Town of Newton et al. v. Rumery
480 U.S. 386 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
An agreement in which a criminal defendant releases their right to file a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending criminal charges is enforceable if the agreement was entered into voluntarily, there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and its enforcement would not adversely affect relevant public interests.
Facts:
- David Champy was indicted for aggravated felonious sexual assault against Mary Deary.
- Bernard Rumery, a friend of Champy, telephoned Deary to inquire about the charges.
- Deary reported to Police Chief David Barrett that Rumery was trying to pressure her into dropping the charges against Champy.
- Rumery and Deary spoke again; Deary later told Chief Barrett that Rumery had threatened her life during this second call.
- Based on Deary's report, Chief Barrett arrested Rumery and accused him of felony witness tampering.
- The prosecutor, Brian Graf, offered to dismiss the witness tampering charge against Rumery if Rumery would sign an agreement not to sue the town, its officials, or Deary for any harm caused by his arrest.
- Part of Graf's motivation for the agreement was to spare Deary, the victim in the sexual assault case, the trauma of having to testify in the witness tampering case against Rumery.
- After consulting with his experienced attorney for about an hour and considering the offer for three days, Rumery, a sophisticated businessman, signed the release-dismissal agreement.
Procedural Posture:
- Ten months after the charges were dropped, Rumery filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire against the Town of Newton and its officers.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, raising the release-dismissal agreement as an affirmative defense.
- The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the agreement was voluntary, deliberate, and informed, and therefore enforceable.
- Rumery, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, adopting a per se rule that all release-dismissal agreements are invalid as against public policy.
- The Town of Newton, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Is an agreement in which a criminal defendant agrees to release any civil claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a town and its officials, in exchange for the dismissal of pending criminal charges, unenforceable per se as contrary to public policy?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. A release-dismissal agreement is not per se unenforceable; its validity must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court rejected a per se rule of invalidity, reasoning that such agreements are not always coercive, as criminal defendants often make difficult choices that waive constitutional rights, such as in plea bargaining. In many cases, a defendant's choice to enter into such an agreement is a rational judgment that the certain benefit of escaping prosecution outweighs the speculative benefit of a civil suit. The court also found that these agreements can serve legitimate public interests, such as sparing public officials the burden of defending against frivolous lawsuits and, as in this case, protecting a vulnerable witness from the trauma of testifying. The court concluded that Rumery's agreement was voluntary, there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and its enforcement served the public interest of protecting the witness, Deary.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. An innocent person should not be required to choose between facing a threatened indictment and surrendering the right to a civil remedy for constitutional violations. The dissent argued that such agreements are inherently coercive and create a dangerous conflict of interest for prosecutors, who may be tempted to bring trumped-up charges to protect police from civil liability or dismiss meritorious cases to avoid a lawsuit. Unlike plea bargains, which involve an admission of wrongdoing, release-dismissal agreements often exonerate the defendant, suggesting the prosecutor's case was weak to begin with. The dissent contended that the public's interest in vindicating constitutional rights and exposing official misconduct is paramount and outweighs the government's interest in avoiding litigation costs.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. While release-dismissal agreements are not per se invalid, the burden of proof rests on the government officials seeking to enforce the agreement. To enforce the covenant, the defendants must establish that the agreement was voluntary, not the product of prosecutorial overreaching, and in the public interest. This inquiry should consider factors such as the defendant's knowledge and experience, the presence of counsel, the seriousness of the criminal charges (and their coercive effect), and whether a legitimate criminal justice objective was served. In this specific case, the prosecutor had a legitimate reason—protecting the sexual assault victim from further trauma—and the evidence showed Rumery's decision was voluntary, making the agreement enforceable.
Analysis:
This decision rejects a bright-line rule against release-dismissal agreements, establishing instead a fact-intensive, case-by-case balancing test. This gives prosecutors a significant tool to dispose of marginal criminal cases while shielding public officials from potentially costly civil rights litigation. However, it also creates a risk of prosecutorial abuse, where the threat of criminal charges could be used to suppress meritorious civil rights claims. Justice O'Connor's concurrence is critical as it clarifies that the burden is on the government to prove the agreement's validity, providing a procedural safeguard for defendants challenging these agreements in future cases.
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