Niederman v. Brodsky
261 A.2d 84, 436 Pa. 401, 1970 Pa. LEXIS 950 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may recover for physical harm resulting from negligently inflicted emotional distress, even in the absence of a direct physical impact, provided the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact and actually feared for their safety (the 'zone of danger' rule).
Facts:
- On November 4, 1962, Harry Niederman was walking on a sidewalk with his son in Philadelphia.
- A driver, the appellee, operated a motor vehicle in a reckless and negligent manner.
- The appellee's vehicle skidded onto the sidewalk where Niederman and his son were located.
- The vehicle struck Niederman's son and destroyed a fire hydrant, a litter pole, and a newsstand.
- The vehicle did not physically strike Harry Niederman.
- Almost immediately after witnessing the event, Niederman suffered severe chest pain.
- Niederman was hospitalized for five weeks and diagnosed with acute coronary insufficiency and other serious heart conditions.
Procedural Posture:
- Harry Niederman (appellant) filed a complaint against the driver (appellee) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, a trial court.
- The appellee filed preliminary objections, asking the court to dismiss the case.
- The trial court judge, bound by existing precedent, dismissed Niederman's complaint for failing to state a cause of action under Pennsylvania's 'impact rule'.
- Niederman (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff have a cause of action for physical injuries resulting from negligently inflicted emotional distress, absent any physical impact, if the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact and actually feared for their safety?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Roberts
Yes, a plaintiff has a cause of action for physical injuries resulting from negligently inflicted emotional distress, absent any physical impact, if the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact and actually feared for their safety. The court abandons Pennsylvania's 'impact rule,' which required a physical impact as a precondition for recovery. The historical justifications for the impact rule—difficulty in proving medical causation, fear of fraudulent claims, and the potential for a flood of litigation—are no longer persuasive. Medical science has advanced sufficiently to establish a causal link between emotional shock and physical harm. Furthermore, the judicial system possesses adequate safeguards to weed out fraudulent claims, and the fear of increased litigation is not a valid reason to deny justice to an entire class of injured individuals. The court adopts the 'zone of danger' rule, allowing recovery where a negligent force was aimed at the plaintiff, put them in personal danger of physical impact, and caused them to actually fear that impact.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Bell
No, a plaintiff should not have a cause of action for injuries resulting from fright without impact. The majority's decision overrules the well-established 'impact rule' and will open a 'Pandora's Box' of fictitious, exaggerated, and fraudulent claims that will overwhelm the courts. It substitutes a clear, definite rule with a vague 'medical guessing game,' as it is incredibly difficult to prove with certainty that emotional distress, rather than a pre-existing condition or other life events, caused a specific physical ailment like a heart attack. Most importantly, the majority's decision deals a fatal blow to the principle of stare decisis, creating instability and uncertainty in the law by cavalierly overturning decades of precedent based on the flimsy justification of 'phenomenal advances in medical science' that have supposedly occurred in the few years since the rule was last affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in Pennsylvania tort law by formally abolishing the common law 'impact rule' for negligent infliction of emotional distress. By adopting the 'zone of danger' test, the court expanded the scope of a defendant's liability to include plaintiffs who suffer tangible physical harm from the fear of immediate injury, even without being touched. This ruling aligned Pennsylvania with the modern trend and the majority of other jurisdictions, creating a new avenue for recovery while also establishing a clear, albeit more liberal, boundary for such claims.
