Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission
2002 Conn. LEXIS 44, 788 A.2d 1158, 259 Conn. 131 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Connecticut's environmental intervention statute, General Statutes § 22a-19, does not expand the jurisdictional authority of an administrative agency. An intervenor only has standing to raise environmental issues that fall within the scope of the agency's pre-existing statutory jurisdiction.
Facts:
- First Stamford Corporation proposed to build a commercial shopping center in Stamford, Connecticut.
- The project required a certificate of operation from the state traffic commission (commission), an agency whose authority is limited to traffic and highway safety.
- First Stamford filed an application with the commission for the required certificate.
- Maurice Nizzardo, who owned property near the proposed project, filed a 'Notice of Intervention' with the commission.
- In his notice, Nizzardo asserted that the project was likely to unreasonably pollute the air, water, and other natural resources, seeking to intervene under the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (§ 22a-19).
- The commission denied Nizzardo's request to intervene, stating it lacked jurisdiction over environmental issues.
- Subsequently, the commission granted the certificate of operation to First Stamford.
Procedural Posture:
- First Stamford Corporation applied to the State Traffic Commission for a certificate of operation.
- Maurice Nizzardo's request to intervene in the proceeding was denied by the commission.
- The commission granted the certificate of operation to First Stamford.
- Nizzardo appealed the commission's decisions to the Superior Court (trial court).
- The trial court granted First Stamford's motion to dismiss the intervention claim as untimely and, after a hearing, dismissed the rest of the appeal, finding Nizzardo was not classically aggrieved.
- Nizzardo, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court of Connecticut (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- The Supreme Court of Connecticut granted Nizzardo's petition for certification to appeal.
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Issue:
Does Connecticut General Statutes § 22a-19 grant a party standing to intervene in an administrative proceeding to raise environmental issues that are outside the jurisdictional authority of that administrative agency?
Opinions:
Majority - Vertefeuille, J.
No, Connecticut General Statutes § 22a-19 does not grant standing to raise issues beyond the agency's jurisdiction. The statute is intended to provide standing for parties to raise environmental concerns but does not expand the substantive authority of the administrative body. The court reaffirmed its precedents in Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford and Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., which held that § 22a-19 must be read in conjunction with the agency's enabling legislation. An agency, as a creature of statute, cannot act beyond its legislatively prescribed powers. To interpret § 22a-19 as overriding an agency's specific jurisdictional limits would violate the principle of construing statutes harmoniously. The State Traffic Commission's authority under § 14-311 is strictly limited to matters of highway safety and traffic control, not environmental protection. Because Nizzardo sought to raise issues of air and water pollution that were outside the commission's jurisdiction, he lacked standing to intervene.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Borden, J.
Yes, Connecticut General Statutes § 22a-19 should grant standing regardless of the agency's specific jurisdiction. The majority's holding misinterprets the statute and relies on flawed precedent. The plain language of § 22a-19(a) permits intervention in 'any' administrative proceeding and focuses on the 'conduct' at issue, not the agency's jurisdiction. The purpose of the Environmental Protection Act was to eliminate traditional standing barriers and ensure environmental issues are considered broadly. The majority's interpretation renders the statute toothless, as it only permits intervention where an agency already has environmental authority, which largely defeats the statute's purpose. This decision effectively overrules cases like Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, which correctly allowed intervention in non-environmental proceedings to raise environmental concerns.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a narrow interpretation of Connecticut's environmental intervention statute, confirming that it is a procedural tool for gaining standing, not a substantive grant of new authority to agencies. It significantly curtails the ability of environmental advocates to force non-environmental agencies, such as traffic or planning commissions, to consider broad environmental impacts that are not explicitly part of their statutory mandate. The ruling reinforces a strict separation of powers among administrative bodies, requiring that environmental concerns be litigated only before agencies specifically empowered by the legislature to address them. This creates a higher barrier for challenging projects on environmental grounds when the primary permitting agency lacks environmental jurisdiction.
