Neil v. Biggers
409 U.S. 188 (1972)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The admission of evidence from a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure does not violate due process if, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification is reliable. Reliability is determined by weighing five factors against the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure.
Facts:
- On January 22, 1965, a woman was grabbed in her kitchen by an assailant armed with a butcher knife.
- The assailant walked her at knifepoint about two blocks to a wooded area and raped her; the entire incident lasted between 15 and 30 minutes.
- The victim stated she had a good opportunity to see her assailant's face under light from her bedroom and a full moon.
- Immediately after the crime, the victim gave police a detailed description of her assailant, including his approximate age, height, weight, complexion, skin texture, build, and voice.
- Over the next seven months, the victim viewed numerous suspects in lineups, showups, and was shown 30 to 40 photographs, but she did not identify anyone.
- Seven months after the assault, police detained Archie Biggers on an unrelated charge.
- Because police could not find others fitting Biggers's description for a lineup, they conducted a showup, walking Biggers past the victim.
- At the victim's request, police directed Biggers to say the words her assailant used, after which she positively identified him, stating she had 'no doubt.'
Procedural Posture:
- Archie Biggers was convicted of rape in a Tennessee state trial court.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction.
- On a writ of certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state court's judgment by an equally divided court.
- Biggers then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, a federal trial court.
- The District Court granted the writ, finding the station-house identification procedure violated due process.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, an intermediate federal appellate court, affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The State of Tennessee (Neil, the warden) was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a suggestive out-of-court showup identification procedure violate a defendant's due process rights if, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification is determined to be reliable?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. A suggestive out-of-court identification procedure does not violate a defendant's due process rights if the identification is reliable under the totality of the circumstances. The primary evil to be avoided is a substantial likelihood of misidentification, not merely a suggestive confrontation. Unnecessary suggestiveness alone does not require the exclusion of evidence. The central inquiry is whether the identification was reliable even though the procedure was suggestive. The court established five factors to assess reliability: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description, (4) the witness's level of certainty at the confrontation, and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Here, the victim's good opportunity to view her assailant, her high degree of attention as a victim, the thoroughness of her prior description, her absolute certainty, and her prior refusal to identify other suspects outweighed the negative effect of the seven-month delay. Therefore, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification, and the evidence was properly admitted.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
This opinion concurs that an affirmance by an equally divided Court does not bar subsequent federal habeas corpus review. However, it dissents from the majority's decision to reverse the lower courts on the merits. The dissent argues that the majority improperly departed from the long-established 'two-court rule,' under which the Supreme Court does not reverse findings of fact that have been concurred in by two lower courts unless they are clearly erroneous. The District Court and the Court of Appeals both found, after reviewing the record, that the identification was unreliable due to the victim's poor opportunity to view her attacker and the seven-month delay. The majority, in the dissent's view, engaged in a de novo review of these elemental facts, improperly substituting its own judgment for that of the lower courts.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established the definitive five-factor test for evaluating the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence obtained through suggestive procedures. By shifting the constitutional focus from the suggestiveness of the police procedure to the overall reliability of the identification, the ruling created a high bar for defendants seeking to suppress such evidence. The 'Biggers factors' give courts a framework to admit identifications even from flawed procedures, provided other indicia of reliability are present. This case significantly shapes the litigation of eyewitness evidence in criminal trials, often making it more difficult for the defense to exclude identifications that result from showups or other suggestive methods.
