Newman v. United States
382 F.2d 479, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5454 (1967)
Rule of Law:
The United States Attorney's broad discretion in deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings, what charges to bring, or whether to consent to a guilty plea for a lesser offense is not subject to judicial review, even if it results in different treatment for co-defendants, unless there is a showing of invidious discrimination.
Facts:
- Appellant (Newman) and Anderson were alleged to have committed an act of housebreaking and petty larceny together.
- Anderson's legal counsel engaged in discussions with an Assistant United States Attorney regarding potential plea options.
- The Assistant United States Attorney decided to allow Anderson to plead guilty to lesser misdemeanor charges of petty larceny and attempted housebreaking.
- The United States Attorney subsequently refused to extend the same plea offer to Appellant.
- Appellant believed that he and Anderson were equally culpable for the offenses.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellant (Newman) and Anderson were indicted (formally charged by a grand jury) for housebreaking and petty larceny.
- Anderson was allowed to plead guilty to lesser included misdemeanors following negotiations with an Assistant United States Attorney.
- The United States Attorney declined to consent to the same plea for Appellant.
- Appellant subsequently failed to appear for his trial, became a fugitive, was later apprehended, tried, and convicted of the original charges.
- Appellant received a sentence of 2 to 6 years imprisonment for his conviction.
- Appellant appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the prosecutor's differential treatment in plea bargaining violated his constitutional rights.
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Issue:
Does the United States Attorney's refusal to consent to a co-defendant's guilty plea for a lesser included offense, while allowing a different co-defendant to take the same plea, deny the first co-defendant's constitutional rights to due process or equal protection?
Opinions:
Majority - BURGER, Circuit Judge
No, the United States Attorney's refusal to consent to a co-defendant's guilty plea for a lesser included offense, while allowing a different co-defendant to take the same plea, does not deny the first co-defendant's constitutional rights. The court affirmed that the Executive branch, through the United States Attorney, possesses broad and largely unreviewable discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, what charges shall be made, and whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought. This discretion stems from the constitutional separation of powers, which prevents courts from interfering with the Executive's control over criminal prosecutions. While prosecutors act as officers of the court regarding conduct, their role as agents of the Executive means their discretionary decisions on prosecution policy are responsible to their superiors, not the judiciary. The court cited Oyler v. Boles to establish that “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” Numerous factors, such as a defendant's criminal record, role in the offense, or age, can legitimately influence a prosecutor's decision to treat co-defendants differently, and courts lack jurisdiction to review such decisions, deferring instead to internal executive oversight for any potential abuses of discretion.
Concurring - BAZELON, Chief Judge
No, the Assistant United States Attorney did not act unconstitutionally in this specific case. Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in the affirmance, stating that Appellant made only a bare assertion that he should have been allowed to plead guilty to the lesser crimes simply because his co-defendant was. Appellant failed to present any evidence or argument to establish the reasons for the different treatment, and thus could not demonstrate that the disparity was irrational or otherwise unconstitutional. Therefore, there was no basis to find a constitutional violation in this instance. The concurring opinion noted that it had not considered the broader statements made by the majority opinion, as they went "very far beyond the necessities of this frivolous case."
Analysis:
This case firmly establishes the principle of broad prosecutorial discretion in the American legal system, particularly concerning charging decisions and plea bargaining. It reinforces the separation of powers doctrine by limiting judicial review of executive decisions in criminal prosecutions. The ruling means that mere disparities in treatment between co-defendants, without evidence of invidious or irrational discrimination, will not generally be deemed a constitutional violation, thereby making it challenging for defendants to challenge plea offers on equal protection or due process grounds.
