Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First National Bank
358 N.E.2d 974, 265 Ind. 457, 1976 Ind. LEXIS 408 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
When a trial court grants a new trial on the grounds that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence, its order must contain special findings that relate the supporting and opposing evidence to each material element of the claim, as required by Indiana Trial Rule 59(E)(7). A failure to provide such detailed findings constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Facts:
- Nissen Trampoline Company manufactured an aquatic diving device called an 'Aqua Diver' and sold one to Herbert A. Mason.
- Nissen did not provide any warnings or instructions for use when it delivered the aqua diver to Mason.
- Prior to the sale, Nissen's own tests had determined that it was possible for a user's foot to slip between the device's elastic cables.
- Mason set up the aqua diver for use at his recreation establishment, Southlake Beach.
- In June 1970, thirteen-year-old Bruno Garzolini, Jr., used the aqua diver for the first time.
- While attempting to jump from the platform onto the mat, Garzolini's left leg became entangled in the elastic cables.
- His body fell forward over the metal frame, breaking his leg at the knee.
- Due to complications from the injury, Garzolini's leg was subsequently amputated above the knee.
Procedural Posture:
- Bruno Garzolini, Jr. sued Nissen Trampoline Company for defective product and Herbert A. Mason for negligence in an Indiana trial court.
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants, Nissen and Mason.
- Garzolini filed a motion to correct errors, asking the trial judge to set aside the verdict.
- The trial court granted the motion as to defendant Nissen on the strict liability claim, finding the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and ordered a new trial.
- Nissen filed a motion for a change of judge for the new trial, which was granted.
- Nissen then filed its own motion to correct errors, attacking the order for a new trial, which the original trial judge overruled.
- Nissen (appellant) appealed the grant of a new trial to the Court of Appeals, First District.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial.
- Nissen petitioned the Supreme Court of Indiana for transfer.
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Issue:
Does a trial court comply with Indiana Trial Rule 59(E)(7) when it grants a new trial on the grounds that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, but its findings fail to specify the evidence related to material elements of the claim, such as defect and proximate cause?
Opinions:
Majority - DeBruler, J.
No, a trial court fails to comply with Trial Rule 59(E)(7) when its order granting a new trial does not contain specific findings and a collation of evidence on each material element of the claim. The trial judge's order was procedurally defective because it did not analyze the supporting and opposing evidence for the essential elements of a failure-to-warn products liability claim. The judge concluded the product was 'defective... without warning and instruction' but failed to set forth any specific warning or instruction the absence of which rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. Furthermore, the findings did not address the evidence relating to proximate cause—that is, how a proper warning would have prevented the injury. This lack of specificity forced the appellate courts to speculate about the trial court's reasoning, which is contrary to the purpose of the rule. The rule's requirement of detailed findings provides assurance that the judge's evaluation of the evidence is superior to the jury's, and a failure to comply invalidates the order.
Dissenting - Arterburn, J.
Yes, the trial court's order sufficiently complied with the rules. The trial judge's findings were adequate, specifically noting that Nissen knew a user's foot could slip through the cables and that expert testimony supported the need for supervision for beginners. These findings support the conclusion that the product was defective and dangerous without a warning. A different, higher standard of care in products liability should apply where products are intended for use by children, who lack the mature judgment to appreciate observable dangers. The situation is analogous to the attractive nuisance doctrine, where a different standard of liability applies for children versus adults.
Dissenting - Hunter, J.
Yes, the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the grant of a new trial. A finding of proximate cause was implicit in the judge's order, supported by the recited facts. The defect was the manufacturer's failure to warn of a known danger, and the gravity of the foreseeable harm was significant. In circumstances where the manufacturer's failure to warn makes it difficult for the plaintiff to prove causation in the traditional sense, liability should not be denied. Obvious dangers are not necessarily appreciated dangers, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the jury's verdict to be against the weight of the evidence.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the procedural strictness of Indiana Trial Rule 59(E)(7) and curtails the trial court's power as the 'thirteenth juror.' It establishes that a trial judge cannot simply substitute their judgment for the jury's without a rigorous, on-the-record analysis that details the evidence on both sides of each material element of a claim. The ruling strengthens the finality of jury verdicts by making grants of new trials on evidentiary weight grounds subject to stringent appellate review. Consequently, it requires trial courts to be meticulously detailed in their orders to withstand reversal, ensuring a transparent and rational basis for overturning a jury's decision.
