Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
433 U.S. 425 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
Congress may enact legislation directing an Executive Branch official to take custody of and screen a former President's official materials to preserve items of historical and governmental importance, where the intrusion is limited, justified by substantial public interests, and provides safeguards for the former President's constitutional rights and privileges.
Facts:
- After his resignation from office, former President Richard M. Nixon prepared to take custody of approximately 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings from his administration.
- The shipment of these materials to Nixon was delayed after the Watergate Special Prosecutor informed President Ford of a continuing need for them in ongoing investigations.
- Nixon entered into a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services, Arthur Sampson (the Nixon-Sampson agreement).
- This agreement affirmed Nixon's ownership of the materials and granted him control over access.
- Crucially, the agreement stipulated that all tape recordings were to be destroyed at the time of Nixon's death or on September 1, 1984, whichever occurred first, and allowed Nixon to direct their destruction at any time after September 1, 1979.
- In direct response to the Nixon-Sampson agreement and the risk of the materials' destruction, Congress passed the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act.
- The Act directed the Administrator of General Services to take complete possession and control of all of Nixon's presidential historical materials, thereby nullifying the Nixon-Sampson agreement.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard M. Nixon sued the Administrator of General Services in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- Nixon's complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act.
- A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case.
- The District Court limited its review to the facial constitutionality of the Act, finding that challenges related to future public access regulations were not yet ripe for review.
- The District Court dismissed Nixon's complaint, holding that the Act was constitutional on its face.
- Nixon, as appellant, filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which directs an Executive Branch official to take custody of former President Nixon's presidential materials, unconstitutionally violate the separation of powers, Presidential privilege, his right to privacy, or the Bill of Attainder Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act is facially constitutional and does not violate the separation of powers, Presidential privilege, the right to privacy, or the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Act is a legitimate exercise of congressional power to preserve materials of great public and historical interest. With regard to separation of powers, the Act does not disrupt the Executive Branch's ability to accomplish its functions, as control over the materials remains within the Executive Branch (the Administrator of General Services). Concerning Presidential privilege, the privilege survives a president's tenure but is qualified; the limited intrusion by professional archivists for screening purposes is justified by the overriding public interest in preserving the historical record, similar to the in camera review upheld in United States v. Nixon. As for privacy, while Nixon has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications, this interest is outweighed by the public interest, given that the vast majority of the materials are official, and the Act provides for the return of purely private items. Finally, the Act is not a bill of attainder because it does not inflict punishment; instead, it serves legitimate, non-punitive goals, and its specificity is justified because Nixon, due to his unique agreement to destroy the tapes, constituted a 'legitimate class of one.'
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
Yes, the Act is unconstitutional because it violates the principles of separation of powers, privacy, and the prohibition on bills of attainder. The Act is an unprecedented act of congressional coercion over the Presidency, intruding on the historic autonomy and confidentiality of the office, which is a cornerstone of the separation of powers. It also constitutes a sweeping invasion of Nixon's privacy, amounting to a general warrant to seize and search his most personal papers and communications without the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the Act is a clear bill of attainder because it is special legislation that singles out one named individual, deprives him of his property (his papers, as historically understood) and rights enjoyed by all other presidents, and inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, the Act is a clear violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The decision upholding the Act poses a real threat to the ability of all future Presidents to receive candid advice, as it will have a chilling effect on communications within the Executive Branch. Presidential advisers will fear that their confidential discussions could be seized by a future, potentially hostile, Congress. The Court's 'balancing' test is improper; any substantial intrusion upon the effective discharge of the President's duties violates the separation of powers. The support of the incumbent President for the Act is irrelevant and cannot waive the constitutional protections of the office for future presidents.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
No, the Act is constitutional, although it raises serious questions under the Bill of Attainder Clause by singling out one individual for special treatment. This specific treatment is permissible here only because Nixon constituted a 'legitimate class of one.' His resignation under unique circumstances and his acceptance of a pardon placed him in a different class from all other Presidents, providing a legitimate, non-punitive justification for the statute's specificity. Therefore, this case should not be considered a precedent for future legislation that targets a single occupant of the Presidency.
Concurring - Justice Powell
No, the Act is facially constitutional. This was emergency legislation passed in response to the unique circumstances of Nixon's resignation and his agreement to destroy presidential records. The support of the incumbent President (Ford, then Carter) for the Act is dispositive of the separation-of-powers claim, as only the sitting President can speak for the interests of the Executive Branch. The Act's facial validity is upheld on the assumption that future regulations will provide procedural safeguards and substantive restrictions that protect Nixon's constitutional rights and privileges, with the most difficult questions of access and privacy to be resolved later.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that a former President's papers are not entirely beyond the reach of congressional regulation, particularly under extraordinary circumstances. It affirms a functional, flexible approach to separation of powers, weighing congressional interests against the degree of intrusion into executive functions. The Court's validation of the Act as targeting a 'legitimate class of one' makes the holding a narrow precedent, potentially limiting its application to future presidents unless similarly unique and compelling circumstances arise.
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