Niz-Chavez v. Garland
593 U. S. ____ (2021) (2021)
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Rule of Law:
To trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal eligibility under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(d)(1), the government must serve a single, comprehensive document that contains all the information specified for 'a notice to appear' in §1229(a)(1), including the time and place of the removal proceedings.
Facts:
- Agusto Niz-Chavez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without authorization in 2005.
- In March 2013, the U.S. government served Niz-Chavez with a document initiating removal proceedings.
- This initial document contained the charges against him but did not specify the time or place for his hearing.
- Two months later, the government sent Niz-Chavez a second document which provided the specific time and place of his removal hearing.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. government initiated removal proceedings against Agusto Niz-Chavez in an immigration court.
- An Immigration Judge found Niz-Chavez removable and ordered him removed from the United States.
- Niz-Chavez appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the removal order.
- Niz-Chavez (petitioner) then filed a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Sixth Circuit denied the petition, siding with the government (respondent).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.
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Issue:
Does providing the statutorily required information for a 'notice to appear' across multiple documents trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal eligibility, or must all the required information be contained in a single document?
Opinions:
Majority - Gorsuch
No. A series of documents that collectively contain the required statutory information does not constitute 'a notice to appear' sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule; the information must be provided in a single document. The statute's use of the indefinite article 'a' before 'notice to appear' signifies a discrete, countable object, not an abstract concept of notice that can be delivered in installments. This interpretation is supported by customary grammatical usage, where 'a' precedes a countable noun, suggesting a single document. The Court analogized 'a notice to appear' to other single-document, case-initiating pleadings like 'an indictment' or 'a complaint.' The structure of the surrounding statutory provisions, such as the use of 'the Notice' in §1229(e)(1) and 'a written notice' for changes of hearing time in §1229(a)(2), further suggests Congress intended a singular document. Finally, the Court rejected the government's pleas of administrative inconvenience, holding that such arguments cannot justify departing from the statute's clear text.
Dissenting - Kavanaugh
Yes. A notice to appear can be provided in more than one document, and the stop-time rule is triggered upon service of the final document containing the last piece of required information. The statute defines 'a notice to appear' as 'written notice,' which does not inherently require a single document. The majority's focus on the word 'a' is a form of literalism that ignores ordinary parlance, where things like 'a job application' or 'a manuscript' can be delivered in installments. The two-document approach can benefit noncitizens by providing earlier notice of the charges, allowing more time to prepare a defense, while not prejudicing them, since the stop-time clock does not begin until all information is received. The majority's single-document rule creates absurd results and imposes significant administrative costs on the immigration system for no meaningful benefit.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Court's holding in Pereira v. Sessions by establishing a strict, formalistic requirement for what constitutes 'a notice to appear.' By mandating a single, comprehensive document, the Court prioritizes textualism and the right of an individual to receive clear, unambiguous notice over government arguments of administrative efficiency. This precedent will force the government to alter its notice-issuing procedures, potentially delaying the initiation of the stop-time rule in many cases. Consequently, it may expand the pool of nonpermanent residents who are eligible to apply for discretionary relief from removal by allowing them to accrue more time toward the 10-year continuous presence requirement.
