No, the law is fair. The Court decided that the different rules for moms and dads make sense because of biology. A mother's connection to her child is proven at birth, but a father's is not always clear. The government has two important goals: 1) making sure the parent is actually the biological parent, and 2) making sure there's a chance for a real relationship between the parent and child. The extra steps required for dads (like signing a paper or getting a court order before the child turns 18) are a good way to meet these goals and are based on the reality of childbirth, not on unfair stereotypes about men and women.

Yes, the law is unfair and unconstitutional. The dissenting judges argued that the law is based on old-fashioned stereotypes that mothers are naturally better parents than fathers. They said other parts of the law already make sure a dad is the biological father. The extra rules for dads are unnecessary and treat men unfairly. A fairer law would have the same rules for both parents and wouldn't be based on outdated ideas about family roles.

No, the law is okay. This justice agreed with the main decision. However, he also believes that courts should not have the power to grant citizenship at all—only Congress can do that. But since the other justices decided to rule on whether the law was fair, he joined them in saying that it was.

The law is okay because it's trying to make sure that a child born outside the U.S. really is related to their American parent and has a chance to build a relationship with them. The rules are different for moms and dads because moms are always there when a baby is born, but dads might not be. This difference is real and doesn't violate the idea that everyone should be treated equally under the law.

Agrees with the main decision but wants to point out that the court can't just give someone citizenship if the law doesn't allow it. The court also doesn't need to decide if there could be a better way to make the law; it just needs to decide if the current law is allowed.

The law isn't fair because it assumes that moms and dads will act differently towards their kids, which isn't a strong enough reason to treat them differently. The law should treat moms and dads the same when it comes to giving their kids citizenship. Just because the impact is different doesn't mean it's okay unless there's a really important reason for it.

Yes, I hold that the law is okay for having different rules for children born outside the U.S. to get citizenship based on whether the American parent is their mom or dad, because it is designed to ensure that a child is actually related to its American parent and can build a relationship with them. Moms are always there when a baby is born, but dads might not be, and that real difference does not violate the idea of treating everyone equally under the law.

Yes, I agree that the law is okay. However, I note that I cannot just grant someone citizenship if the law doesn't allow it, and I do not need to decide whether there might be a better way to make the law; my role is solely to determine if the current law is allowed.

No, I dissent. I hold that the law is not okay because it wrongly assumes that moms and dads behave differently toward their kids—a reason that is too weak to justify treating them differently. The law should treat moms and dads the same when it comes to giving their kids citizenship; different impacts alone do not make it acceptable without a very important reason.

Under the statute, the citizenship of the child depended on whether the mother or the father was the United States citizen.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "[f] athers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of a different set of rules for making that legal determination with respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective."

—holding that less burdensome citizenship application requirements for the child of a citizen mother than that of a citizen father withstands intermediate scrutiny, in part because "[t] o fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences—such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father need not be—risks making the guarantee of equal …

—finding "important" an asserted government interest in requiring evidence of a relationship between child seeking derivative citizenship and citizen parent that "consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States

As an initial matter, Plaintiff is undoubtedly correct that the right to return to the United States is inherent in American citizenship.

"For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."

"Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of... discrimination... such evidence alone is insufficient [to prove a constitutional violation] even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny."

The difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.

—the United States Supreme Court upheld an immigration statute that favored mothers over fathers on the basis that, due to biology, at birth the father may be unknown while the mother is easily identifiable.

The Court has repeatedly said that "[t] he fact that other means are better suited to the achievement of governmental ends... is of no moment under rational basis review."

No, the gender-based distinction in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 does not violate the equal protection guarantee. The statute withstands intermediate scrutiny because its differential treatment of unwed mothers and fathers is substantially related to important governmental objectives. The Court identified two such objectives: 1) ensuring the existence of a biological parent-child relationship, which is inherently verifiable for the mother at birth but not for the father; and 2) ensuring the potential for a real, meaningful relationship between parent and child. The statute's requirements for fathers—legitimation, written acknowledgment of paternity under oath, or a court adjudication of paternity before the child turns 18—serve to establish this potential relationship, which is automatically present for the mother due to the circumstances of birth. The Court concluded that the distinction is based on real biological differences between men and women regarding the birth process, not on impermissible gender stereotypes.

Yes, the gender-based classification in 8 U.S.C. § 1409 violates the equal protection guarantee. The government failed to provide an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the distinction, as required by heightened scrutiny. The statute's means are not substantially related to its asserted ends. The goal of ensuring a biological link is already met by § 1409(a)(1)'s requirement of 'clear and convincing evidence' of paternity, making the additional requirements of § 1409(a)(4) redundant and ill-fitting. The goal of ensuring an opportunity for a relationship rests on the impermissible stereotype that mothers are inherently more likely than fathers to develop caring relationships with their children. The existence of superior sex-neutral alternatives, which the majority dismisses, demonstrates that the law is an unconstitutional reliance on overbroad generalizations rather than a necessary response to biological differences.

No. While joining the majority opinion in full, the concurrence was written to reiterate the belief, first expressed in *Miller v. Albright*, that courts lack the authority to confer citizenship as a remedy, as that power belongs exclusively to Congress. However, because a majority of the Court proceeded to the merits of the equal protection claim, this opinion does so as well and concurs with the majority's reasoning and judgment.

Yes. The statutory distinction is justified by two important governmental objectives: ensuring a biological parent-child relationship and ensuring an opportunity for a relationship between the child and the citizen parent. The means employed are substantially related to these objectives, as they account for the unique relationship of the mother to the event of birth and the potential for the father-child relationship to develop. The Court acknowledges the basic biological differences between mothers and fathers in relation to the birth process, and such recognition does not violate the principle of equal protection.

Concurs with the majority opinion but emphasizes that the Court lacks power to confer citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress. The Court's role is not to evaluate whether other means might be better suited to achieve governmental ends but to determine if the means chosen are constitutionally permissible.

No. The statute does not withstand heightened scrutiny because it relies on overbroad generalizations about the different roles of mothers and fathers. The INS has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-based classification, and the means employed are not substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. Disparate impact alone is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation, but the Court must ensure that the classification serves important governmental objectives.

Yes. I find that the statutory distinction is justified by two important governmental objectives: ensuring a biological parent-child relationship and ensuring an opportunity for a relationship between the child and the citizen parent. The means employed are substantially related to these objectives, as they account for the unique role of the mother in the event of birth and the potential for the father-child relationship to develop. I acknowledge the basic biological differences between mothers and fathers in relation to the birth process, and I hold that such recognition does not violate the equal protection guarantee under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Yes, I concur with the majority opinion that the statutory distinction is consistent with the equal protection guarantee under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I emphasize that the power to confer citizenship rests solely with Congress, and my role is limited to determining that the means employed are constitutionally permissible, not assessing whether alternative measures might better serve governmental objectives.

No, I hold that the statute does not withstand heightened scrutiny because it relies on overbroad generalizations regarding the roles of mothers and fathers. I find that the INS has not provided an exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-based classification, and I determine that the means employed are not substantially related to achieving the important governmental objectives. Although disparate impact alone does not establish a constitutional violation, I maintain that the classification fails to serve the important governmental objectives required under equal protection.

Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

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