Nexsen v. Haddock

Court of Appeals of South Carolina
353 S.C. 74, 576 S.E.2d 183 (2002)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Under South Carolina law, a sublease created by a tenant without the written consent of the landlord is a nullity with respect to the landlord's rights. This statutory requirement applies by default when a lease agreement is silent on the issue of subleasing, even if the lease contains general permissive language about the tenant's use of the property.

Facts:

Kenneth E. McClary was a tenant on a lot of land under a lease agreement that allowed him to use and occupy the premises as he 'desired'.
The lease agreement did not contain any provision prohibiting or expressly permitting subleasing.
In 1996, David Nexsen purchased the tract of land, becoming McClary's new landlord.
In July 2000, McClary entered into a sublease agreement with James G. Lifrage and Marion Driggers.
Neither McClary nor the subtenants sought or obtained Nexsen's permission before entering into the sublease.

Procedural Posture:

David Nexsen filed an action in the trial court seeking a declaratory judgment to nullify the sublease.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of Nexsen, holding that S.C.Code Ann. § 27-35-60 rendered the sublease invalid without the landlord's written consent.
The subtenants, James G. Lifrage and Marion Driggers, appealed the trial court's decision.

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Issue:

Does a state statute requiring a landlord's written consent for a sublease render a sublease invalid when the original lease agreement is silent on subleasing but permits the tenant to use the property 'as desired'?

Opinions:

Majority - Cureton, J.

Yes, the sublease is invalid. A state statute requiring a landlord's written consent controls when a lease is silent on the matter. The court reasoned that the plain meaning of S.C.Code Ann. § 27-35-60 dictates that a sublease without the landlord's written consent is a nullity. The general language in the original lease permitting the tenant to use the property 'as desired' is not specific enough to grant the right to sublease. Because the lease is silent on the specific right to sublease, the statute acts as a default rule, and its requirement for written consent must be satisfied. As Nexsen did not provide written consent, the sublease between McClary and the appellants is void.

Analysis:

This decision clarifies the hierarchy between statutory provisions and private lease agreements in South Carolina landlord-tenant law. It establishes that a statutory default rule, such as the requirement for landlord consent to sublease, will govern unless the parties explicitly contract around it. The ruling emphasizes that general, permissive language in a lease is insufficient to override a specific statutory requirement, thereby strengthening a landlord's control over who occupies their property. Future tenants wishing to retain the right to sublease must ensure that right is explicitly granted in the written lease agreement.

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