Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., et al.
435 U.S. 589 (1978)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute and must be weighed against competing interests. The existence of a comprehensive statutory scheme created by Congress to govern public access to specific materials is a decisive factor that can tip the discretionary balance against immediate judicial release of those materials.
Facts:
- President Richard M. Nixon maintained a system that recorded conversations in the White House Oval Office and other executive offices.
- The Watergate Special Prosecutor subpoenaed numerous tape recordings from Nixon for use in the criminal trial of several of Nixon's former advisers, known as United States v. Mitchell.
- Following the Supreme Court's order in United States v. Nixon, the subpoenaed tapes were turned over to the District Court.
- During the Mitchell trial, approximately 22 hours of the taped conversations were played for the jury and members of the public and press present in the courtroom.
- The physical reels of tape played for the jury were entered into evidence under the custody of the court.
- Reporters and the public in attendance were provided with earphones to listen to the tapes as they were played and were furnished with transcripts of the recordings, which were then widely published.
Procedural Posture:
- Various broadcasters filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to copy and broadcast portions of tapes played at the United States v. Mitchell criminal trial.
- Former President Richard Nixon, the petitioner, opposed the application.
- The District Court initially ruled that a common-law right of access existed but deferred a decision pending the conclusion of the trial.
- After the trial concluded, a different District Court judge denied the broadcasters' petition without prejudice, citing the pending appeals of the convicted defendants and the passage of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act.
- The broadcasters, as appellants, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court's refusal to permit immediate copying was an abuse of discretion, and remanded for the development of a release plan.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the common-law right of access to judicial records require a federal district court to release copies of tape recordings, which were admitted as evidence in a criminal trial, to the media for broadcasting and commercial distribution, especially when Congress has created an alternative statutory scheme for their release?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
No. The common-law right of access to judicial records does not compel the District Court to release the tapes in its custody. The court recognized the general common-law right to inspect and copy judicial records but emphasized that this right is not absolute and is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court weighed the public's interest in access against petitioner Nixon's privacy and property interests, as well as the potential for commercial exploitation. The decisive factor, however, was the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, a comprehensive statutory scheme established by Congress to process these specific materials and provide for their eventual public release. The existence of this alternative, congressionally-prescribed avenue of public access tips the scales in favor of denying judicial release, as allowing it could frustrate the orderly process Congress intended. The Court also rejected the First Amendment claim, stating the press was not denied information as they had full access to the trial and transcripts, and the Sixth Amendment public trial claim, noting the requirement is met by allowing the public to attend and report on the proceedings, not by requiring evidence to be broadcast.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. The court should have affirmed the decision to release the tapes. The majority's reliance on the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act is misplaced because the Act, by its express terms, only covers 'original tape recordings.' The tapes at issue here are copies, which petitioner himself conceded are not covered by the Act. To the extent the Act is relevant, its purpose was to ensure the American people have 'full access to all facts about the Watergate affair,' which supports, rather than prevents, release. The Judiciary should not defer to an inapplicable statute to deny a 'precious common law right.'
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stevens
Yes. The trial judge's decision to permit release of the tapes was a proper exercise of discretion that should not be overturned. The decision to release trial exhibits is a housekeeping matter for the trial court, and appellate review should be highly deferential, reversing only for an 'egregious abuse of discretion.' Here, both the District Court and Court of Appeals concurred in the decision to release. The majority's reliance on the Presidential Recordings Act is ironic, as the Administrator of General Services, in creating regulations under that Act, actually deferred to the District Court's expertise in this very case. The Act itself manifests Congress's intent to provide 'as much public access to the materials as is physically possible as quickly as possible,' making it an inappropriate basis for suppression.
Analysis:
This case establishes that the common-law right of access to judicial records is a discretionary doctrine, not a constitutional mandate, and can be superseded by a specific congressional act. The decision sets a precedent that courts should defer to comprehensive, alternative statutory schemes for public access to sensitive or historically significant materials, rather than allowing access through traditional common-law motions. It distinguishes between the public's right to know what happens in a trial, which was satisfied here, and a right to physically copy and commercially distribute evidence, which is not guaranteed. This ruling impacts future cases involving access to sensitive evidence where a legislature has created a specialized disclosure process.
Unlock the full brief for Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., et al.