New York v. Uplinger
467 U.S. 246, 81 L. Ed. 2d 201, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 95 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The Supreme Court may dismiss a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted when, after full briefing and oral argument, it determines the lower court's decision rests on ambiguous grounds or is inextricably linked to a prior state court ruling that is not being challenged.
Facts:
- New York Penal Law §240.35(3) prohibited loitering in a public place for the purpose of engaging in, or soliciting another to engage in, 'deviate sexual intercourse.'
- Previously, New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, had declared the state's consensual sodomy statute unconstitutional in a case called People v. Onofre.
- The loitering statute was viewed by the New York Court of Appeals as a companion statute intended to punish conduct leading up to the act of consensual sodomy.
- Respondents were charged with violating the loitering statute, §240.35(3).
Procedural Posture:
- Respondents were charged in a New York trial court with violating N.Y. Penal Law §240.35(3).
- Respondents challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
- The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which is the state's highest court.
- The New York Court of Appeals held the loitering statute unconstitutional, reasoning it was a 'companion statute' to the consensual sodomy law it had previously struck down in People v. Onofre.
- The State of New York (Petitioner), represented by the Erie County District Attorney, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Should the Supreme Court dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted when the underlying state court decision is subject to varying interpretations and is premised on a prior, unchallenged state court ruling?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted because the case is an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the constitutional issues raised. The Court's reasoning is threefold: first, the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals is ambiguous, making it uncertain what precise federal constitutional issue the state court decided. Second, the state court's decision was clearly premised on its earlier, unchallenged decision in People v. Onofre, which had decriminalized consensual sodomy. Third, a fundamental conflict arose between the petitioner (a county district attorney) and the New York Attorney General regarding the statute's constitutionality, a circumstance that was not apparent when certiorari was granted.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes. The writ should be dismissed because the most straightforward interpretation of the New York court's opinion is that the loitering statute is not severable from the invalidated sodomy statute as a matter of state law, which would mean there is no federal question for the Court to decide. Furthermore, while the 'Rule of Four' is sufficient to grant certiorari and hear a case, it does not compel a majority of the Court to issue a decision on the merits if, after full consideration, the case is deemed an unwise vehicle for constitutional adjudication. The principle of judicial restraint allows a majority, upon fuller information post-argument, to decide against resolving a complex constitutional question.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. The writ should not be dismissed because the New York statute was invalidated on federal constitutional grounds. The merits of that decision are properly before the Court and should be addressed.
Analysis:
This case is a significant procedural decision illustrating the Supreme Court's discretionary power over its own docket. It clarifies that granting certiorari is not an irreversible commitment to deciding a case on the merits. The dismissal highlights the Court's doctrine of judicial restraint and its reluctance to rule on cases with unclear state-law foundations, ambiguous federal questions, or internal conflicts among the parties representing a state. The concurrence by Justice Stevens provides an important commentary on the 'Rule of Four,' positing that its power is largely spent after a case is argued, at which point a majority can still decline to issue a merits opinion if the case proves to be a poor vehicle for establishing precedent.
