Neal v. Neal
873 P.2d 881 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Idaho does not recognize a civil cause of action for adultery (criminal conversation). To recover for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress based on fear of contracting a disease, a plaintiff must prove actual exposure to a disease-causing agent, and consent to sexual contact is not vitiated by a partner's fraudulent concealment of infidelity unless the fraud relates to the essential character of the act itself.
Facts:
- Thomas Neal and Mary Neal were married in 1984 and had one child.
- In 1988, the couple moved to Boise, where Thomas, a physician, began a residency that also required him to travel to Spokane, Washington.
- In November 1988, Thomas Neal began an extra-marital sexual affair with Jill LaGasse.
- For approximately five months, Thomas engaged in sexual intercourse with both his wife, Mary, and with LaGasse.
- Mary was unaware of the affair during this five-month period.
- In the spring of 1989, Mary confronted Thomas with her suspicions, at which point he admitted the affair and stated he wanted a divorce.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas Neal filed a divorce action against Mary Neal in an Idaho magistrate's court.
- Mary Neal filed a counterclaim seeking a divorce and also asserting tort claims for damages against Thomas Neal.
- The magistrate's court transferred the tort claims to the district court, as they were beyond the magistrate's jurisdiction.
- The district court bifurcated the proceedings, remanding the divorce issues to the magistrate and retaining jurisdiction over the tort claims.
- Mary Neal filed an amended pleading in the district court, adding Thomas's mistress, Jill LaGasse, as a party.
- Thomas Neal and Jill LaGasse filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The district court accepted outside evidentiary materials, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Thomas Neal and Jill LaGasse, dismissing all of Mary Neal's tort claims.
- Mary Neal, as the appellant, appealed the district court's dismissal to the Idaho Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Do tort claims for interference with a marital relationship, emotional distress from fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease without proof of actual exposure, and battery based on a spouse's undisclosed infidelity state a valid cause of action under Idaho law?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Walters
No. The claims for interference with the marital relationship, emotional distress, and battery do not constitute valid causes of action under these facts. The court extended the rationale from O’Neil v. Schuckardt, which abolished the tort of alienation of affections, to also abolish the related tort of criminal conversation. The court reasoned that such 'heart balm' torts are susceptible to abuse, often used for vindictive purposes, and undermine rather than protect the institution of marriage. Regarding the emotional distress claim for fear of contracting sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), the court established that for such a fear to be legally reasonable and compensable, the plaintiff must demonstrate actual exposure to a disease-causing agent; a mere possibility of exposure is insufficient. Finally, the court rejected the battery claim, holding that Mary's consent to sexual intercourse was valid because Thomas's deception about his fidelity was a 'collateral matter' that acted as an inducement to consent, rather than a mistake about the 'essential character' of the physical act itself.
Concurring - Acting Judge Silak
No. While concurring in the result, this opinion disagrees with the majority's reasoning on the battery claim's consent analysis. The proper analysis under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B(2) is whether there was a substantial mistake concerning the extent of the harm to be expected. A spouse's infidelity could constitute such a substantial mistake if it actually exposed the other spouse to the harm of an STD. However, because the record shows no evidence that anyone was actually exposed to or infected with an STD, the mistake was not substantial enough to vitiate consent, and the battery claim therefore fails for lack of harm.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Idaho's move away from archaic 'heart balm' torts by formally abolishing the cause of action for criminal conversation, viewing it as an anachronism rooted in the idea of spousal property rights. Significantly, the case establishes a stringent 'actual exposure' requirement for claims involving fear of contracting a disease, creating a high bar for plaintiffs in such cases and aiming to prevent a flood of litigation based on speculative fears. The court's analysis of consent in the battery context reinforces a narrow view of what constitutes a 'substantial mistake,' distinguishing between fraud as to the nature of the act and fraud as to collateral matters like fidelity, which impacts how such claims can be framed in future litigation.
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