuana users, particularly when the federal laws do not regulate employment itself. The ruling underscored the importance of an implied private right of action for statutory enforcement, affirming that where a state law benefits a specific class and lacks an explicit enforcement mechanism, courts may infer the right to sue to uphold legislative intent. This decision provides a crucial legal avenue for medical marijuana patients seeking employment protections and guides how federal courts may interpret the interplay of state medical marijuana protections and federal law in the absence of explicit federal preemption.
