Nelson v. Krusen
1984 Tex. LEXIS 404, 678 S.W.2d 918, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 31 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A medical malpractice statute of limitations that extinguishes a cause of action before the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover the injury violates the 'open courts' provision of the Texas Constitution. While Texas law recognizes a 'wrongful birth' claim for parents to recover expenses for an impaired child due to negligent advice, it does not recognize a 'wrongful life' claim brought on behalf of the child.
Facts:
- Tom and Gloria Nelson had a child with Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
- In 1976, while Gloria Nelson was pregnant with their second child, they consulted Dr. Edward Krusen to determine if she was a genetic carrier of the disease.
- Between April and June 1976, based on tests conducted at Baylor University Medical Center, Dr. Krusen advised the Nelsons that Mrs. Nelson was not a carrier.
- Relying on Dr. Krusen's advice, the Nelsons decided to continue the pregnancy.
- Their son, Mark Nelson, was born on November 24, 1976.
- On February 20, 1980, when Mark was over three years old, a neurologist diagnosed him with Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
- The disease's symptoms were not reasonably discoverable prior to this diagnosis, as they could be dismissed as normal clumsiness in a young child.
Procedural Posture:
- Tom and Gloria Nelson sued Dr. Edward Krusen and Baylor University Medical Center in a Texas state trial court for wrongful birth and wrongful life.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Dr. Krusen and Baylor.
- The Nelsons, as appellants, appealed the decision to the Texas Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Nelsons, as petitioners, then appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
First, does a medical malpractice statute of limitations violate the Texas Constitution's 'open courts' provision by barring a claim before the injury is reasonably discoverable, and second, does Texas law recognize a cause of action for 'wrongful life' brought by a child born with severe defects?
Opinions:
Majority - Spears, Justice
Yes, as to the first question, and No, as to the second. A statute of limitations that bars a claim before an injury is reasonably discoverable violates the Texas 'open courts' provision. However, Texas law does not recognize a cause of action for 'wrongful life' on behalf of the child. The 'open courts' provision of the Texas Constitution (Art. I, § 13) guarantees that courts must be open for any person to seek a remedy for an injury. A statute requiring a person to sue before they could reasonably know they have been injured imposes an impossible condition, thereby unconstitutionally abrogating their right to redress. Regarding the 'wrongful life' claim, the court rejects it for two primary reasons: 1) it fundamentally asserts that non-existence would have been preferable to an impaired life, a concept that contradicts the high value the law places on human life; and 2) calculating damages is impossible, as it would require the court to weigh the value of an impaired life against the value of non-existence, a task better suited for philosophers and theologians than for a court of law. While the parents' 'wrongful birth' claim for economic damages is permitted under Jacobs v. Theimer, the child's claim for his own existence is not.
Concurring - Robertson, Justice
Yes, as to the first question, and No, as to the second. The concurring opinion agrees with the outcome but clarifies the reasoning. On the statute of limitations, it emphasizes that the parents' claim is a traditional, well-established common law action for negligence, which merits protection under the 'open courts' provision. On the 'wrongful life' claim, the core reason for its failure is not public policy or difficulty in calculating damages, but the child's inability to prove the essential element of injury. To prove injury, a court would have to compare the child's impaired life with the alternative of non-existence, which is a rationally impossible calculation. Without proof of the existence of an injury, a negligence claim cannot proceed.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kilgarlin, Justice
Yes, as to the first question, and I would answer Yes, as to the second. This opinion concurs that the statute of limitations is unconstitutional but dissents from the rejection of the child's 'wrongful life' claim. It argues that the court should recognize a limited cause of action for the child to recover for extraordinary medical expenses he will incur after reaching the age of majority. Denying the child's claim is inconsistent, as the court allows a jury to perform a similar 'life versus non-life' calculation for the parents' 'wrongful birth' claim. Failing to recognize the child's claim undermines tort law's deterrent function and leaves the primary victim of the malpractice without a remedy if the parents fail to bring a timely suit.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Gonzalez, Justice
Yes, as to the first question, but I dissent from allowing the parents' claim. This opinion concurs that the statute of limitations is unconstitutional and that the child has no claim for 'wrongful life,' but dissents from the majority's decision to allow the parents' 'wrongful birth' claim. It argues that recognizing a 'wrongful birth' action creates a legal entitlement to a 'perfect child,' contributes to a 'disposable society,' and disregards the sanctity of life, especially in the era following Roe v. Wade. The opinion would overrule Jacobs v. Theimer, which established the 'wrongful birth' cause of action in Texas.
Dissenting - Wallace, Justice
No, I would find no cause of action for either the parents or the child. This opinion argues that the majority's holding is inconsistent. If a court cannot rationally compare an impaired life with non-life for a 'wrongful life' claim, it is equally illogical to allow a 'wrongful birth' claim, which requires a court to determine if parents are worse off with an impaired child than with no child at all. The dissent sees 'wrongful birth' and 'wrongful life' as identical causes of action under different labels. It would overrule the precedent allowing 'wrongful birth' claims, which would dispose of the case without needing to reach the constitutional statute of limitations issue.
Analysis:
This landmark Texas Supreme Court decision establishes two critical principles. First, it powerfully affirms the state's 'open courts' doctrine, holding that statutes of repose in medical malpractice cases cannot constitutionally extinguish a claim before the injury is reasonably discoverable. This precedent significantly protects plaintiffs whose injuries have a long latency period. Second, the case carves out a fine but firm distinction in Texas tort law, sanctioning parents' 'wrongful birth' claims for economic damages while rejecting a child's 'wrongful life' claim. This bifurcation reflects a judicial unwillingness to declare life itself, even with severe impairments, a legally cognizable injury, leaving the impaired child without a direct legal remedy against a negligent medical provider.
