NEUROSURGERY AND SPINE SURGERY v. Goldman
790 N.E.2d 925, 339 Ill. App. 3d 177, 274 Ill. Dec. 152 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
The tort of abuse of process requires both an ulterior purpose and a misapplication of process beyond its intended purpose, not merely the issuance of a summons; fraudulent misrepresentation is historically limited to interferences with financial or commercial interests and only allows recovery for pecuniary losses, not physical or emotional distress in noncommercial contexts.
Facts:
- Neurosurgery and Dr. Michael Rabin, a neurosurgeon, operated a medical practice in Naperville.
- Mary Goldman was a patient of Dr. Rabin’s partner, Dr. Gary Skaletsky, and was treated by Dr. Rabin at Edward Hospital on April 25, 1999.
- During the summer of 1999, Nancy Skaletsky, Dr. Gary Skaletsky's wife and a nurse employed by Neurosurgery, allegedly told Goldman that Dr. Rabin had been dismissed from the staffs of two hospitals due to incidents similar to Goldman’s April 25, 1999 incident.
- Goldman relied upon Nancy Skaletsky’s statement and republished it to Edward Hospital on October 18, 1999, also alleging that Dr. Rabin had forced his way into her room while she was undressed and examined her with the door open.
- On December 22, 1999, Gregg I. Minkow, Neurosurgery and Dr. Rabin’s attorney, called Goldman, referred to a Chicago Tribune article about the lawsuit, and made statements Goldman interpreted as threats to publicly reveal confidential medical information and financial records.
- On the afternoon of December 22, 1999, Goldman was served with a summons, complaint, and a letter from Minkow stating, 'If you wish to discuss an early resolution of this matter please call me.'
- During a January 17, 2000 telephone conversation, Minkow allegedly implied he would terminate the lawsuit if Goldman agreed to falsely testify that she had an affair with Dr. Skaletsky and received drugs from him.
Procedural Posture:
- On December 20, 1999, Neurosurgery and Dr. Rabin (plaintiffs) filed a defamation action against Mary Goldman in the circuit court of Du Page County (trial court).
- On March 6, 2001, Mary Goldman (defendant/counterplaintiff) filed a third-party complaint, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation against Nancy Skaletsky and abuse of process against the plaintiffs' attorneys and their associated law firms.
- On July 5, 2001, Mary Goldman filed a second amended countercomplaint against Neurosurgery and Dr. Rabin (counterdefendants), alleging two counts of abuse of process.
- On September 20, 2001, the trial court dismissed count I of Goldman’s third-party complaint (fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Nancy Skaletsky) upon motion by Nancy Skaletsky.
- On October 11, 2001, the trial court ordered that the dismissal of count I of Goldman’s third-party complaint was with prejudice.
- On January 29, 2002, the trial court dismissed, with prejudice, Goldman’s second amended countercomplaint (abuse of process claims against Neurosurgery and Dr. Rabin) upon motion by Neurosurgery and Dr. Rabin.
- The trial court found that there was no reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of this order or its previous dismissal orders.
- Mary Goldman filed a timely notice of appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
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Issue:
1. Does a countercomplaint adequately state a cause of action for abuse of process if it only alleges the issuance of a summons and vague threats regarding confidential information and financial records as evidence of misapplication and ulterior motive? 2. Does a third-party complaint adequately state a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation if it alleges noncommercial dealings and seeks damages for emotional distress, physical harm, and unspecific legal costs?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Gilleran Johnson
No, Goldman’s countercomplaint did not sufficiently state a cause of action for abuse of process because it failed to allege facts demonstrating a misapplication of process, and her allegations of improper motive were unclear and confusing. The court reasoned that abuse of process requires two distinct elements: (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive (such as extortion, intimidation, or embarrassment) and (2) some act in the use of process that is not proper in the regular course of proceedings, meaning a misapplication of process beyond its purview. The tort is disfavored in Illinois, and its elements are strictly construed. The mere issuance of a summons is the intended purpose of process (to establish in personam jurisdiction) and thus cannot constitute a misapplication; misapplication has historically been found only in cases involving actual arrest or seizure of property. Goldman's allegations regarding threats to reveal confidential medical information and financial records were deemed 'bemusing' and lacking a clear indication of an improper motive that constituted an abuse of process. No, Goldman’s third-party complaint did not sufficiently state a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation because it did not involve a business or financial transaction and failed to allege pecuniary damages with the required specificity. The court affirmed that fraudulent misrepresentation, rooted in the common law action of deceit, has historically been limited to interferences with financial or commercial interests and only allows for the recovery of pecuniary losses. The court explicitly declined to extend the tort to noncommercial and nonfinancial dealings between parties or to allow recovery for physical and emotional distress. Goldman’s general allegation of 'legal and other costs' was deemed an unsupported conclusion that lacked the specificity and particularity required for pleading damages in a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court noted that Goldman’s claim appeared to be a 'subterfuge for an action for contribution' from Nancy Skaletsky, which is unavailable for intentional tortfeasors like defamation.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict pleading requirements and narrow scope of both abuse of process and fraudulent misrepresentation in Illinois. It reinforces that the mere filing of a lawsuit, even with an alleged improper motive, does not constitute abuse of process unless there is a clear misapplication of legal process beyond its intended function, typically involving arrest or seizure. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the historical limitation of fraudulent misrepresentation to commercial or financial transactions, explicitly rejecting its application to non-economic harms like emotional distress or physical harm, thereby curtailing attempts to expand the tort into broader personal injury claims. For law students, this case is a critical reminder that a plaintiff must carefully align the alleged facts with the precise elements of a tort, especially disfavored ones, and must plead damages with specificity within the established boundaries of the cause of action.
