National Labor Relations Board v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.
494 U.S. 775 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is not required to adopt a presumption that striker replacement workers oppose the incumbent union. The NLRB may instead use a case-by-case approach to determine the union sentiments of replacements when an employer claims a good-faith doubt about a union's majority support.
Facts:
- Teamsters Local 968 was the certified collective-bargaining agent for production and maintenance employees at Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.
- After the bargaining agreement expired in May 1979, the Union rejected Curtin Matheson's final offer and commenced an economic strike involving 22 employees.
- During the strike, five of the original 27 employees crossed the picket line to return to work.
- Curtin Matheson then hired 29 permanent replacement employees to replace the 22 strikers.
- The Union ended its strike in July 1979 and made an unconditional offer for the striking employees to return to work.
- Curtin Matheson subsequently withdrew its recognition of the Union, stating that it doubted the Union still commanded majority support.
- At the time recognition was withdrawn, the bargaining unit consisted of 19 strikers, 25 permanent replacements, and the 5 employees who had crossed the picket line.
Procedural Posture:
- The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Curtin Matheson with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
- The NLRB's General Counsel issued a complaint, and the case was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
- The ALJ, as the initial fact-finder, dismissed the complaint, concluding that Curtin Matheson had a reasonable good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status.
- The NLRB, acting in its appellate capacity, reversed the ALJ's decision, found that Curtin Matheson violated the NLRA, and issued a bargaining order.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upon petition for review, denied enforcement of the NLRB's order, holding that the Board must apply a presumption that striker replacements oppose the union.
- The NLRB (Petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Must the National Labor Relations Board, in determining whether an employer has a good-faith doubt about a union's majority support, presume that permanent striker replacements oppose the union?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
No, the National Labor Relations Board is not required to presume that permanent striker replacements oppose the union. The Board's refusal to adopt such a presumption is rational, consistent with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and entitled to deference. The Court reasoned that the Board's 'no-presumption' approach is empirically supportable, as replacements may cross a picket line for economic reasons or disagree with a particular strike while still desiring union representation. Furthermore, the Board's rule serves the Act's overriding policy of promoting industrial peace by limiting an employer's ability to oust a union simply by hiring replacements, which could chill employees' statutory right to strike.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes, the NLRB must effectively treat striker replacements as opposing the union, as the Board's contrary finding in this case was not supported by substantial evidence. There is a deep and inherent conflict of interest between replacements and a striking union, whose loyalty lies with the strikers it seeks to have reinstated, often at the expense of the replacements' jobs. To ignore this powerful inference is to engage in bad fact-finding. The Board cannot disguise a policy choice—protecting unions from the consequences of hiring replacements—as a factual determination that defies logic and industrial reality.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes, the NLRB's decision should be overturned because it is an unexplained departure from the Board's own precedents. In other lines of cases, the Board has explicitly recognized the inherent conflict between strikers and replacements. The agency's failure to reconcile its position here with its contradictory reasoning in those prior decisions makes its order invalid. An agency cannot swerve from prior precedent without a reasoned analysis, and the Board has remained 'intolerably mute' on this inconsistency.
Concurring - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No, the Board is not required to adopt the presumption, but its 'no-presumption' rule presses the deference owed to the agency to its absolute limit. While the rule is legally permissible, it severely restricts an employer's ability to prove a good-faith doubt. This is especially concerning given that another Board rule prevents employers from polling employees to gauge union support unless they have already established a good-faith doubt, creating a potential catch-22. However, that issue is not before the Court, and the case should be remanded for the Court of Appeals to apply the correct, no-presumption standard.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the NLRB's discretion in setting labor policy, reinforcing judicial deference to the agency's expertise in labor relations. By rejecting a mandatory anti-union presumption for striker replacements, the Court strengthened the position of incumbent unions following a strike, making it more difficult for employers to withdraw recognition based solely on the composition of the workforce. The ruling preserves the 'good-faith doubt' defense but requires employers to provide more concrete, objective evidence of a union's loss of majority support, shifting the analysis from a categorical presumption to a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry.
