Neff v. Lasso
555 A.2d 1304, 382 Pa.Super. 487, 1989 Pa. Super. LEXIS 617 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if they personally suffer a direct emotional shock from a 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' of a traumatic event involving a close relative, which does not strictly require visual perception of the moment of impact but can be satisfied through other sensory experiences, such as hearing the event and immediately witnessing its aftermath.
Facts:
- Janice E. Neff was at her home looking out her kitchen window.
- She observed her husband, William L. Neff, driving his pickup truck on the street in front of their house.
- Neff also observed a vehicle driven by William Lasso, Jr., following her husband's truck at an excessive rate of speed.
- As her husband attempted to turn left into their driveway, Lasso's vehicle struck the pickup truck in a no-passing zone, fatally injuring him.
- Neff heard the impact of the two vehicles colliding.
- She immediately went to the accident scene on her front lawn.
- Upon arriving, she found her husband lying unconscious.
- As a direct result of this experience, Neff suffered severe emotional distress.
Procedural Posture:
- Janice E. Neff filed a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against William Lasso, Jr. and G. Thomas Pasquariello in the trial court.
- The defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing Neff had failed to state a cause of action because she did not visually observe the accident.
- The trial court sustained the defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed Neff's claim.
- Neff, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's order of dismissal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by alleging they witnessed the events immediately preceding a fatal accident involving a close relative, heard the impact, and immediately arrived on the scene to find the victim, even without visually observing the precise moment of the collision?
Opinions:
Majority - Kelly, J.
Yes. A plaintiff can state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under these circumstances because the requirement of a 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' is not limited to visual perception. The court traced the evolution of the tort in Pennsylvania from the restrictive 'impact rule' to the 'zone of danger' rule, and finally to the foreseeability test established in Sinn v. Burd, which adopted three factors from Dillon v. Legg: (1) proximity to the scene, (2) shock resulting from a direct sensory and contemporaneous observance, and (3) a close relationship to the victim. The core of this case is the interpretation of the second factor. The court rejected the trial court's narrow interpretation that 'observance' implies sight only. Instead, it reasoned that the purpose of the Sinn test is to determine if the emotional shock was direct and immediate, as contrasted with learning of the event from a third party after its occurrence. Aural perception (hearing the crash), when combined with prior visual context (seeing the speeding car) and immediate subsequent visual confirmation (seeing the unconscious victim), creates a single, direct, and immediate traumatic experience for a 'percipient witness.' To deny recovery based solely on the sense used would be arbitrary and contrary to the policy underlying Sinn.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' requirement for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in Pennsylvania. By holding that observance is not limited to sight, the court expanded the scope of bystander liability and lowered the pleading barrier for plaintiffs who are 'earwitnesses' to a traumatic event. The ruling shifts the analytical focus from the specific sensory mechanism of perception to the overall directness and immediacy of the plaintiff's experience. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to obtain dismissals in cases where a plaintiff heard, but did not see, the moment of impact involving a close relative, thereby allowing more such cases to proceed to a jury.
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