Nestor v. Whitney
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24844, 466 F.3d 65, 88 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,535 (2006)
Rule of Law:
A federal Title VII action seeking remedies unavailable in prior state administrative and judicial proceedings is not barred by res judicata, even if those proceedings affirmed a finding of liability on the same underlying discrimination claim.
Facts:
- Gale Nestor worked as a machinist for Pratt & Whitney from 1973 until September 2, 1992.
- Pratt & Whitney fired Nestor on September 2, 1992, after she allegedly had an altercation with a male employee.
- Nestor was reinstated in 1993 without back pay, pursuant to a labor arbitration.
- On November 5, 1992, Nestor filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CCHRO), alleging her employment termination was due to sex discrimination.
- The CCHRO advised Nestor that it could not award compensatory damages, but that full damages could be awarded in state court.
Procedural Posture:
- Gale Nestor filed a sex discrimination complaint against Pratt & Whitney with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CCHRO).
- The CCHRO conducted a public hearing in June 1998 and decided on September 20, 1999, that Pratt & Whitney terminated Nestor's employment based on her sex, awarding her back pay.
- Pratt & Whitney appealed the CCHRO decision to the Connecticut Superior Court, which affirmed the decision on February 20, 2001.
- Pratt & Whitney further appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, which also affirmed on September 10, 2001.
- Pratt & Whitney's petition for certification to the Connecticut Supreme Court was denied.
- Pratt & Whitney subsequently paid Nestor the awarded back pay with interest.
- On February 19, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued Nestor a right-to-sue letter.
- Nestor filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking attorney’s fees, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages.
- Pratt & Whitney moved for summary judgment in the District Court, arguing that Connecticut’s doctrine of res judicata barred Nestor’s action.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to Pratt & Whitney on March 31, 2005.
- Nestor timely appealed the District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of res judicata bar a Title VII plaintiff from subsequently filing an action in federal court to seek attorney's fees, compensatory damages, and punitive damages that were unavailable in prior state administrative and judicial proceedings on the same discrimination claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Dennis Jacobs, Chief Judge
No, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar a Title VII plaintiff from filing a subsequent federal action seeking remedies that were unavailable in prior state administrative and judicial proceedings, even after those state proceedings have concluded. The court first addressed subject matter jurisdiction, finding Nestor's claim for compensatory and punitive damages involved substantive issues beyond just attorney's fees, distinguishing it from North Carolina Dept. of Transp. v. Crest Street Cmty. Council, Inc. Second, under federal preclusion law, the court reconciled New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey (allowing federal suit for fees after state proceedings) with Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp. (applying res judicata to liability determinations), holding that Title VII permits supplemental relief unavailable in state courts. The court reasoned that Carey allows for such supplemental actions to achieve complete relief under Title VII, which is a federal goal, and that this does not impede the state’s exercise of regulatory powers. Concerns of comity and duplication were considered, but the court found Congress's intent to provide full relief under Title VII outweighed them. Third, under Connecticut preclusion law, the court found the state's 'transactional' test for res judicata is subject to an exception from Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(l)(c) for when a plaintiff was unable to seek a certain remedy in the first action due to jurisdictional limitations. Connecticut courts had adopted this exception in cases like Connecticut Water Company v. Beausoleil. Applying this exception, the court concluded that Nestor's inability to seek compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees in the CCHRO proceedings meant her federal claim was not barred. The court emphasized that the policy of encouraging the use of state agencies like the CCHRO would be frustrated if claimants were penalized by limited remedies.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interplay between state administrative and judicial discrimination proceedings and subsequent federal Title VII actions, particularly regarding the doctrine of res judicata. It reinforces that Title VII provides supplemental remedies to ensure full relief, even if it means a 'split' claim where liability is established in state court and additional damages are sought federally. This decision protects plaintiffs who utilize state agencies for initial liability determinations but need federal courts to secure all available Title VII remedies, thus promoting both state-level dispute resolution and the comprehensive enforcement of federal anti-discrimination laws. It prevents the mechanical application of res judicata from undermining congressional intent to provide complete relief under Title VII.
