Nectow v. City of Cambridge
277 U.S. 183 (1928)
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Rule of Law:
A zoning ordinance, constitutional on its face, may be unconstitutional as applied to a specific parcel of land if the restriction does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and causes serious injury to the property owner.
Facts:
- Nectow owned a 140,000 square foot tract of land in the City of Cambridge.
- The City of Cambridge enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance, which placed a 100-foot-wide strip of Nectow's land into a residential-only (R-3) district.
- The remainder of Nectow's tract, and the land to the east and south of the restricted strip, were zoned as unrestricted for industrial use.
- The restricted parcel was adjacent to a Ford Motor Company assembly plant, a soap factory, and the tracks of the Boston & Albany Railroad.
- Prior to the ordinance, Nectow had a contract to sell the larger tract for $63,000, but the purchaser refused to complete the sale due to the new zoning restrictions.
- A court-appointed master found that no practical use could be made of the restricted parcel for residential purposes and that its inclusion in the residential district would not promote public health, safety, convenience, or general welfare.
Procedural Posture:
- Nectow (plaintiff) filed suit in a Massachusetts state court against the City of Cambridge and its inspector of buildings (defendants).
- Nectow sought a mandatory injunction to require the city to issue a building permit without regard to the zoning ordinance.
- The case was referred to a master, who conducted a hearing and made findings of fact favorable to Nectow.
- A justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confirmed the master's report but reported the case to the full court for determination.
- The full bench of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the state's highest court) sustained the ordinance and dismissed Nectow's suit.
- Nectow (plaintiff in error) sought review from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a city zoning ordinance that restricts a specific parcel of land to residential use violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as applied to the landowner, where the land is practically unusable for residential purposes and the restriction does not promote public health, safety, or welfare?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Sutherland
Yes, the ordinance as applied to Nectow's property violates the Fourteenth Amendment. While the governmental power to interfere with property rights through zoning is legitimate, it is not unlimited and must bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. In this case, the master's finding, confirmed by the lower court, established that restricting this specific parcel to residential use does not promote the public welfare. Because the restriction is highly injurious to the property owner and lacks the necessary justification of a public benefit, the action of the zoning authorities is arbitrary and cannot be sustained.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing the viability of an "as-applied" challenge to a zoning ordinance. It carves out an important exception to the broad deference granted to legislative zoning decisions in Euclid v. Ambler Co. While a zoning plan may be constitutional in its general scope, Nectow demonstrates that courts will scrutinize its specific application to individual properties. The decision affirms that if a restriction on a particular parcel is arbitrary, serves no valid public purpose, and destroys much of the land's value, it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process.
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